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Lee Push to Asia 
1. "The Push to Asia" and the Australian Media Response: An Outline of the 
Issue. 
In 1989 the Garnaut Report appeared arguing Australian trade would have to take 
on a new Asian focus. 1 The Hawke Government began to impleme~t its 
recommendations in 1990-91. But it was not until the ascendancy of the Keating 
administration that in 1992 the Federal Government launched a major national 
initiative to integrate Australia more closely with the Australian-Pacific Region. 
Various federal politicians and departmental spokesperscns argued with a great 
deal of urgency that "Asia" was a potential economic lifeline for Australia well into 
the 21st Century. Federal Minister Dawkins said the time had come for Australia "to 
be enmeshed with the dynamism of the Asian-Pacific region". Prime Minister 
Keating addressing the region said Australia was "a friend you can rely on". Foreign 
Minister Evans said we were "not Asian but alongside Asia".2 
The Federal Government initiative called for a reorientation of our national 
economic focus towards the Asian-Pacific Region. The urgency of the issue implied 
a major revolution in our way of interacting and communicating with the region at 
all levels. Apart from commerce, trade and investment, there were calls to overhaul 
cultural and educational exchanges, to rethink defence, foreign policy and regional 
security issues, and most importantly, for the Australian me~ia to "get on board" by 
giving greater emphasis to reporting the region in a fair, accurate, comprehensive 
and positive light. 
In short, the Federal Government was calling for not just individuals to take up the 
Asian challenge but for key institutions to accept that they had a responsibility in 
helping the Federal Government's new Asia-Pacific agenda to succeed. Beyond 
this lay a somewhat rhetorical clarion call for all Australians to readjust the very way 
we as a nation consider our place within the region. A re-examining of the self-
image of :a shared national identity, even a deeper questioning of long held and 
long cherished notions of national values - real and mythical, was not beyond the 
pale. This process of self-reflection and redefining was about breaking down 
barriers between Australian economic and financial markets and the region. The 
immediate and even the medium to long-term key objectives were persistently 
defined as Australian business, industry, goods and services finding a niche, a 
1 Garnaut Report,Austra/ia and the North East Asian Ascendency, AGPS, Canberra, 1989. 
2
Pattrice de Beer, 'Australia- 'white tribe of Asia's' dilemma,' Guardian Weekly, 7.3.93, p.16. 
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place in the sun, a market share, within the "greater Asia" marketplace. 
Definitions of where this "greater Asia" was exactly were many and varied, to the 
point that some began to argue that public references to "Asia" were quickly 
degenerating into a cliche at best, and a disguise for a new "cargo cult" mentality 
at worst. Amidst confusion and conflict in the public mind, accusations arose that 
the "Push to Asia" was being driven by the hidden persuaders, the "economic 
rationists", who had kept economics at the forefront of the political debate and 
media commentary in Australia. 3 That aside, there was still a general agreement 
that "Asia", (now akin to motherhood), would become the economic powerhouse of 
the 21st century and the region of the globe from where most growth and 
investment was expected to occur in the immediate future. Australia's nirvana! 
To convey this message to the Australian people and to the region itself, the 
Federal Government has sought to enlist the support of the Australian media in a 
campaign for greater regional integration. It has also sought to influence the way 
the Australian media projects images of Australia to the region and the way it 
projects the images of Asia to the Australian people, be they newspaper and 
magazine readers, radio listeners or television viewers. 
This Working Paper for the Edith Cowan University Centre for Asian 
Communications and Media Studies seeks to examine the ways in which the 
Australian media has responded to the Federal Government's "Push to Asia". A 
focus of this paper will be the media coverage surrounding the Prime Minister Paul 
Keating 's two major regional tours in Asia during 1992. The first tour was in April 
and focused on Australian-Indonesian relations. The second tour was in September 
and focused on Australian-Japanese relations. 
The methodology employed in this paper will be through content analysis. It will 
survey and sample some of the leading domestic press coverage, concentrating on 
page one headlines, editorials, features and commentary by leading columnists. 
Where possible reference will be made to the electronic media. A more detailed 
study would naturally sub-divide the media more closely. It would distinguish to a 
greater extent than here, between reports by foreign editors, Asian specialists, 
overseas-based correspondents and general political reporters. It would also 
examine the angle presented by business and trade-related journalists within their 
specialist columns and supplements as opposed to coverage in the general news 
3see Kenneth Davidson, 'Heroes and Heritics', Age, 17.6.93, p.13. 
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reports. 
Thus this paper will inevitably fall short of a comprehensive press and media 
overview. It seeks to position the examples cited within the context of a pre-existing 
press debate about Australian-Asian foreign (and economic) relations and the 
related issue of Australian-Asian media relations. 
2. The Historical Background of Australian-Asian Relations. 
(a) Redefining .. Asia .. in the wake of the renewed .. Push to Asia ... 
When we talk of Australia's economic "Push to Asia" it immediately raises the 
question of "where is Asia?". Most contemporary commentators stress that 
geographically speaking Asia is so broad that the term "Asians" defies 
homogeneity.4 Within each Asian country ther~ is usually a cultural, ethnic and 
religious diversity that renders any universal application of what should be the 
appropriate Australian response to "Asia" confusing at best. In short, there is not 
one "Asia", but many. As Viberto Selochan, has pointed out, " ... many Australians 
see Southeast Asia as an amorphorous mass, and fail to take into account the 
myriad differences between and within the countries of the region". He noted the 
warning from fellow scholar Robin Lim, that in international politics, "thinking in 
stereotypes about other countries is a deeply ingrained habit". 5 
But in answering the question with which "Asia" does Australia now seeks to 
identify itself economically, attention is usually drawn to the numerous press articles 
in the business, features and foreign trade sections of the daily papers, ministerial 
papers and keynote addresses at home, while abroad the supportive evidence is 
provided by the OECD forecasts, IMF papers and the international press. Within all 
of these sources one can find evidence supporting the view, firstly, that the East 
and Northeast Asian regions, secondly, the Southeast Asian nations of ASEAN, 
and thirdly, the Asian-Pacific region as a whole, are the projected growth areas into 
4For example DFAT staffers are regulars here. Paul Callaghan, talk to Monash CSEAS, November 
1992, where he argued semi-rhetorically that "there was no such thing as Asia" and Alison 
Broinowski's similarly all-encompassing definition of "Asia" at the Centre for Independent Journalism 
Seminar on Foreign Affairs Reporting, State Library, NSW, 1992. 
5Viberto Selochan, 'New Directions and New Thinking in Australia-Southeast Asia Relations', 
Centre for the Study of Australia-Asia Relations, working paper No. 62, at Introduction, p.1. 
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the 21st Century. 6 
This then is the starting point for a line of thinking that projects that should Australia 
successfully harness itself through reciprocal trading arrangements to these 
regions, ultimately, we stand a better chance of prospering in the future. One 
leading advocate of this "Push to Asia" strategy is Foreign Minister Senator Evans. 
He paints the broad picture with the view, "Given that Australian exports to 
Southeast and Northeast Asia now make up 59% of our total exports, Asian 
economic growth constitutes the most important single external factor influencing 
Australia's prospects." 7 As one press commentator noted, our existing trade 
surplus with Asia "bailed us out" of our trade deficit imbalances with the EC and US. 
But once we move away from generalising about the region strong differences of 
opinion inevitably emerge over the weighting of importance of the individual 
countries. Writer Mike Ticher in ·~From Yellow Peril to Main Game", a special 
supplement for Australian Left Review in August 1992, pointed out the enormous 
discrepancies between the nations of East and Southeast Asia. He queried whether 
the Asian 'basket-cases' (Philippines, Burma?) were as appealing to us as the 
Asian 'powerhouses' (Malaysia, Thailand?) or the Asian 'tigers' (Taiwan, Korea?). a 
In the same supplement, Rowan Gallick, a regular correspondent for the Financial 
Review in Pacific affairs, bemoaned that the target countries for our "Asia thrust" 
had "lurked unstated", in much of the copious media commentary, until The 
Australian newspaper's foreign editor Greg Sheridan had identified Malaysia, 
Thailand and the Philippines as of prime concern.9 Yet, Gallick noted, it is 
commonly understood that Japan, ,Korea and Taiwan are also vital, if not primary, 
elements of Australia's desired expansion into the region. Others, of course, have 
identified China as the leading hope for our future prosperity. 
This confusion suggested, although we could narrow down "Asia" to a favoured 
shortlist of trading partners, the broader problems of definition still remained. When 
6 For example see Richard Nixon, 'Run free with the Asian tigers to avoid poverty traps', The 
Australian, 8.1 .92, p.9 and Special Report, 'Asia's high tech quest, Can the tigers compete 
worldwide', International Business Week, 30. 11.92. 
7 Gareth Evans, 'AUSTRALIA IN ASIA: AN OVERVIEW, Australia links capabilities to regional 
growth,' Asia Today, (Sydney), October 1992, p.11. 
8 Mike Ticher, 'Into Asia?', introduction to the 'From Yellow Peril to Main Game' supplement, 
Australian Left Review, No. 142, August 1992, pp. 26-40, at p.26. 
9 Rowan Gallick, 'So Long SOPAC', Australian Left Review, No. 142, August 1992, at p. 29. 
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answering the question of what we mean by 11Asia .. ,· Ticher argued the 
contemporary assumption was one that defined it in terms of potential economic 
advantage whereby countries like India and Pakistan would normally rate inclusion, 
yet they were .. clearly not what most Australians meant when they use the t13rm ... If 
confirmation was needed, the Indian High Commissioner to Australia recently 
stated, .. there can be no Asia without an India, just as there can be no Europe 
without an Italy ... 1 0 His comment was a belated acknowledgement of the apparent 
marginalisation of South Asia and the Indian sub-continent in the current media 
flurry and excitement over Asia.11 
But if India was not quite the Asia that the Australian media sought refuge within, 
for some writers it seemed, neither was the Pacific. In Ticher's viewpoint the Pacific 
Islands failed to match Keating's idea of the .. dynamic, populous and booming 'Asia' 
with which we should be associated ... 12 Callick saw just such a view as 
shortsighted, even counterproductive. In this context he noted Sheridan writing in 
The Australian in support of the Federal Government's .. Asianisation .. strategy, at 
one stage, advocated Australia's .. disengagement .. from the South Pacific ostensibly 
because of the Pacific's remoteness from the .. Main Game ... 13 For Callick, such a 
viewpoint, .. overlooked our dependence on trade, which today meant truly world 
trade, and our relationship with the region which constituted our only sphere of 
influence: the South Pacific ... 14 
By way of example Callick pointed to our loss of Fiji's petroleum oil import market to 
Malaysia, to the detriment of both Australian exporters and Fijian consumers.15 
Callick argued this loss of market demonstrated· the shallowness of the .. Sheridan 
viewll which he saw as linked to the 110ne-track· mind 11 of the ucanberra coterie II that 
10 Speech to the 'Media Images' of Asia/Australia: Cross-Cultural Reflections' conference, 
University o·f Canberra, November 27-28th 1992. 
11When the Australian Foreign Minister opened the India-Australia Institute at LaTrobe University in 
1992 not one journalist could muster enough interest to raise a question when prompted by the 
Chair. More media attention was devoted on the day to the anti-Evans demonstration mounted by 
East Timor activists outside the official function. 
12 M. Ticher, op. cit., Australian Left Review, p. 26. 
13 
Greg Sheridan, 'Forget the Pacific minnows, we've got bigger fish to fry', Australian, 15.7 .92, 
p.11. ' 
14 R. Gallick, op. cit., p. 30. 
15 
R. Gallick, op. cit., p. 30. 
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snubs the South Pacific Forum. The Canberra lobby were said to have ignored our 
unique role in supporting the security and defence of our Pacific neighbours (with 
Australian made patrol boats), ignored the fact that the Pacific is an ideal "nursery" 
for Australian exporters and forgotten that Oceania is the largest long term 
employment destination for expatriates from· Australia. Gallick believed that if 
Australia couldn't maintain its influence in the Pacific, where it has a head start, it 
was unlikely to crack the Asian "Main Game".16 
The inference was therefore that Prime Minister Keating, along with like-minded 
people in the media, were fostering a particular kind of mental map or image onto 
the Australian electorate as to where Asia was and who constituted it. For Ticher 
and Gallick this image of Asia was one that fitted the bill only on some occasions. It 
was one that became associated as much with values and opportunities as much 
as it did with simple questions of geography. Of the two, Gallick proved the most 
vitriolic and remained highly critical of those who wished to impose any specific 
Asian framework onto Australia's regional aspirations. He identified a particular 
creed behind this new design with his passing comment, "For the new 'Main Game' 
is simply the old 'Yellow Peril' inverted. For inscrutable, untrustworthy, inferior, read 
today hard-working, cohesive, superior - especially in economic affairs. It is no 
coincidence that this formula comes from the Canberra team that bought us 
'economic rationalism'." 17 
Thus the Philippines could be described as a source of cheap labour and tax-free 
haven. Alternatively, it was a nation of depressed economic circumstances imposed 
by a corrupt military elite. Its position within the Australian media constructions of 
the "push to Asia" thus involved personal value judgements that could be derived 
from perceived economic objectives or a desire to foster a harmonious bilateral 
relationship fulfilling the needs and aspirations of both Australians and Filopinos. 
Seldom could one have both objectives in mind. And yet 'economic rationalists' 
argue this is precisely the objective - to raise living standards by injecting Australian 
capital into the depressed, low wage parts of Asia. 
But in this context the Philippines may rate exclusion from this 'mental map' of Asia 
for reasons other than the level of its GNP or growth rate. If it has in common with 
16As Australian journalist Jemima Garrett noted recently, the South Pacific Forum may soon turn to 
Asia itself through the infrastructure of APEC membership. See 'The Asian Connection', Pacific 
Island Monthly, November 1992, p. 9. 
17 R. Gallick, op. cit., p. 29. 
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say, India or Fiji, a work ethic perceived as inferior to that which the Canberra 
"rationalists" sought to emulate with the more disciplined economies of Japan, 
Taiwan and Singapore for example. In such a case, Canberra could be said to be 
seeking an image of Asia that relates more directly to its own domestic economic 
agendas, or at least those values that the "economic dries" see as their Asian 
panacea.18 
(b) "Asia" and the Contemporary Debate over .. National Identity". 
But just assuming that Canberra was correct in strategic terms with its quest to 
identify Australia with one main focus in Asia. There still remained other dangers of 
projecting a closed-ended image of Asia as the "Main Game". Assuming there was 
agreement in Australia of roughly where we meant when we talked of Asia, and of 
whom we were dealing with when we talked of Australia's "shift to Asia". The desire 
to reconcile geographical and economic necessity still had to confront the issue of 
whether Australia as a nation was willing to surrender the entrenched, historically-
grounded, European foundations of its political and cultural institutions.19 
Engrossed in this debate was whether Australians wanted to face the challenge of 
a new Asian imperative if it meant a redefinition of such fundamental tenets as 
national identity. 
Asia has been perceived historically in Australia through European eyes. For 
Europeans, Asia was the "Far East", an unknown 'Other'. Thus for Australians, Asia 
was thought of and imagined from within a similar cultural framework; indeed, 
usually as somewhere "more distant" and "more exotic" than even Europe itself. 
Even for politicians, in the past, it was somewhere to fly over rather than go to. 
Despite geographical proximity to Australia and significant historical encounters 
with our continent, Asia has remained for most Australians, until recently, one of the 
unknown 'Other', along with the other great 'Other', Aboriginal society. Thus the 
Australian understanding of the "East" was said to "conform to an orientalist 
thematic" whereby 'Asia' was seen as essentially different to the "West". It was "its 
18 A number of media commentators, for example Ken Davidson in the Age, persistently relate 
"the push to Asia" with the economic agenda of the "economic rationalists" in the Federal 
bureaucracy of Treasury and their supporters. 
19 See Carolyn Jones, 'Australia risks falling behind in law, human rights, Lessons from Europe', 
Higher Education Supplement, Australian, 27 .1.93, p.16, where Professor Alisdair Davidson 
argued, "while the future presumably lies primarily in Asia economically, the world is becoming more 
Europeanised politically ..... ". 
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opposite or darker side".20 
Throughout 1992, one of the leading media advocates of greater Australian 
engagement with Asia was the (Asian) Regional Secretary of the Department of 
Foreign Affairs and Trade, Alison Broinowski. In her book The Yellow Lady, 
Broinowski draws on Orienta/ism, the seminal text of Edward Said, to exemplify 
how Australia "invented" Asia in the image of certain European myths of the 
Orient.21 In a similar vein, a recent paper by Donald Horne reflected back on the 
"Living with Asia" chapter from his mid-sixties book The Lucky Country. Horne 
pointed out that Australians "conceptualised" a number of different visions of Asia 
as part of establishing our relations with Asia. He argued the "gamut of attitudes", 
from good to bad, still existed. He advocated a continual"reconceptualisation" as a 
means of breaking away from the negative stereotypes.22 
Underlying the question Horne has posed of how we need to constantly 
(re)conceptualise Asia lies another debate. This concerns the current reworking in 
the domestic sphere of Australian national identity in a way that now accepts and 
incorporates the vision of Australia as a 'multicultural society•.23 By the1990s, after 
two decades of debate, the political consensus was now settling in favour of a 
multicultural society. As if to show how far the debate has moved on, the most 
recent challenge to notions of a continuing Anglo-Saxon hegemony over national 
identity revolves around whether "traditional" Australia will now accept a 
multicultural mix with an in-built Asian ascendency.24 In the light of this trend, there 
has been no shortage of press articles arguing over the composition of our future 
immigration intake. Into this milieau Keating launched his "Push to Asia" quest in 
early 1992. But political fears and anxiety of losing the electoral 'middle ground' 
here was said to explain why the Federal Government projected a tougher media 
20 Julie Stephens 'Butterflies, china dolls and temptresses: imagining 'Asian' women', a review of 
The Yellow Lady: Australian Impressions of Asia by Alison Broinowski, Australian Women's Book 
Review, Vol. 4, No.3, September 1992, pp.16-18 at p.16. 
21Julie Stephens, Australian Women's Book Review, ibid., pp.16-18. 
22 Donald Horne, 'Reconceptualising Australia', The Sydney Papers, Vol. 4 No.3, Winter 1992, p. 
2. 
23 See Stephen Castles et. al., Mistaken Identity, Pluto Press, Sydney, 1988. 
24 A~ example of the opening up of this debate can be found in a report on Population 
Conference in the September 1992 issue of Asia Report Magazine, (F. Chong, ed., Sydney). 
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image in its response to Asian new 'boat people' seeking refugee status. 
A Saulwick Poll of April 1992 found that some 70% of Australians wanted to remain 
separate from Asia, while a similar number of those polled thought Asians felt the 
same way about Australians. Alison Broinowski examined the poll from the reverse 
perspective, revealing over a quarter of all Australians already perceived 
themselves as part of Asia and believed we were seen as such by our neighbours. 
Yet from the Australian media's point of view the poll was interpreted as a rejection 
of Keating's "push to Asia" strategy.25 In opposition to this view Broinowski argued, 
" .... that (such a result) was not what the poll proved. The PM had talked about 
Australia's growing engagement with Asia in trade and investment, defence and 
peacekeeping- what we are doing. The Saulwick poll talked about national identity 
- who we are." 26 
Broinowski identified Keating himself as having contributed to the media's confusion 
over the two separate issues as he frequently ran them together as though they 
were one issue. She cited his April 1992 address to the Asia-Australia Institute 
where Keating said, "Menzies-style Anglophilia was holding Australia back from 
realising its destiny as an Asian-Pacific nation". Again in Jakarta, .with his remarks 
about the flag which implied "republicanism was a means of gaining acceptance in 
Asia". Broinowski reflected that the loudest opponents of these remarks were 
people (conservative Constitutional monarchists in the business community?) who 
wanted Australia to "come to terms" with Asia (for economic reasons), but don't 
intend to do so themselves (culturally). She argued from this observation that those 
who harp on our ineptitude in Asia maybe pursuing a new form of "cultural cringe". 
27 
In one press column in mid-April 1992 the Sydney Morning Herald foreign editor 
Warren Osmond seemed to agree with this Broinowski criticism. Headed, "Keating's 
25 The Sydney Morning Herald positioned the poll result on page one, immediately opposite its lead 
article where Keating was outlining our "Asian destiny" in the context of his Indonesian visit. See 
'Don't flirt with Asia', Sydney Morning Herald, 21.4.92. 
26 A. Broinowski, 'Beyond the Cringe', Australian Left Review, op. sit., p.27. The subtlety of this was 
lost on Stuart Littlemore on his Media Watch comment on the Saulwick poll that "Mr Keating is 
attempting to lead Australian opinions rather than reflecting established perceptions." One could 
argue that is what is expected of a Prime Minister? 
27 A. Broinowski, op. cit., ALR, p.27. A classic example here was the comment on Alan Jones' 
2UE report (loc. cit.) where Jones sings out the growth rates of the Asian "tigers" (all nearly double 
figures) and then heaves a sign of disgust at Australia's miserable 0.5% growth rate. 
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foreign policy cliches", the Osmond article argued, "Keating has no developed view 
of the world, and so far he has sketched only two themes in search of a foreign 
policy. The first is his anti-British outlook; incipient republicanism; the second is an 
"Asia First", or, more vaguely, "Asia-Pacific First" future for Australian foreign policy, 
which merely repeated in a low grade way the Hawke-Evans policy legacy." 
Osmond contended this amounted to support for a "de facto Eurasian" society; one 
that was able to "trade more successfully with Asia and better survive a breakdown 
of GATT". He concluded, "The Hawke-Keating policy eschewed the identity 
question and tightly focused on Australia's feasible roles as a middle-level 
diplomatic power with vital Jinks to many world regions, not just one." 28 
Broinowski grounded her pro-Asianist optimism here on the historical factor. She 
maintained there were Australians who wanted to "come to terms" with Asia ever 
since 1788. Trade and migration between Australia and Asia existed from the 
earliest days of European settlement. As mere colonies of the expansive British 
Empire contact with the other Asian members of the British family such as China, 
Fiji, India and elsewhere was common. The historical connection was taken up 
elsewhere in the media. Professor Bolton pointed out in his 1992 Boyer Lectures 
that Australia sold horses to India and sandalwood to China in the 1840s. Bolton 
argued: "these industries (the horses kept going to India for a century) show that 
Australia has been quite aware of the South and East Asian markets for 
considerably longer than the past few years".29 
But the historical break from Asia was also widely commented upon. The end of 
colonialism, marked by Australia's Federation in 1900, saw the erection of tariff 
barriers and the White Australia Policy. This marked a retreat from Asia. Japanese 
traders and others were compelled to desist from contact with the new Australia. 
But Broinowski builds on this legacy to position Australia as having a distinctive 
place as .the gradual decline of European colonial domination in Asia proceeded 
throughout the 20th Century. She noted how we began to accept the decline of 
Empire but still hedged our bets with the new uncertainties imposed upon us by 
geography. Our inherited Anglo-Saxon superiority lingered in the post-colonial era 
28 Warren Osmond, 'Keating's foreign policy cliches', Sydney Morning Herald, 13.4.92. 
29 Jamie Collins, 'The lie in Advance Australia Fair', Higher Education Supplement, The Australian, 
18.11.92, p.16, reporting on Boyer lectures by Pofessor Bolton. 
12 9/2/93 
Lee Push to Asia 
with the foreign policy ideal of "helping Asians less fortunate than ourselves". 30 
Parts of Asia then became an insurance policy for us against communism. 
Broinowski explained how this failure to break from the colonial vision of Asia has 
left us with a "bifurcated" vision: where "defence and foreign policy in the North 
Atlantic" was awkwardly balanced with "trade and investment in the Western 
Pacific". Hence, she suggests, this was why there was no move by Australia to 
exclude the US and Canada from the APEC grouping in 1989. Nor had we broken 
away from the "Europeans and Others Group" at the United Nations.31 In a 
separate article she argued " ... such concepts as the Third World, North-South, the 
Western Alliance and so on were rooted not in rational appraisal of today's world 
but in atavistic, archetypal beliefs in selfhood and Otherness .... West means what 
represents us, and East means them ....... 32 
Broinowski's criticisms of our colonial legacy were nowhere more clearly expressed 
than in our treatment of refugees. As Melbourne academic Julie Stephens pointed 
out: "The year [1992] has brought other paradoxes. Like a mantra, the new 
government and business axiom that we are now 'part of Asia' is repeated with 
monotonous and meaningless regularity. Yet images of Cambodian refugees in all-
but-wire cages (another form of Australian greeting) raise questions about which 
'Asia' it is that we are supposed to be part of. Keating's patting of the Queen seems 
to have prompted more discussion about reshaping Australian links with the region 
than either the predicament of 'Asian' refugees here in Australia or, indeed, the 
massacre in East Timor." 33 
But while Broinowski remained the Yellow Lady, a sceptical, conscience and critic 
of Australia's inadequate responses to Asia in the past, she did surprisingly 
acknowledge some progress at the government level during 1992. She argued the 
Keating ~overnment's 'Push to Asia' was moving beyond mere rhetoric and that, 
300ne wonders whether encoded here is a rationalisation for Australia ditching its program of free 
· education for overseas students for the current "marketplace-driven" full cost recovery 
arrangements. 
31 A. Broinowski, op.cit., Australian Left Review, pp. 27-28. 
32A. Broinowski, 'The Yellow Lady and Asia', The Sydney Papers, Vol. 4, No.3, Winter 1992, p. 
27. 
33 J. Stephens, op. cit., p. 17. As a number of writers have noted, the reception of refugees here 
could well relate to a White Man inability to come to terms with the original dispossession of the 
Aboriginals. 
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while Asia will always be a place where "history versus geography and Western 
tradition versus Asia-Pacific location" collide with one another within Australian 
thinking, the recent endorsement of "Asia literacy" at a government level could be 
perceived as an honest attempt to "redefine" and "rediscover" our place in Asia.34 
Part of this process Broinowski noted elsewhere, jnvolved the other side of 'cultural 
exchange' where she advocated that Australian culture (as opposed to its European 
roots) should receive greater exposure in Asia itself. 35 
But in attempting to grapple with the current Australian confusion over "national 
identity" and "self image" from within the government bureaucracy Broinowski could 
be criticised for retreating into the language and rhetoric of the 'economic 
rationalists'. At one point she argued if we projected ourselves as "failures" and 
"antipodeans" towards Asia we would be seen as such. She argued from this point 
that Australians were not "antipodeans" or "Asians" but "members of the Asia-
Pacific hemisphere", who, if they decided to do it, could become the world's leading 
resource-nation on "Asian" affairs by the end of the decade. Thus she felt it was 
"antipodean to see as barriers what are in fact opportunities". On this point 
Broinowski concluded "we don't have to lift the barriers: what we have to lift is our 
game."36 
But has Broinowski here become an unwitting partner in the very "cultural cringe" 
she has urged others to throw off? Is she endorsing a government, business and 
media led Asia strategy in a disguised capitulation to a 'minimalist' position? 
Prominent among her critics was the Melbourne academic and feminist Julie 
Stephens who suggested praise for The Yellow Lady in the popular press, in its 
highlighting Australian cultural ignorance of Asia, served to complement, rather than 
challenge, the narrow economism of the Keating led "Push to Asia" agenda. 
Stephens. maintained that Keating had no qualms in supporting a ditching of the 
non-profitable sentimentality of British colonial rituals (history) in order to "come to 
terms" with the profitable markets of Asian capital (geography). In doing so, Keating 
wished to ignore other aspects of our historical links with Asia, such as solidarity 
between the Australian working class and the exploited workers of Asia, epitomised 
34 A. Broinowski, ALR, op. cit., p. 28. 
35 Also reported in the Financial Review article. 
36 A. Broinowski, op. cit., paper, International Development Programme Conference, Canberra, 
November 1992. 
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by the wharfies strikes for Indonesian independence in the late 1940s, and again, 
against Japanese militarism over Manchuria. These aspects of Australian-Asian 
relations, were coincidentally, according to Stephens, passed over in a superficial 
way by the popular press reviewers of Broinowski's book. Instead, they centred on 
her "culturally" orientated study, a focus which Stephens felt gave too much 
limelight to the racist luminaries of Australia's "Asianist" pioneers, (such as artist 
Norman Lindsay), and offered insufficient weight to the those Australians who were 
consciously anti-racists and anti-imperialist. 37 
In short, Stephens felt the Broinowski cultural focus on Asia served as a distraction, 
in a way that disguised the negative aspects of Keating's economic agenda, 
namely, the ensuring that the anti-imperialist tradition was written out of 
contemporary Australian-Asian relations. Thus behind the all-embracing rhetoric of 
the "Push to Asia", encapsulated in the thousand "cultural" blossoms of the Yellow 
Lady (book), was a priority given over to the cementing of contacts between the 
Australian and Asian elites in place of genuine people-to-people contacts. Thus the 
prevailing view of "national interest" placed government-to-government and 
business-to-business contacts within the region as the key indispensable focus of 
the Asian-Australian exchange. 38 Some would no doubt defend this as the natural 
order of things or as a true reflection of the power distribution within society. Others 
would argue this connection is a debasement of the true meaning of cultural 
exchange and can only proceed in the interests of the few and against the 
democratic interest of the many. 39 
*The English Language Debate. 
Another area of concern was the perception that the "push to Asia" involved the 
loss of a shared European cultural and educational heritage. This issue came to the 
fore as part of the media debate over changing the Australian flag early in 1992 
37 J. Stephens, op. cit., p.18. 
38 As P.J. Boyce noted in his introduction to Diplomacy in the Marketplace: Australia in World Affairs 
1981-90, p.1, "From the accession to power of the first Hawke Labor Government in March 1983 
external policy meant primarily foreign economic policies, and the issues addressed were interfaced 
with domestic economic issues to an unprecedented degree." 
39 
An instructive press article here would be Humphrey McQueen, 'Indonesia's noble Solzhenitsyn', 
Weekend Australian, 22-23.2.93, p. 32. The Australian-Indonesian Institute refused to fund the 
translation of one of Indonesia's best writers because he was a former political prisoner and it may 
have embarrassed the Indonesian Government to have supported him. McQueen concluded that 
cultural exchange was sacrificed in order to avoid any potential disruption to bilateral trade. See 
later. 
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during the Keating visit to Indonesia. Media debate on the flag and Republican 
issues aside, the issue was also fought out in a range of articles in the Higher 
Education Supplement of Wednesday's Australian newspaper over the push for 
more Asian language teaching in secondary and tertiary institutions. Here the 
concept of Asian languages, taught and spoken in Australian society as a whole, in 
addition to their use as a tool in Asian business dealings, was perceived by some 
commentators as a threat to our mother tongue, the English language. 
Within the 'traditionalist' camp were Professors John Passmore and lachlan 
Chipman who saw Australia losing more than it would gain in ditching our English 
and European scholarship.40 The 'Asianist' camp promoted the concept of 'cultural 
exchange' between Australia and Asia arguing both continents would become more 
aware of their respective cultural heritages. In an article from the Financial Review, 
'Towards regional cultural exchange', the head of the English School at the 
University. of WA, Associate Professor Bruce Bennett, was quoted from his address 
to the International Development Programme Conference in Canberra in November 
1992. He outlined the necessity for changes to the existing Australian literature and 
books on Asia which were currently "typified by characters doing little more than 
exploring Asia". The Bennett thesis maintained that a deeper understanding of Asia 
would allow a deeper understanding of our own culture in a way that would be 
"enhancing rather than diminishing our sense of cultural independence from the old 
and middle masters of our destiny" .41 
The Bennett argument thus rejected the notion that the "Push to Asia" was a new 
form of "cultural cringing",42 preferring to see it as a liberating force from the 
existing one espoused by the 'traditionalists' and the 'Anglophiles'. Bennett also 
pushed the issue beyond the 'cargo cult' mentality of those who pictured Asia only 
in terms of pure economic advantage claiming this vision fell short of a true cultural 
exchang~. He argued: "language and culture are inseparable. It is not surprising 
therefore, that national cultural studies (of both Australia and Asia) are emerging as 
an essential point of entry to those understandings which a narrow belief in 
40 See A. Broinowski, op. cit., IDP Conference, Canberra, November 1992. 
41 M. DWyer, 'T awards regional cultural exchange', Financial Review, 24.11.92. 
42 The "cultural cringe" argument was put consistently in the media by ALP back-bencher from 
Kalgoorlie WA, Graham Campbell . 
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commerce and trade denies." 43 
Queensland academic Martin Stuart-Fox saw the problem as more related to the · 
fallacious attempts to even define "Asia" or Australian national "identity" as fixed 
concepts. He argued national identity was something that was always fluid or in 
"perpetual evolution". He argued, " .... just as there is no monolithic 'Asia' threatening 
cultural imperialism (over Australia), there is no reified Australian 'cultural identity' 
which we should or can preserve like some exotic insect in amber". Fox argued the 
real danger was the opposite. Asian ethnic minorities in Australia, like other ethnic 
groups, are more at risk that they will lose their cultural diversity and be swallowed 
up by the dominant Australian values.44 Indeed, a number of Asian countries have 
been reported in the Australian press as fearing for the survival of their own cultural 
heritage because of the all-pervasiveness of the English language.45 
In an article that attempted to find a middle ground on the foreign language issue, 
Florence Chong wrote in The Australian in December 1992, "If the Federal 
Government's goal in moving towards compulsory Asian language learning makes 
young Australians more sensitive to Asian cultures, it's a goal worth pursuing". But, 
she argued, it was "potentially dangerous" to force the issue as "some talkback 
radio reaction has revealed how sensitive the issue of compulsory foreign language 
learning is". Chong maintained, in terms of business exchanges with Asia, the 
advantage of speaking a foreign tongue was a "flawed" argument. The article, 
headed "Cash talks louder than bad Japanese", noted Asian businesses were 
happy to work through interpreters, provided "etiquette and common courtesy" were 
observed by Australians while engaged in business dealings.46 
But the language debate has continued. In a speech to a conference on Australian 
trade with the emerging market economies of Eastern Europe in April 1993 Tim 
Fischer, ~he National Party head, described the Australian Government emphasis 
43This dual exposure to Asian and Australian Studies was a dominant theme of The Australian 
newspaper's grappling with the issue. See James Mackie, 'East and West: the best of both worlds, 
Australian , 15.12.92, p.11 and Martin Thomas 'Two-way street to Asia', Australian, 16.12.92, p. 14. 
44 Martin Stuart-Fox, 'Engaging "Asia" ', Asian Studies Review, Vol.16, No.3, pp.95-99. Fellow 
academic Alan Healy was more critical of the academic profession and their Eurocentrism - see his 
letter 'Scholars are blind to Asia', Sydney Morning Herald, 27.4.92, p.12. 
45 
See Andre Malan, East is East - but English is universal', West Australian, 16.1 0.92, p. 1 1. 
46 
Florence Chong, 'Cash talks louder than bad Japanese', The Australian , 16.12.92, p. 9. 
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on Asian languages as "wrong-headed".47 The Age played up the paranoic aspect 
of this issue with the heading "Fischer wars on push for Asian tongues". 48 This 
headline overstated the divisiveness of the Fischer position as he h~~ asserted 
merely that language teaching alone would not improve trade without the 
simultaneous ··understanding of cu1ture. Further, Fischer did not oppose Asian 
language teaching as such. He was, however, critical of the an overemphasis on 
them to the detriment of European languages which he argued were easier to learn 
and perhaps just as rewarding to the Australian economy. 
3. The Australian-Asian Media Relations. 
(a) The Historical Straight-jacket: Structural limitations on Reporting Asia. 
Media analyst Rod Tiffen argued that news coverage of Asia tells us as much about 
Australia as it does about Asia. Up until 1975, Cold War concerns dominated. Asian 
nationalism, problems of nation building, post-war colonial legacies, were all 
ignored or distorted by the Australian media. But Whitlam's visit to China and the 
Vietnam War created the momentum for a coming to terms with the region by the 
1980s at the same time as multiculturalism was gaining acceptance domestically. 
Tiffen argued the media lagged behind public opinion in all these significant 
areas.49 
This lag was partly explained by the fact that, apart from a few notable individual 
efforts, the Australian media never started to discover South East Asia until the mid 
1960s. Journalists, editors and the public at the time were informed through the 
narrow news prism of the domino theory and South East Asia. In the context of the 
Vietnam War and Sukarno's uncertainty, Asia was seen as a time bomb on our 
doorstep. Ironically the region itself outside of Indochina at this time was entering a 
period of unparalleled political stability, "The Suharto era, whose end is not yet 
clearly in· sight, actually began before the Menzies era finished. Lee Kwan Yew 
ruled Singapore for over a quarter of a century. President Marcos reigned in the 
Philippines for 20 years, while Ne Win has outlasted him in Burma. UMNO 
47 Fischer no doubt had noted the hardline emanating from an Ethnic Affairs Commission funded 
NAT I f.oreign language teacher (Ms Bell) who argued on SBS-TV news 4.2.93 that Australians were 
"arrogant" when they refused to learn foreign languages for improved trade relations. 
48 Margaret Easterbrook, 'Fischer wars on push for Asian tongues', Age, 28.4.93, p.l2. 
49 Rod Tiffen, address to Centre for Continuing Education course 'Australia and Asia, Sydney 
University, October 1992. 
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remained the ruling party throughout Malaysia." 50 
According to Tiffen, the Australian media since the 1960s has stereotyped 
persistently the region into four major images: the next domino, the corrupt military 
dictatorship, the latest economic miracle, the exotic E~st. But rather than presenting 
just one of these flawed images constantly, the Australian media "shuffled the 
pack". He offers the example of Thailand. Thailand was presented as a "new tiger" 
or "economic miracle" for a number of years. Then the violence associated with the 
military coup in Bangkok in May 1992 swept onto the front pages and television 
screens against a backdrop of dead silence about the events leading up to it. Thus 
the image of Thailand as "economic miracle" was replaced with "corrupt military 
dictatorship" image. 
When, in the 1990s, the Australian media look at East and Southeast Asia, "the 
security concerns of the sixties have given way to the threats and opportunities of 
the region's economic dynamism" according to Tiffen. In spite of this chang!3, Tiffen 
argues, "the prisms defining newsworthiness, the stimuli to which our media 
respond, are still very narrow". One of the greatest problems here is that the social 
and political changes accompanying economic growth in Asia are seldom explored 
by the Australian media. Hinting at this media superficiality Tiffen asked: "how 
different is Malaysian government and politics now from 20 years ago? What in the 
Australian media prepared us for the strength and courage of the protest movement 
iri Bangkok in mid 1992? Are our media ready for grappling with the onset of the 
post-Suharto politics in Indonesia?" 
Journalist and diplomat Nicholas Jose, after residing in China for some time, 
reflected on the inevitable restraints imposed when writing about Asia. He 
maintained that from the level of the editor's desk there are only three basic stories 
on China: The "free-wheeling Capitalist Road" story, with a focus on Southern 
China and its market potential, the "Oriental communist despot" story, like 
compulsory abortions and fly eradication campaigns to boost the Olympics bid, the 
"freak story", like the giant sturgeon in the Yangtse River that helped to fill the "stay 
in touch" column of the Sydney Morning Herald. 51 Jose argued this format exists 
because newspapers are commercial organisations whose coverage is constrained 
by "what the readership wants". He argued news items on countries like China have 
50 Rod Tiffin, Backgrounder, Vol. 3, No.lO, 5 June 1992, p. 5. 
51 
Nicholas Jose at the 'Asia-Australia: Cross Cultural Media Images' Conference, Canberra, 
November 27-28th 1992. 
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to fit onto the page in a pattern that reflects the pre-existing notions of how the 
readership .. reads .. a particular country. In terms of China this pattern is fixed by 
these three stereotypes. 52 
While the Australian press has a long history of racism and patronising attitudes to 
Asia, Tiffen maintained one of the ironies of the current situation was that the 
contemporary era offered a much improved performance by Australian journalists 
reporting Asia. He argued the degree of professionalism was high. However a 
generally reflection may argue the standard of reporting still varied from one 
journalist to another. Factors that may influence here include whether the journalist 
was resident in Asia, how well-briefed they were, language skills, the experience of 
the journalist, whether they were on assignment in Asia, a whistle-stop tour, part of 
the press contingent of some visiting politician or major event, such as the 
Cambodian elections, and so on. 
The Australian media's reliance on whistle-stop tours of poorly-briefed and 
language-deficient journalists was a .. cost related .. factor argued Paul Kelly, editor of 
the Australian, during a National Press Club address, ....... Australia's current media 
commitment to and coverage of Asia fails to recognise fully its importance to us as 
a nation. We don't have enough journalists in the region. We don't have sufficient 
expertise in its diverse politics, economics and social issues." 53 Kelly identified 
.. scarce resources" as a factor restraining the media from greater coverage of Asian 
affairs. It required $125,000 to $250,000 annually to maintain a foreign post. But 
given the financial crisis that faced the Australian media in the late 1980s, and the 
media's pre-existing commitment to maintain a global coverage, the Asian-Pacific 
region obviously doesn't receive as many resources as it warrants. 54 
Kelly identified a number of other reasons for the failure of the Australian media to 
perform in Asia. One related to their primary responsibility in Australia which is to 
.. lead debate and reflect popular taste... He argued the cultural similarity of Britain 
and America to Australia meant their media were .. more accessible for our 
52 Jose argues that even in the 'up-market' intellectual publications like The Independent 
Monthly you can see the "heavy hands of marketing" at play. 
53paui.Kelly, 'Australian media representations of Asia', Backgrounder, Vol. 3, No. 10,5 June 
1992, p. 2. 
54 P. Kelly, Backgrounder, ibid., p. 2. 
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audiences and, therefore, there is greater consumer demand for this type of 
northern hemisphere foreign coverage". Thus our coverage of Asia is restricted by. 
an inbuilt Eurocentrism in the marketplace as the media must reflect the "cultural 
predilections" of their market. In this context, Kelly argues the Australian media are 
still trying to sort out their own division of responsibility between "leading the 
debate" and "reflecting popular taste. u55 
But despite a perception of an overall increase in professionalism by Australian 
media reportage of Asia, our coverage, particularly when it is critical or hostile to the 
Asian regimes, has remained a very volatile element in bilateral relations with Asia. 
This volatility reflects a definite shift in the power balance within the political arena 
of Asian-Australian relations. It also reflects the increasing power of the media and 
communications industries to agenda-set in an era of rapid technological change. It 
may also reveal how Asian regimes fall for the temptation of invoking Australia's 
colonial past, and "foreign influences" generally, for use as a 'whipping horse' for 
their own domestic policy failures and, in this context, the central role the media 
play in exposing human rights violations makes them especially vulnerable. 
Australian news reports on Asian affairs, despite the reputed professional approach 
of many of the journalists, still faces a surprising plethora of critics not just in Asia 
but in Australia itself. 56 One of the more outspoken was journalist Kalinga 
Seneviratne who claimed the Australian domestic media over recent years were 
permeated by an "Anglo-centric concept of truth" when reporting Asian issues. He 
offered the example of where the Australian media unfairly portrayed Asian migrant 
communities as having imported historical conflicts and ethnic divisions into their 
local community inside Australia.57 Seneviratne outlined an example from his Sri 
Lankan homeland where inter-ethnic strife was reported as existing in Australia 
55 P. Kelly, Backgrounder, ibid., p. 2. 
56Not all critics of the media are politicians, business community or other journalists. Jazz musician 
Graeme Bell castigated the coverage of his band's tour of China. He argued in the June 1990 
newsletter of the Australia-China Friendship Society "Don't take any notice of Peter Ellingsen's 
article in the Sydney Morning Herald and the Age. It was a vicious right-wing bias and complete 
inaccuracy and gave the impression that the audience in Beijing were pushed around by soldiers 
and that we had to be protected. It was all completely untrue .... " 
57 See Kalinga Seneviratne, Paper Foreign Correspondents Seminar, Sydney, September 
1992. See also article by the same author 'Is the Australian media accessible to Diverse 
Viewpoints?', Viva, October 1991, p. 21. 
21 9/2/93 
Lee Push to Asia 
without any evidence. It was just assumed by the media to have occurred. 58 
(b) The Federal Government Response to a Changing Regional Environment 
and Its Impact on Asian-Australian Media Relations. 
The Federal Government has always maintained a media profile throughout Asia 
through its departmental publications. Apart from supplying the Asian media with a 
growing array of publications from the DFAT directly, many other bodies such as 
Austrade, the International Development Program and Australian Tourist 
Commission have their own publicity machines performing a semi-government role 
as roving ambassadors. One acknowledgement of the influence of these bodies 
was when Prime Minister Keating criticised the Australian Tourist Commission 
advertisements screening on television sets throughout Asia. Keating argued the 
continued use of Paul Hogan and Greg Norman as icons sent the "wrong image" of 
Australia to Asia. He argued the revised effort by the ATC would ensure that 
"Asians will see Australia as a land of fine dining, sophisticated shopping, farm life, 
Aboriginal culture and wide open spaces under the catchcry "Australia, the feeling 
is magic"." 59 
The Keating concern for how the images Australia were projected into the region 
was not a one-off comment. It reflected a new government philosophy on Asian-
Australian media exchanges. In a paper presented in 1991 to a Pacific Journalists' 
Conference, DFAT media liaison staffer Sue Boyd outlined how the Federal 
Government had adopted a policy of shifting the emphasis of Australian foreign 
relations more towards the region. In order to do this the government rationalised it 
was important to keep both the Australian public and the Asian region informed 
about policy shifts. Boyd argued when implementing new policies the government 
cannot afford to neglect the media and must keep them fully informed. Hence the 
number of government briefing and background papers, conferences, press liaison 
contacts has increased to match government policy initiatives in the Asian-Pacific 
region. The issue here is whether a journalist snowballed with government 
information will then short-cut any critical investigation of the "Push to Asia" strategy 
58 K. Seneviratne, ibid. 
59Mark Whittaker, 'Gurus trade in Hoges, Norman', Weekend Australian, 29-30.8.92, p. 3. 
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they may be undertaking. 60 
Boyd's defence of a need for greater government input into the media, at a time of 
an increasingly sophisticated and globalised trading environment, was backed up 
by fellow DFAT staffer Sandi Logan, who argued recently: "Challenges such as how 
to influence opinion in an increasingly sophisticated region with access to more 
sources of information have given the Department the opportunity to exploit the 
latest development in communications. DFAT is committed to effective public affairs 
programs in Australia and overseas, mindful that images and perception exert 
considerable influence on attitudes and intentions. In turn this can affect trade and 
other interests. As a consequence, Australia's Asian and Pacific region public 
affairs strategies are designed to deal with the ever-changing and often challenging 
developments of the global village." 61 
Thus, as the current Federal Labor Government re-orientates its foreign economic 
policy towards a more regionalist and Asianist direction, in the light of the 
threatened trade blocs in the Northern Hemisphere, Asian-Australian media 
relations and foreign policy reporting generally are calculated as playing a more 
vital, sensitive, and potentially, a more controversial or disruptive role, in 
Government foreign policy-making.62 Without defining the Australian media as 
being in opposition to the government objectives, the Federal Government now 
seeks to play an activist role in combating the repercussions of any negative 
reporting. Thus there is the tendency to ensure both the journalists covering the 
the region and the public at large are aware of the official view. 
Quite apart from the regular reporting of public speeches and press releases, direct 
contributions to the press on foreign affairs issues, under the name of the Prime 
Minister, Foreign Minister, Defence Minister, Immigration Minister and others, 
positioned on the key editorial and features pages of the press, is now a more 
frequent ·occurrence. As far as the Departmental of Foreign Affairs and Trade is 
60 As Philip Schlesinger points out, government's are often torn between exploiting the "system 
sustaining" potentialities of journalists or containing their "boat rocking qualities", particularly during 
crises. See P. Schlesinger, Media, State, Nation: Political Violence, Collective Identities, London, 
Sage, 1991, p. 3. 
61 Sandi Logan, 'Australia, Asia and the Pacific: Regional Media Issues', Paper at the 
Journalism Education Association Conference, Newcastle, November 29-December 2nd 
1992, University of Newcastle. 
62
See Senator Evans address to the 'Asia-Australia: Cross-Cultural Media Images' Conference, 
Canberra, November 1992. 
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concerned, key officials or ex-officals are encouraged to write articles for everything 
from specialist magazines, trade publications to the daily press in a prolific and 
strategic manner. Former secretary to the DFAT Richard Woolcott in an issue of the 
Financial Review wrote 'Foreign Affairs role defined for the 90s'. The thrust of his 
argument was "Australia is an isolated continent. It is not a member of a large bloc. 
We do not have a powerful neighbour on which to, rely for protection. Our markets 
stretch across the globe. To maintain these existing markets, and to open up new 
ones, will require intensified efforts by both governments and business ... "63 These 
"intensified efforts" undoubtedly involve a closer policing of what the domestic 
media are saying about regional politics. 
In this context, both Richard Woolcott, as outgoing head of the DFAT and Alison 
Broinowski, as Head of the Asian Regional section of the DFAT, maintained a high 
media profile throughout the government's "Push to Asia" 1992 crusade. Woolcott's 
role emerged most clearly in his June 1992 address to the Sydney Institute where 
he made a head-on assault on the media critics of the Federal Government's policy 
over East Timor and Indonesia. He complained that critics of the government were 
inaccurate, had misplaced priorities and were given too much space by the media. 
His comments were written up extensively in the Sydney Morning Herald, the 
Australian and elsewhere, in the form of both feature articles and prominent news 
reports. Space offered to replies was sporadic and confined to the letters 
columns.64 
One of the ironies here is that the comparative debate on Asian and Australian 
media argues the Asian regimes exercise more direct control over the content of 
their mass media and attempt to police content more closely than in Australia using 
the dictate that the media must broadly reflect the national priorities and aspirations 
of the respective government. This process of intervention is often defended as 
"development journalism" or similar phrases. Contrawise to this definition, the 
Australian media is believed to be more robust, open to dissenting views and 
independent from government. While the extent of this touted independence in the 
state-media relations in Australia has been the subject of debate for many 
63Richard Woolcott, 'Foreign Affairs role defined for the 90s', Financial Review, 18.2.92, p.l5. 
64 Richard Woolcott, Sydney Morning Herald, June 1992, Australian , June 1992. Broinowski's role 
was more subtle. In the context of condemning stereotypes of Asia, she placed the need to 
overcome our deficiencies within the framework of the government's current priorities. See Chapter 
2, op. sit and 'Lessons to be learned in our own backyard', Australian, 23.6.93, p.18. 
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decades,65 the current "Push to Asia" appears to coincide with a far greater level of 
government media intervention, suggesting the distinctions between our media and 
theirs may not be as wide as often envisaged. 
* The Federal Government Policy of .. Disassociation .. from Embarrassing 
Media Comment. 
Nevertheless there are still restraints imposed by the "liberal" press axiom in 
Australia. So much so that the Federal Government has felt compelled to employ 
an additional fall-back or "damage control" measure in the wake of damaging 
political criticisms of Australian media content launched by certain Asian regimes. 
This new government defence mechanism has been exercised in a number of 
different ways. In November 1992 the Foreign Minister Senator Evans rationalised 
government action in a speech that was critical of Australian media reporting of 
Asia. 66 Evans argued the media were sometimes aggravating regional differences 
and unfairly undermining government diplomacy where they identified Federal 
Government soft-pedalling on certain bilateral issues, when clearly, the government 
had no choice in the matter. Evans maintained this media grandstanding was 
sometimes doing great damage to our regional bilateral relations. As a result the 
government had no choice but to disassociate itself from the media's coverage. 67 
Senator Evans referred specifically to the media coverage of his visit to Malaysia to 
patch up a break down of bilateral relations caused by the Malaysian furore over 
the Embassy television drama series. On that occasion Senator Evans apologised 
to the Malaysian Government for any offence the series caused in Malaysia and 
and disassociated the Australian Government from the producers of the ABC 
television series. Many Australian media commentators saw this apology as 
fawning and expressed outrage that the Malaysians should attempt to influence 
65 Two of the recent contributions to the debate are Derek Parker, The Courtesans, The Press 
Gallery in the Hawke Era, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1991 and Graham Coddington, Government 
Management of the Media, Deakin Uni. Press, Geelong, 1991. 
66senator Evans address to 'Asia-Australia: Cross Cultural Media Images' Conference, Uni. of 
Canberra, November 1992. Contrast the reports in the Australian and Sydney Morning Herald the 
next day. 
67 1n defence of this policy Senator Evans has observed,"The extent to which foreign ministers 
uniquely suffer from the Australian media lash should not be exaggerated: an all pervasive 
scepticism about the motives and performance of those in high places is a distinctive national habit". 
See Gareth Evans & Bruce Grant, Australian Foreign Relations In the World of the 1990s, MUP, 
1991, pp. 50-52, at p.52. . 
25 9/2/93 
Lee Push to Asia 
Australian television content. 68 
In a subsequent incident over the feature film Turtle Beach which had received 
indirect government assistance through the Film Finance Corporation, a federally-
funded body, the government pre-empted a Malaysian response by withdrawing its 
sponsorship credit and apologising in advance of the film's release. It was aided by 
the fact that the domestic media debate over the accuracy of the film's content was 
conducted in an academic vacuum whereby foreign affairs journalists were allowed 
to preview the film well in advance of both the artistic previews and the eventual 
release date. Given the foreign affairs writers almost unanimously canned the film 
and given the distributors mistake in delaying its release until well after this debate, 
the film predictably was a box office flop. This flop was in turn interpreted by the 
conservative media's political commentators as a vindication of the Federal 
Government's stand. 
There is no doubt the Federal Government has adopted an apologetic and cautious 
stand within the region itself as a general policy. The Evans-Malaysia apologies 
were backed up by other senior Cabinet Ministers touring the region. Federal 
Treasurer, John Dawkins, in May 1992, outlined in a Singapore press conference 
how Canberra was sensitive to statements critical of countries in the region. While 
defending Australian press freedoms, Dawkins at the same time indicated there 
would be a continuance of the policy of government disassociation from 
independent press reports found to be potentially damaging to our trading 
interests.69 
But this policy of 'disassociation', however pleasing to neighbouring regimes, ran 
the risk of undermining the Federal Government's credibility on the domestic front. 
A Federal Ministry of the Environment school kit was withdrawn from circulation, 
following .DFAT intervention, when it was discovered the kit contained criticism of 
the destructive environmental policies of three overseas governments, two of them 
in the Asian region.70 The DFAT took the extraordinary step of issuing and apology 
and disassociation to the three Embassies concerned in Canberra even before the 
68 See for example David Jenkins 'Hawke's forelock in Australia's way', Sydney Morning Herald, 
29.10.91, p.11 and editoriai,'Malaysia's right to be offended' , Australian, 17.2.92, p.8. The legacy of 
this press outrage has carried over to the Gillespie case. See Ray Chesterton, 'Gareth's policy 
means having to say we're sorry', Daily Telegraph Mirror, 6.8.92, p.12. 
69 John Dawkins statement to the press in Singapore, May 1992, Radio Australia report. 
70 See Peter Gronau report, Broadside, August 1992. 
26 9/2/93 
Lee Push to Asia 
kit was circulated. Apart from inevitable claims from the parliamentary Opposition 
about government inconsistency between departments there was a more 
fundamental issue. This was an inevitable temptation for overseas governments to 
now assert that the •disassociation• policy was an admission that the Australian 
media reports, (in this case an item from the domestic education curriculum), were 
not only damaging, but false. The implications for any foreign or locally-based 
journalists who wished to stand by the veracity of their reports was thereby 
seriously jeopardised. 
This •sanitising• role of government media interventions emerged in a more subtle 
fashion when at a National Press Club forum, the Deputy Secretary of DFAT, Geoff 
Forrester, argued the media issue goes to the heart of the debate about the nature 
of the Asia-Australia relationship. It was one where: •That debate almost invariably 
assumes Australia•s relations with the highly diverse communities of Asia are 
uneasy, exotic and unequal. Analysts quickly point to clashes of values and 
contrasts of levels of economic advancement. Some play on the contrast, of 
geographical proximity with the hitherto lack of depth and sense of common future 
which has hitherto seemed to mark relations. There are past colonialist and white 
overtones in most of our relations ... But, concludes Forrester, these differences are 
all .. bridgeable .. with .. persistent hard work directed at understanding the languages, 
values, beliefs and administrative, social and business syste~s of each other ... 71 
Clearly it is at this point, the media as the cutting edge of relations with Asia, where 
the Australian government, those business interests with developing Asian 
interests, along with other lobbyists who support the economics-driven .. push to 
Asia .. , would all anticipate the Australian media to compliantly perform as both 
educator or agitator for the cause.72 This offers good cause to investigate whether 
the media has the capacity or inclination to fulfil such a role as a key facilitator and 
fast-tracker in the .. push to Asia .. equation. The ABC television diplomatic 
correspondent Micheal Maher recently maintained that there were few examples 
where the government did not have the whip hand in foreign affairs reporting. He 
71 Geoff Forrester, 'Australia, Asia and the media: where do we stand?', Backgrounder, Vol. 3, 
No.1 0, 5 June 1992, p. 2. Government bureaucrats like Forrester are often reported in the media. 
For example, in February 1992 William Ferris, Chairman of Austrade, warned Australia to tread 
carefully in condemning human rights abuses by its Asian trading partners because "there were 
commercial consequences every time Australia took a stance on a domestic moral issue in another 
country", West Australian, press report February 1992. 
72 A good example here is Prime Minister Keating's speech at the launching of the new 
ATVI satellite television seNice into Asia. 
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could instance only a handful of instances where the media coverage of a foreign 
affairs issue actually precipitated a shift in government policy.73 
However, the view from the media minders and bureaucrats on the media-state 
power balance is a different one. Former DFAT media head Sue Boyd credited the 
media with greater influence than journalist Maher was prepared to concede. She 
regarded the media as an "active player in the public domain" and argued it was 
"naive" to portray the media as a "disinterested player" or as simply some 
transmission belt in the government's developing relations with Asia. 7 4 For this 
reason, she maintained, the DFAT adopts an interventionist response whenever it 
finds the media are not on the team. 
This often involved intervention in those cases where the concept of a "free media" -
was not shared by our neighbours and coverage by Australian journalists was 
correspondingly hostile. Boyd instances here the Australian media coverage of 
Malaysia, Fiji, PNG and East Timor as ready examples where the media may "err" 
in a manner "irresponsible", or may just "reveal" (some fact) and "embarrass" (the 
government). In any such circumstance, according to Boyd, this necessitates the 
DFAT devoting "some effort to working out how to manage this element, in the 
interests of our overall national interests. n75 The implication here is that smooth 
bilateral diplomacy was always the overriding concern and issues like the truth in 
reporting or exposing human rights violations, are accorded by default a lower 
priority in DFAT eyes. Issues such as media censorship by repressive neighbours 
will inevitably become casualties as the government's department takes corrective 
measures in the interests of broader diplomacy. 
As international relations academic Peter Boyce has pointed out, since the advent 
of the Hawke ALP Government in 1983 foreign relations have been seen mainly 
through the prism of foreign economic relations. With trade and economics the 
driving force, one must now ponder the extent to which there is a natural tendency 
for media managers and diplomats to smother or counteract the more unsavoury or 
exploitative side of bilateral trade relations whenever such embarrassing evidence 
is unearthed by journalists and other altruistic interlopers. 
73 See Micheal Maher's chapter in Diplomacy in the Marketplace, op. cit. 
74 Sue Boyd, 'The Media and Foreign Policy', The Sydney Papers, Vol. 4, No.2, Autumn 1992, p. 
15. 
75 S. Boyd, 'The Media and Foreign Policy', The Sydney Papers, ibid., p. 17. 
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.((!) The Institutional Response of the Australian Media to the New Challenge of 
' 
_Asia. 
Leaving aside issues of cultural biases, alluded to by Tiffen, Broinowski, Forrester 
and others above, the tradition view of the Australian media is that they are 
diversified, liberal and pluralist. As an institution, the media within capitalist 
societies like Australia must maintain advertising revenues and profit seeking for 
shareholders as their bottom line. 76 Hence the way the media fit the Federal 
Government's "push to Asia" agenda into their copy space and programming must 
be influenced to some degree by the marketplace. Whether the media will stress 
the issue of "Asia" within its reporting of economics, human rights, cultural 
exchange, foreign policy or diplomacy will be determined by the expectations of 
advertisers and the perceived interests of readers and viewers, who are in essence 
the consumers of the 'product'. 
In highlighting the existing inadequacies academic Rod Tiffen has argued, the 
structure of the Australian media has ensured that news information made available 
to the Australian public about Asia is controlled and narrowed down by key decision 
makers in Australia. He maintained while foreign news content was not a "direct 
systematic expression of any one person's or organisation's ideology" owing to the 
ideological diversity and ambiguity of sources, nevertheless the processes of 
newsmaking were not "politically neutral or ideologically inert". Thus asserted 
Tiffen, "News values, assumptions about audience interests and attitudes, 
production and format demands of news organisations, the differing priority and 
authority accorded to different news sources, all constitute a very considerable and 
limiting prism through which Southeast Asia news is filtered in Australia."?? 
More broadly speaking, if we accept the notion that the Australian media have 
attempteq to fulfil the role of a 'fourth estate' or 'watchdog' here, it may be hard to 
criticise and analyse the value judgements involved as to which of the many 
competing images of Asia deserved an airing in the Australian media. Editors and 
foreign editors could rightly fall back on the defence that the competing images of 
Asia would be reflected differently across different sections of the media, whether 
76The ABC and SBS have been the exceptions here, until recently at least. A letter in the Australian 
16.6.93 suggested with its number of advertisement's SBS should be referred to as the four 
commercial network. 
}] .Rodney Tiffen, The News From Southeast Asia: The Sociology of Newsmaking, I SEAS, s· . 1ngapore, 1978, p.5. 
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within the overall content of one newspaper, or between newspapers. We have to 
acknowledge here that the quality press often give greater emphasis to foreign 
affairs reporting than the tabloid press. 
But deciding how to reassess content in the light of the new "Asia" is not the only 
challenge. Care must be taken when examining the rhetoric for change as in the 
superficially reformist demand for a new breed of journalists. Editor-in-chief of The 
Australian Paul Kelly has argued that regionally-based correspondents must 
become more "sophisticated", taking into account the changing relationship 
between Australia and the region. Part of this "sophistication" involved, according to 
Kelly, a new look at the issue of briefings for foreign correspondents. He asked 
whether someone sent to Jakarta should be briefed to cover "corruption in Jakarta" 
or "other issues which we might consider to be far more important to the Indonesia-
Australia relationship". 78 
This issue of the new "Asia" also related to an institutional debate about the "tone 
and content" of news coverage. Kelly conceded there was an inbuilt tension over 
Australian regional reporting but still advocated far more subtlety because the 
region should not be reported in a similar way to "coverage of factional difficulties 
inside the Labor Party". He argued here, "in a sense Australian politics and the 
Australian media have grown together and the culture produced is a very assertive 
and very aggressive one". But in reporting the region, Kelly felt journalists had to be 
"clever" in deciding what tone to use. This argument over the tone of reporting was 
also supported recently in a paper by long-time, Singapore-based, Australian 
journalist lisa Sharp. 79 
Apart from the newspaper editors who selectively cull in a narrow way the available 
information, debate in the media about Asia and Australia's foreign policy options is 
restricted. mainly to politicians and a few pressure groups.80 One DFAT policy 
maker has pointed out that his department began each day by analysing the foreign 
affairs coverage offered by the few select columnists on foreign affairs from the 
nation's morning papers. The official expressed a belief that this small group of 
writers "covered the spectrum" of political opinion and thus monitoring this copy 
78Paul Kelly address, National Press Club, June 1992. See Backgrounder article op. sit. 
79 lllsa Sharp, talk at Edith Cowan University, Asian Communications and Media Studies Centre, 
25.11.92. 
80 Rod Tiffen, lecture for Continuing Education Course 'Australia and Asia', October 1992, Sydney 
University. · 
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enabled the department to guage its policy priorities by assessing the level of 
criticism or support emanating from these selective newspaper columnists.81 
Clearly, given the close working relationship between the foreign news editor desks 
and the DFAT, where a mutual dependency must inevitably grow out of privileged 
background briefings to journalists on the one hand and "responsible" and 
"sensitive" reporting on the other, it is highly dubious if, over time, the DFAT officials 
would be able to discern any real diversity of opinion on foreign affairs reporting in 
the print media by focusing their attention on such a narrow range of 
contributors. 82 Certainly this example demonstrates how the news is filtered at 
every level in a way that tends to narrow policy options. 
It would be remiss not to mention here that such indications of a collaborative 
media-state relationship conforms to the neo-marxist and radical media critiques of 
the "pluralist model" of the Australian press. One of the more popular dissenting 
viewpoints comes from American philosopher and media critic Noam Chomsky in 
his documentary Manufacturing Consent. 83 His theory contends liberal 
democracies police their domestic airwaves and print media in indirect ways, 
creating what he calls "necessary illusions" about media freedom and public 
access. The Chomsky model maintains that newsflows are regulated by a number 
of "filters", hidden gatekeepers, that disguise themselves behind normative ideas 
like "market forces" and "newsworthiness" and the "exigencies of production". 
When these fail to reinforce the status quo the system resorts to "flak11 or the 
discrediting of pressure groups by defining them as outside the mainstream. To 
achieve this objective the media invariably prioritizes "victims~~ into "worthy" or 
"unworthy" cases for either public sympathy or derision. 84 
Clearly neither economic profits or human rights are taboo subjects in the current 
"Push to Asia". But the current priority given to one over the other issue within the 
81 Paul Callinan, DFAT staffer, at a seminar at the Monash University, Centre for South East Asian 
Studies, November 1992. 
82 
Although Mark Baker, foreign editor of the Age, denied that the press were influenced by DFAT 
strategies. He did however concede that the Age, like other newspapers, accepted the broad 
Parameters of the Federal Government's "Push to Asia" strategy. {Interview with author 13.5.93). 
83 
Screened on SBS-TV during December 1992. 
84
Two existing studies partially employing the Chomsky approach are G.C. Gunn & J. Lee, 
Cambodia Watching Down Under, Institute of Asian Studies, Bangkok, 1991 and Tracy Woods, 
Propaganda: Press, Policy and East Timor, Thesis, Faculty of Communication, Uni. of Canberra, 
1992. 
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media offers preliminary evidence that supports the Chomsky suppositions. It 
reflects firstly the' commercial nature of the Australian media. Media reporting of the 
shifting Indonesian-Australian diplomacy is a case in point. For historical reasons 
the East Timor human rights issue has been a festering sore in bilateral relations. 
The Federal Government's new commercially focused "Push to Asia" involved a 
revamping of relations with our immediate Indonesian neighbour. Later in this paper 
will be an examination of how the Government sort to re·-organise the media's 
agenda to give greater accent to bilateral trade and defence relations with 
Indonesia while at the same time marginalising the Timorese human rights issue. 
The Timorese rapidly shift from worthy to unworthy "victims" in the eyes of the key 
media brokers. 
* Some Institutional Responses to the Keating Initiative: The Print Media and 
the .. Push to Asia ... 
Starting from the premise that the "Push to Asia" is predominantly a Federal 
Government and business community driven agenda, 85 and is primarily about 
opening up economic opportunities for Australian business in the region, it would be 
useful to examine to what degree the media have actually "Asianised" their content 
in response to the challenge. For a preliminary study of the changes in the domestic 
news input into coverage devoted to Asia may in itself be revealing in the light of 
the structural problems of regional newsflows alluded to in the earlier pages. 
A preliminary investigation of the print media reveals, not surprisingly, that the 
quality daily press such as the Australian and The Sydney Morning Herald and to 
a much lesser extent The Age, along with the financial press such as the Financial 
Review, Business Review Weekly, 86 Australian Business Monthly 87 and a 
number of newer specialist magazines, have taken up the issue with far more relish 
than their tabloid counterparts or the electronic media. Leaving aside the issue of 
whether ·the issue has become a preoccupation of the foreign desk of daily 
newspapers, it would be useful to begin with a quick survey the general news 
85 In The Australian newspaper's "Asia link" series,, Tim Blue wrote, "The Business Council of 
Australia, comprised of the chief executives of the largest 80 Australian companies, is a firm 
advocate of greater Australian involvement in Asia." (Australian, 17.11.92, p.42). 
86 For example see Tim Duncan and Robert Gottliebsen, 'Why our companies have snubbed Asia', 
Business Review Weekly, 17.3.89, pp. 20-27. 
87 See for example the 'Business in Asia' column, Sabam Siagian, 'Neighbours: What Indonesia 
wants from us', Australian Business Monthly, January 1993, pp.111-113. 
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sections of the press. 
Of all the papers surveyed The Australian seemed to have taken the "Push to 
Asia" the most seriously in both editorial response and in terms of actual changes in 
content of the paper to reflect this new priority. Its foreign editor Greg Sheridan has 
pursued the issue in column after column with a missionary zeal. In spite of the 
prominent changes at the Australian, the paper's editor-in-chief, Paul Kelly, 
remained critical of the depth of economic, financial and investment reporting of the 
region by the Australian press as a whole. He believed these too much attention 
was still paid to developments in the UK, the US and Japan. He argued, "We need 
to bear in mind the fact that "North East Asia" are very much the "surplus nations", 
and they will invest in Australia. This has been a factor neglected by the media. 
Given the rapid change in the region economically, it now behoves the media tore-
assess the nature of their regional coverage. in areas like "aviation, transport, 
economics, finance, tourism", he added. 88 
In line with this dictate, The Australian newspaper ran a "Special Survey" series in 
August 1992 focusing on individual countries within the North and Southeast Asian 
regions which examined bilateral relations and their investment potential for 
Australia.89 In November 1992 the same newspaper, over a two week period, ran a 
series of supplements in its main news pages under the masthead of "Asia link". 
The introduction to this supplement argued, "Attention that once was focused on 
Europe and the U.S now is firmly on the (Asian-Pacific) markets". The series 
analysed banking and financial world with the "pin-pointing of trends, the potential 
investment hot spots - and danger spots". Other articles followed, on construction 
and infrastructure, property, tourism, travel,· educational and cultural links, the 
opportunities for manufacturing exporters, in particular those prepared to move off-
shore; a concluding article ran with the familiar theme of the need for Australia to 
"lift our game".90 
In its efforts to integrate the Asian theme throughout its overall content The 
Australian ran regular supplements on business, higher education, 
communications and aviation which all gave increasing emphasis to the Asian 
market. The most pronounced change came in the financial pages. The Business 
88 
Paul Kelly, National Press Club, June 1992, op. sit. 
89 
For example see the supplement on Thailand, The Australian, 12.8.92, pp. 9-12. 
90 
The Australian, "Asia link" series, ,Monday 16.11.92 up to Friday 27 .11.92. 
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Australian supplement now carried an Asian Business News section and a regular 
column entitled Asian Business by Florence Chong. This change of format was 
partially at the expense of the daily page on Australian culture and entertainment 
This was a move that reflected the changing Asianist priority but was nonetheless 
unpopular with the many devotees of the. page on Australian culture. It 
demonstrated an incidental way in which the Asia issue was impinging on the 
national identity issue. 
Amongst the other 'quality' or non-tabloid press in Australia are the Sydney Morning 
Herald , Age and Canberra Times. All three have invariably staffed their foreign 
desks with journalists who are either Asian 'literate' or on occasion even Asia 
specialists.91 These papers tended to depend on their regular Australian-based 
contributors as well as correspondents in Asia, such as Lindsay Murdoch from his 
Singapore base, in order to keep pace with the Federal Government's new Asianist 
agenda and monitor the region's reaction. Most news from the region found in these 
papers was still featured either under the heading of "world news" or "the region" 
and at least in part derivative of wire service file. However there was an increasing 
flow of reports from regionally-based correspondents and domestic journalists 
reporting on assignment. 
The Sydney Morning Herald in early 1992 ran a series of feature articles analysing 
Australia's future and the Asian region. Under the banner of "ASIA: OUR ROAD TO 
SURVIVAL" the paper addressed diplomacy, defence and foreign affairs, trade and 
cultural links. In a similar manner to the Australian, the series was written in the 
style of a collection of pep talks, anecdotes, risk analysis and suggestions for 
Australian businesses about to take up the cudgels and expand into Asia. The 
series was strung together by a range of staff national affairs correspondents with 
some input from former overseas correspondents and foreign affairs staff. It clearly 
reflected ~hat the new priority in Asia was the promotion of Australian business links 
with the region. 
Typical here was an article by former Asian-based correspondent Louise Williams 
on the Australian funded Laos-Thailand friendship bridge.92 The article avoided 
mention of fears by Laos people that the bridge, by providing greater outside 
91tn the case of the Herald, however, one of the most recent foreign editors, Warren Osmond was 
said to have a greater interest in Europe than Asia. 
92 Louise Williams, "Friendship bridge stradles troubled waters', Sydney Morning Herald, 6.5.92, p. 
8. 
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access to its largely unspoilt countryside, may lead to a more rapid decimation of its 
rainforest stock by Thai and Japanese logging companies. Nor were the Lao fears 
of cultural domination by Thai and Western influence mentioned. The emphasis 
was on the positive role Australia was playing in developing business links. The 
focus was narrow and avoided mentioning any ,potential negative social implications 
of such investments. Yet the author is renowned for just such broader 
interpretations on Asian development issues. The point at issue is that the paper 
appears to have given a brief to the journalist to come up with an article on 
economics and not social conditions. It raises the issue of whether Asia in 
becoming "our road to survival" is also becoming their own road to destruction?93 
An adjoining article attempted to examine the efforts being made by Austrade, 
Australian tertiary institutions and long established Australian enterprises to "bridge 
the cultural gap" between Australia and Asia. The emphasis here was on what sort 
of knowledge of Asian culture would be necessary for our businesses to prosper in 
Asia. 94 The paper also examined the economic value to the Australian economy of 
Asian tourism in an article that focused on Japanese honeymooners. 95 The 
following day was an article noting the success of the Snowy Mountains 
Engineering Corporation in finding market niches in large construction projects in 
Asia. 96 Another article in the series saw foreign affairs writers David Jenkins, who 
had toured the region, speaking to "academics, policy-makers, businessmen and 
diplomats" posing the question "How do Asians see Australia's role in the Asian-
Pacific?" 97 
Yet another article from the Herald concentrated on the trade with Asia issue 
arguing "expanding trade to the booming m'arkets of Asia will take more than a 
levelling of the playing field". The article explored the implications for Australian 
93Aithough ·not touched on in this paper, as far as Indochina as a whole goes, the plethora of press 
articles extolling the virtues of Vietnam re-embracing the "marketplace", and how Australia's unique 
position will enable us to exploit this opportunity, should not be overlooked. The latest push comes 
from American media magnate Rupert Murdoch. See Margaret Harris, 'Murdoch sets out to conquer 
Asia', Sydney Morning Herald, 27.4.93, p. 36. 
94 Margaret Harris, Suzanne Mostyn, Anne Bernasek, "The know-how we need now", Sydney 
Morning Herald, 6.5.92, p. 8. 
95 Ibid., Sydney Morning Herald, 6.5.92, p.13. 
96 Mike Steketee and Karen Maley, 'Trade tigers ride a pragmatic road', and Suzanne Mostyn, 'Our 
Snowy men beat the tender trap', Sydney Morning Herald, 7.5.92. 
97 
David Jenkins, 'Seven ways to get on with the neighbours', Sydney Morning Herald, 8.5.92. 
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industry of the current policy of reduced tariff protectionism. It concluded that 
"pragmatic" politicians now recognised that this policy in itself was no panacea for 
the future, but also pointed out that "the intellectual battle in the bureaucracy still 
seems to be dominated by the dries in bodies such as the Treasury and Industry 
Commission". 98 
Foreign editor of The Age, Mark Baker felt that his paper had made regular 
comment on Keating's "Push to Asia" but had not gone in for large supplements of 
the Herald and Australian which he saw as aimed primarily at garnishing extra 
advertising revenue. He argued the Age was the paper with the longest links to 
Asia having maintained correspondents in the ASEAN region continuously since the 
1960s and in China since 1973. While a number of correspondents and columnists 
writing for the Age have been critical of the Keating strategy,99 Baker felt the 
overall editorial position of the paper was supportive of the Federal Government 
initiative. The critical response by some of the Age's columnists analysed the "push 
to Asia" as national policy, and not as some other capital city dailies did, as a 
reflection of regional concerns. 1 00 Baker maintained parochial Victorian concerns 
about employment in the TCF and car manufacturing industries was incidental, not 
the driving force behind criticisms of the Canberra strategy. 
This should be compared to Western Australian press response to the Federal 
Government's initiative in November 1992 to encourage the ALP Lawrence 
Government to host an Inter Asia Conference in Perth to give the "push to Asia" a 
more decentralised and regional focus.1 01 The conference was attended primarily 
by international Asian delegates and local representatives of the corporate sector. 
In spite of a political hostility to both the Lawrence ALP Government and the 
Keating ALP Government, the leading Perth daily newspaper, the West Australian , 
responded positively to this initiative with an expensive four page cover wrap-
around supplement to its normal edition on the opening day. 
One explanation for this generous endorsement response was the perception that 
98 Mike Steketee and Karen Maley, 'Trade tigers ride a pragmatic road', and Suzanne Mostyn, 'Our 
Snowy men beat the tender trap', Sydney Morning Herald, 7.5.92. 
99see Ken Davidson, 'Wish as hard as we like, we cannot become part of Asia', Age, 29.4.93, p. 
15. 
1 00 Interview with Mark Baker, by author 14.5.93. 
101 See DFAT publication Insight in November 1992 on the Federal Government's role in initiating 
this conference. 
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newspapers such as the West Australian performed the role ·of advocate for a 
regional focus on national affairs. It carefully examined the economic potential for 
Western Australian involvement within the "Push to Asia" strategy of Canberra. In 
concentrating on the economic issue - food and mineral exports and Asian fin.ancial 
imports - the paper reflected similar priorities to those of Canberra. Where 
parochialism crept in was in the minutiae of arguments like Perth should become 
the logical city to spearhead greater Australian links with Asia because it was on the 
same time zone as the business markets and stock exchanges of Northeast 
Asia.1 02 Elsewhere in the West Australian, a regular Asia Desk column appeared 
in the under the pen of Andre Malan. Malan's Into Asia Conference post mortem in 
the form of news commentary highlighted how the "Push to Asia" was still largely a 
Government-business initiative with, so far, little real interest shown by people 
outside the business community.1 03 
The Adelaide Advertiser often responded with its own parochial concerns with 
Australian-Japan relations placed at the centre of its "Push to Asia" coverage. In 
the run up to Keating's visit to Japan the dispute with Opposition leader Hewson 
was seen through the prism of how trade wars and tariffs would impact on the local 
car industry and whether the Japan visit would kick-start the Multi Function Polis. 
Similarly, the Northern Territory News reacted to the Keating initiative as a 
reassuring confirmation the Northern Territory Government's on-going emphasis of 
building business links between the Northern Territory and Indonesia and the 
continuation of its ill-fated "free trade zone" which had come under severe criticism 
in the national media for the exploitation of imported Chinese labourers.1 04 The 
News has religiously reported complaints by local politicians that the Federal 
Government was trying to steal its limelight on 'the developing regional trade links 
emanating from Darwin in a show of assertive independence from Canberra. 
102 See West Australian , 16.11.92, cover wrap-around. Investigation may reveal that this was 
actually an expensive paid advertisement. · 
103 The Asia Desk editor of the same paper, Andre Malan, offered a commentary at the end of the 
conference entitled 'A long wait to see if talkfest pays off', West Australian, 21.11.92, p.8, where he 
argued "Picking up most of the bill for this expensive talkfest was the WA taxpayer. In return, we are 
told, the state will receive export contracts, new investment and job-creating projects." Malan 
~ommented on the lack of interstate and overseas media, the poor weather and heavy government 
Input. He conceded that 'person to person' business contacts were made but concluded it would be 
a long time before one could measure the benefits of the conference. 
104 
See also Dateline, Saturday, 24.10.92, a programme on the growing business links 
between the Nothern Territory and Indonesia. 
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The Financial Review maintained Rowan Gallick's Pacific Viewpoint column on 
Pacific affairs and although it now gave a greater emphasis to Asian business 
news, it did not run a specific column on Asia, prefering to incorporate such 
coverage either under editorial leaders, 'regional news' pages, regular columnists 
such as Michael Byrnes in Hong Kong, special :supplements on Asian business, or 
profile supplements on individual Asian countries. As with the Australian 
newspaper, such supplements usually couched business news in the 'risk analysis' 
style of presentation and primarily served as advertising revenue raises. A 
significant factor with the Financial Review was the large number of government 
foreign affairs and trade bureaucrats who appeared regularly in its columns 
outlining government strategy on Asia. Undoubtedly this reflected the targeted 
audience of its readership which was heavily weighted in favour of the business 
community and economically-inclined intellectuals. 
* Australian Television and "The Push to Asia". 
Radio and television variations in coverage of Asia would be justified by electronic 
media producers in a similar way to print editors, by reference to issues of market 
demand and viewer/listener satisfaction. Naturally different expectations arise over 
whether we are talking about news, current affairs, television drama, arts or sports 
coverage. Television, as primarily a vehicle for entertainment or "infotainment" is 
inevitably Eurocentric. The issue of Asian content is satirised each Monday 
evening on the ABC-TV's This Sporting Life ; compere "Roy Slaven" offers the 
absurd introduction "Hello viewers, and Hello Asia" in what could only be a tongue-
in-cheek send-up of the Keating strategy.1 05 
Overall, television is seen as less responsive to the Federal Government's "Push to 
Asia", except on occasions like a Prime Ministerial visit to a regional capital such as 
the lndo~_esian and Japanese visits of 1992, or in the context of a national affairs 
debate such as during the March 1993 election, or in the context of crisis diplomacy 
such as the peace-keeping commitment to Cambodia and the Gillespie custody 
wrangle with Malaysia. Commercial television international news coverage, with its 
brevity and heavy dependence of wire service reports, remained the prisoner of the 
"floods and coups" formula for international news for reporting Asia or anywhere 
else. 
105"Siaven" is effectively saying, as if a programme which consisted of lewd jokes and 
innuendoes about local footy stars, etc., replete with Australian slang and vernacular, 
could at all be comprehended by even the most articulate of our Northern neighbours. 
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Reporting of Thailand on Australian television is a good example. Thailand virtually 
disappeared from the news footage following the massive coverage given to the 
military and police massacres surrounding its parliamentary crisis in 1992. Apart 
from the semi-titillating documentaries on the risk of AIDS for Western tourists on 
"sex holidays", Thailand only re-emerged in May 1993 as a leading news item after 
a massive fire and tragic loss of life in a toy factory in Bangkok. Seldom a word 
about developmental or economic issues or even a follow up on parliamentary and 
constitutional issues following the crisis of 1992. Issues like tragedies, natural 
disasters and AIDS, prostitution are inevitably the main focus of scanty coverage of 
this country. 
The ABC fields far more correspondents in the region and inevitably performed 
better than commercial stations in regional news and current affairs coverage.1 06 
SBS, with its charter aimed at greater international sources and focus, also offered 
a more detailed view of Asia. It should be noted here that staff at the "non-
commercial" ABC and SBS television have fought vigorously to maintain their 
"fourth estate" role in the face of growing government pressure to impose greater 
editorial control, through regulatory bodies and executive intervention, as well as 
offering public resistance to continual moves to totally commercialise their 
operations. Behind this struggle it is widely believed there is an on-going desire to 
protect the integrity of current affairs and news reporting which includes its regional 
focus. 
ABC television's current affairs has consistently covered the Asian region far better 
than commercial television, with correspondents in India, Singapore, Thailand, 
Japan, China and elsewhere. The focus of hard-edged current affairs programs like 
Four Comers usually has a specific country emphasis, such as Cambodia or 
Indonesia, where the dilemma of preserving human rights under authoritarian rule 
would invariably figure high on the agenda. Foreign Correspondent would attempt 
the smorgasbord approach, where serious reporting from war fronts would be 
balanced with the joys of Japanese bath houses (culture) and the massive changes 
in southern China's economy (economics). The program angles these vignettes 
usually with the specific focus of change or nations in transition and if applicable, 
106 
However a breakdown of the Channel Nine networks comprehensive coverage of the Cambodia 
War over the past 1 0 years supplied to me by Peter Meakin suggests that a lot more research is 
necessary before any definitive conclusion could be drawn. Over a ten year period Sixty Minutes, 
Sunday and A Current Affair all produced special documentaries on the Cambodia issue. I base my 
~ssumption on the extraordinary number of hours the commercial stations devote to non-Asian 
Issues like soaps and sports. 
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how it affects Australia. On the other hand, Lateline adopted "the more business 
with Asia perspective" or dealt with Asia as part of the big themes of human rights, 
the UN and the post-Cold War international security balance. 
The opening of Australian Television International (ATVI) in March 1993 was 
regarded as a big step forward in projecting Australian television to the region and 
also in providing regional news to an Australian audience through a half hour late-
night bulletin. The launch featured heavily in the run up to the Federal elections. 
The daily press pontificated that A TVI could become an embarrassment for the 
government's "Push to Asia" drive if it focused on "human rights" abuses in Asia. 
Keating, the ABC executives and the rest of Cabinet countered by denying this 
would not be the case. They emphasised "responsible and "sensitive" reporting 
would be the order of the day and the nation should take pride in our first television 
flagship across Asia. 1 07 
The debate over funding the new A TVI satellite television station raised other 
important considerations about the future of "serious listening" programming on 
Radio Australia and Radio National. The fear here was that self-funding 
requirements would soon mean no government funding, eventual financial 
starvation and the muzzling of the critical edge of Australian public broadcasting. As 
Graham Debell has demonstrated, many ordinary people in the Asian-Pacific region 
still rely on Radio Australia and the ABC to report on their country's internal affairs. 
Radio Australia is still perceived widely throughout the region as one of the few 
sources of independent news from a non government-controlled avenue.1 08 
However it is worth recalling the views of an Australian journalist of Asian descent, 
Kalinga Seveneratne, whose analysis of both the ABC and SBS news and current 
affairs reporting was highly critical. His study argued that both stations were "Anglo-
Centric" at the management level and took a hotchpotch approach to presenting the 
107Privately, one ABC producer conceded to me that hard-edged episodes of say human 
rights in Indonesia profiles from Four Corners would most likely not see the light of day on 
ATVI. (Interview, with unnamed ABC producer, November 1992). 
108 See Graeme Debell's chapter in AIDAB, 'Australia's Media Treatment of the developing 
world. How does it rate?' International Development Issues, No.6, Canberra,AGPS, 1989. 
Jemima Garrett gave a report on the continuing censorship and government control of the 
Pacific media on ABC Radio's International Report, 16.6.93. 
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Asian region to Australian viewers.1 09 As if to confirm this viewpoint, regular 
viewers of the ABC's Foreign Correspondent, Four Comers, 7.30 Report , and to a 
lesser extent Lateline, may find room for argument over the lack of non-Anglo 
'talking heads' when Australia's position on Asian-Pacific regional politics and 
international relations were discussed on current affairs programmes since the 
Seveneratne study was completed in 1991. The most recent example concerning 
SBS-TV was a letter-writing campaign by the Australian Khmer community 
demanding representation on the Dateline forum scheduled to discuss the John 
Pilger documentary Return to the Killing Fields and the Cambodian elections in 
May 1993.110 
But whatever problems the ABC and SBS have in getting across a legitimate view 
of Asia, they pail into insignificance when placed along side the 'popular' 
commercial television shows. Paul Kelly at the National Press Club made an 
observation about the marked differences in standard between the 'quality' and 
popular' print media coverage devoted to Asia, arguing the 'popular' approach was 
to see Asia as a "freak show". This barb is probably more relevant when we 
consider the Australian television and Asia. On Saturday 5th December 1992 in the 
6.30 P.M. time slot a good comparison of the 'quality' versus 'popular' television 
coverage of Asian affairs was gleaned from two simultaneously screened television 
documentaries on national television. 
Firstly, the SBS-TV Dateline current affairs programme covered the political future 
of Indonesia. In this programme Max Lane, former diplomat, academic and human 
rights activist on Indonesian affairs was interviewed. Lane argued that pressure was 
being applied the Suharto dynasty from three sources; the Army dissidents who 
don't like being used just to prop up Suharto dynasty and would like a greater share 
of the (economic and political) action; the middle class business interests who are 
opposed ·to monopolisation (Suharto's family dynasty) in the atmosphere of a 
growing deregulated economic market inside Indonesia; the student movement 
aligned with the peasantry campaigning over specific reform issues, although some 
of them see it as a rebuilding of the pre-1965 movement for genuine democracy. 
109 Kalinga Seveneratne, paper on SBS-TV during the foreign correspondents Seminar 
organised by the Australian Centre for Independent Journalism in 1991. His study gave a 
breakdown of the last episode of the SBS-TV's now defunct programme Asia Report to 
demonstrate it was tokenistic, trivialised development issues and showed a total 
Westernised perspective on Asia. 
110 
Information supplied by Khmer activists in Melbourne 14.5.93. 
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Overall it was a hard-hitting critical programme that argued Indonesia would either 
move further down the road of liberalisation or a Suharto imposed Presidential 
backlash would see a new round of repression.111 
The second, or 'popular' programme was shown on the Kerry Packer-owned, 
Channel Nine network, the travel documentary programme known as The World 
Around Us. It began with a picture of Balinese dance culture. The program 
promoted all the stereotypes of Indonesia as an exotic destination. It concentrated 
on the colourful (for Westerners) fascination in the Bali dance traditions and rituals. 
It argued one dance was devised in the "1930s" just for the Western tourists. It 
showed the luxury resort town Sunar without mentioning the one five star hotel, the 
Bali Beach Hotel on the beach (Japanese financed with war reparation money) 
stood alone in the skyline because of protests over the scale of its construction and 
the local opposition to any further construction along that magnitude. The 
programme only emphasised Bali as an exotic tourist destination - showing fat, 
middle-aged pale-skinned Australians lounging around the cocktail pool at the hotel 
with drinks in hand or taking snapshots of a burial ceremony or dance festival. No 
mention of the Australians who had lived their for ages blending with the local 
customs. 
Then there was a glimpse of a remote village on the northern end of the island 
which prompted the dubious remark that the camera crew were possibly the first 
whites the locals had ever seen. The pace of Indonesian development would 
eventually engulf this village and its customs and way of life the narrator told us. 
This point was presented as some inevitable march of (Western) progress. The 
programme continually stressed the need for on-going (Western) Australian tourism 
as a necessity towards improving the living standards of the locals. No attempt was 
made to explain the tensions between the Balinese and Jakarta over control of the 
wealth and decision-making over the islands tourist industry or the negative impact 
tourism has had in commercialising local rituals and customs. If viewed in 
Indonesia, this programme could only reinforce the idea that Australians were fat 
and lazy holiday seekers.112 
But whatever the problems of these two television approaches to presenting Asia, 
noting here that interpretations will always be subjective and determined in part by 
111 SBS-TV Dateline, Sat. 5.12.92. 
112 Ch 9 television, The World Around Us. 5. 12. 92. 
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taste, it is worth remembering that many of the deficiencies of the Australian 
' media's approach to Asia lie deeper than just cultural bias of writer, producer and 
camera operator. Tiffen has asserted that the malaise was as much a structural 
one, not unrelated to the extravagances of the spending in the media industry in 
Australia <Juring the 1980s. Pessimistically, he argued, " ... The last six years has 
been a sad time in Australian media, with closures, bankruptcies and redundancies. 
The 1990s promises to be a more dynamic period for our region than for our news 
media, and we cannot have great confidence that they will measure up to the 
challenges which reporting the region will pose."113 
(d) The Asian View of the Australian Media and Its Impact on the Australian 
Media Coverage of the Region. 
As a number of Australian journalists have pointed out the Australian media, and 
Western media generally, has been the "fall guy" for the growing assertiveness of 
Asian regimes. Criticism has emerged in the Australian media through 
correspondent reports on Asian press conferences by politicians, business leaders 
and military heads, statements issued from regional and international forums. The 
steady flow of Asian leaders to Australia and the high profile of certain local Asian 
diplomats has also ensured that the Asian view of the Australian media gets across 
to the Australian public. Unfortunately Australian media criticisms of Asian regimes 
are often not as privileged. Apart from Radio Australia, Australian commentary does 
not have an immediate mass audience in Asia. 
In the June 1992 National Press Club seminar on Australian-Asian press relations 
visiting Indonesian journalist, Goenawan Mohamad, argued "... one shouldn't 
expect too much from the press, or exaggerate its role in constructing or 
deconstructing inter-state relations. A newspaper is not a very generous institution. 
It is owned (especially in the Australian case) by people who want to accumulate 
immense wealth. It sells stories, and a story is usually defined by what the editor 
thinks the readers want to read. And normally, it has to have drama or a unique 
idea or a charming style. In other words, a normal newspaper has its built-in limit 
when writing about other countries." He also observed: "The problem is that the 
Australian press is not famous for its humility. It finds the Indonesian Government's 
113 Rod Tiffen, ·National Press Club address, see Backgrounder, op. sit. This view would have to be 
Weighed up against the plus side where technological change continues to make the job easier. The 
satellite link with Phnom Penh is just one example. I have not dealt with radio to any extent here but 
clearly phone linked interviews to the region have given radio an edge over other mediums from the 
point of view of immediacy. 
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aversion to it a kind of inverted compliment. Being accustomed to being feared by 
politicians, businessmen and others, it has less incentive to doubt its infallibility. It 
has less reason to examine its own motives as well as its own prejudices. It hardly 
makes time to appreciate the difficulty of knowing other people in other 
societies."114 
Mohamad questioned the notion of "cross-cultural" reporting. The difference in 
reporting between an Indonesian journalist in Australia and an Australian in 
Indonesia was not "cultural" or "racial" bias, but mainly the "historical distance from 
the realities of poverty and other traumas". He argued, "for any Indonesian 
journalist living today, poverty is an integral part of a common memory, even of a 
current reality. For an Australian journalist born after the Second World War, 
poverty is almost a remote, alien thing. His immediate society (normally not an 
Aboriginal one) is practically free from a traumatic past." He argued, visiting 
Australian reporters were predictable, "You normally find a mention of slums and 
slum dwellers, of the gap between rich and poor. Then there will be a hint of 
violence and repression (potential or otherwise), or of corruption and bureaucratic 
clumsiness. Occasionally there will be a description of the atmosphere of squalor, 
with its strange odours and colours, or about the intense sensation of the local 
climate. Sometimes you will also read some anecdotes of exotic beliefs and habits 
of the people, as a way of explaining the prevailing 'culture of inactivity'." 
Moharnad doesn't argue these Western images are a misrepresentation, only that a 
proper perspective is required to avoid a poor picture of the realities. By "proper 
perspective" he means "a way of looking at poverty as something that has a long 
history and a complex origin". To illustrate his point he quotes the Australian writer 
Christopher Koch from his book The Year of Living Dangerously, where Koch 
argues most Australians become children again when they enter the slums of Asia. 
He broadens this by pointing out that most Australian journalists don't acknowledge 
this naivete on entering Asia. They become a victim of the "Wilkes syndrome". 
Wilkes was the Australian writer in Blanche d'Aipuget's Turtle Beach who assumes 
she knows Malaysia because she was there twenty years before. She has a trace 
of scorn for Malaysians and "hardly has any talks with the common people of 
Malaysia, whose fear, worries and bitterness are the origin of the tragic event she 
writes about". Mohamad says her method of reporting is "I know, I come, I 
114 Goenawan Mohamad, 'Do the media really matter?', Backgrounder, 5.6.92, pp.4-5. 
Mohamad gave a similar speech to the Sydney Institute, see Sydney Papers Vol. 4, No.3, 
Winter 1992, pp. 67-70. 
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judge".115 
Criticism of Australian journalism has also appeared in the Australian media from 
Asian politicians. The Business Australian, reported prominently the Malaysia's 
Minister for International Trade, Dato Seri Rafidah Aziz during her visit to Australia 
in July 1992. She came to initiate a new chapter in the commercial and economic 
relations between Australia and Malaysia and to attend the Malaysia-Australia Joint 
Trade Committee. Aziz described the relationship between the two countries as 
"strained in the recent past" because of the "misrepresentation" of facts by sections 
of the Australian media which put Malaysia in "a bad light". She added, Malaysia 
would react to what was being (wrongly) presented and "as a result of chain 
reactions the private sector was affected ... " But now she wanted to ensure the 
Australian private sector that there should not be "the perception of undue risks in 
investing in Malaysia". 116 
Another example is the high press profile of the Indonesian Ambassador Sabam 
Siagian. In his benign appeals for our local media to treat the stories of human 
rights abuses in East Timor with scepticism Siagian displayed an articulate ability to 
exploit the Australian media's liberalism. Imploring journalistic notions of objectivity 
and pleas for both sides of the argument get a fair run, Siagian was persuasive to 
the point where some reporters forgot that censorship on the issue was imposed 
primarily by the Indonesians denial of access to East Timor.117 Thus in reality, the 
Siagian notion that the media-derived 'truth' lies between the Fretilin-lndonesian 
extremes, can sometimes be obfuscating. 
Siagian was also adept at presenting the arguments of leading Australian opinion 
makers back onto his Australian audiences. While never conceding so much as a 
115 Blanche d'Aipuget argues the fault lies more in the nature of the Australian film industry which is 
so susceptible to international market forces that virtually any attempt to adequately reconstruct a 
Written novel on film is doomed to some degree of failure. See her article 'From Novel to Film: The 
Transformation of Turtle Beach',' The Sydney Papers, Vol. 4, No.2, Autumn 1992, pp. 107-113. 
116Fiorence Chong. 'Malaysia trade at the top of minister's agenda', Business Australian. 
14.7.92, p.19. See also Lateline, Monday 21.9.92 where Aziz argued, "Australia should show 
more understanding" before raising "human rights" issues. Dr Mahathir's views on the subject 
are found in Asia Today, (Sydney), October 1992, cover story. 
117 
While Siagian at the Darwin forum, loc. cit., claimed the Indonesian press agenda set the issues 
forth~ 1992 Indonesian elections Louise Williams 'Asia's axe falls on the free press', Sydney 
Mornmg Herald, 1.1 0.86., pointed out that six years earlier it was precisely because the regional 
Press had already been muzzled that ASEAN political heads were attempting to clamp down on the 
one dissenting voice - the foreign media. 
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hint that there may be an element of colonialism and racism with Indonesian military 
actions in East Timor and West Irian, Siagian silenced many of his local critics 
through cleverly exploiting Australia's legacy of 'post-colonial' guilt over its racist 
and anti-Asian past.118 Similarly, criticism of Indonesian human rights abuses are 
deflected by suggestions that the 'Australian pot' is calling the 'Indonesian kettle' 
black. 119 Evidence suggests that this line of thinking has permeated and tempered 
the critical edge of some of the more seasoned 'Indonesia watchers' in the 
Australian media.120 
These examples highlight one of the problems posed by a Australian-based 
domestic media that is largely ignorant of Asian affairs. Visiting Asian politicians are 
often critical of Australian policy in areas where similar criticisms could be made of 
their policy. Historically, Lee Kuan Yew and Dr Mahathir on the Indochinese refugee 
issue are a case in point. The Australian domestic media sometimes go beyond the 
needs of protocol in offering deference and respect to such visiting dignitaries. Their 
ignorance of those countries usually results in a case of obseqiescence displayed 
by the media and they fail to pick up on obvious inaccuracies in a way that 
sometimes costs the regionally based correspondents some. of their credibility. 
In recent years criticism of the Australian media from regional leaders has been 
sharp. Criticisms scapegoating the Australian media or government by Asian 
leaders are sometimes domestically inspired. Asian responses can be out of all 
118 In a forum on 'The Press and Cultural Sensitivities' in Darwin, Siagian noted that journalists in 
industrialised countries were concerned with individual rights but that in developing countries the 
focus is on collective interests. "In a world where domination over, and interference between, states 
are still painful reality, no country should assume the role of judge over other countries." See Press 
Council News, Vol. 4, No. 3, August 1992, p. 1. 
119 In one public submission responding to the East Timor massacre Siagain went into extensive 
detail on how white Australia has never atoned for Myall Creek and similar massacres of Aboriginals 
in the 19th Century. 
1201t could be argued that Siagian is merely running with the ball thrown to him by 
Australia's own conservative media commentators who rally against preaching to Asia on 
human rights issues because it acts as a restraint on trade. Greg Sheridan's 'Swim with Asian 
tide or we'll be beached', Australian, 8.4.92, p.13, is instructive here. That paper's 
conversion (?) to the Asian viewpoint is demonstrated by Ali Alatas becoming their 'chief 
correspondent' on the Vienna Human Rights Conference. See Ali Alatas' Putting the world 
to rights' Australian, 16.6.93, p. 9. Portugal attacked Indonesia over East Timor two days later 
(18.6.93) at the same forum. 
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proportion to the origin~l offending press report.121 At other times, of course, the 
criticisms made by foreign governments and political leaders are justified. Incidents 
often blow over but not always quickly. For example the Australian media position 
towards Indonesia deteriorated after the 1975 death of Australian journalists. 
Critical articles since have resulted in restricted access for Australian journalists. 
But even when the thaw came in 1989 and journalists with the Senator Evans visit 
were all given visas the wounds had not healed. The return visit by Ali Alitas to 
Australia "did little to heal the deep wounds from the media's viewpoint". The 
Sydney Morning Herald editorial on 8 March 1989 said, "our society values the 
tradition of free and vigorous media even if that risks some ignorant, misinformed 
and sensationalist reporting. But if all reporting was impeccable it would still, at 
times, raise the ire of our neighbours." 122 
(e) The Tensions between Australian Business and Media in their Responses 
to the Asia Challenge. 
A common response from Australian journalists when asked about the failures of 
Australia in Asia is to point the finger at the business community. On returning from 
a week long study tour of Asia in 1992, a producer of a radio documentary series 
on Asia for Perth ABC station 6PR argued that many of the political and business 
leaders he had interviewed in Asia felt the Australian business community often 
arrived in Asia poorly briefed about local business customs and with unrealistic 
expectations. Australian businessmen were often criticised in Asia for their 
sometimes naive approach when they frequently attempted to adopt "roughhouse" 
tactics to deal clinching in Asia only to come unstuck and lose the contract.123 On 
a Dateline programme on Australian-Indonesian business relations, screened 
nationally on SBS-TV in November 1992, it was pointed out that many 
businessmen went from Australia to Asia dressed casually as though they are on a 
121Louise Williams 'Asia's axe falls on the free press', Sydney Morning Herald, 1.10.86., pointed out 
that six years earlier it was precisely because the regional press had already been muzzled that 
ASEAN political heads were attempting to clamp down on the one dissenting voice - the foreign 
media. See also David Flint 'Others must live with our free press', Age, 7.5.87,p.13 and Michael 
Byrnes, 'Australian press is the fall guy in South-East Asia', Financial Review, 22.5.87, p.8 
122AIDAB, 'Australia's Media Treatment of the developing world. How does it rate?' 
International Development Issues, No.6, AGPS, 1989. Introduction, Annemaree O'Keeffe, 
PP.l-2, 
123 Interview by the author with John Moseley, producer Kevin Hume, Drive Time programme, ABC 
Radio 6WF, in November 1992. Moseley was recounting the views of a journalist based in Hong 
Kong who had critically observed the behaviour of visiting Australian business people. 
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holiday, whereas their Asian hosts presented themselves in more formal attire. The 
result was the Australians were not taken seriously in negotiations.124 
Journalists are not alone when one attempts to pin-point what the critics of 
Australian business in Asia have said. A similar criticism was made by a successful 
Australian businessman operating in Hong Kong who pointed out in an interview 
with the Australian newspaper that there are no short cuts. He argued Australians 
can't expect to invest in Asia without recognizing local sensibilities. As the 
Australian reported, "Dr Wynhoven warned local companies against moving into 
Asian markets merely to escape the recession in Australia. For an Australian 
business to be successful in Asia, it had to be in the region for the long term to 
allow time for its managers to understand and blend into the corporate culture of 
the chosen country. n125 
In July 1992 Dateline ran a program on how Asian-based businessmen view 
Australia. The programme interviewed delegates from the Asia 2010 Conference. 
The programme concluded our problem was a mixture of local work practices and 
local attitudes to Asia. It began with an attack on Australian "work practices" where 
the narrator informed the viewing audience that the arrival of most of the delegates 
was delayed by a baggage handlers strike. Comments aired on the programme 
ranged from, Peter Wood a businessman from Hong Kong who described Australia 
as "half in and half out" of Asia, to Jim Maxwell, from Maxwell & Associates 
(Singapore), who posed the question "Is your loyalty and mindset really in the US 
and Europe?" Then Mr Tan Keok Tin from the Federation of Malaysian 
Manufacturers argued, "Unions are too powerful. They can overide government. 
They can make demands for increases in wages without corresponding increases 
in productivity" .126 
Academic. Viberto Selochan saw Australia's poor standing in business terms within 
the region as related to Asian perceptions of the Australian economy. Pushing a 
line similar to the Business Council of Australia Selochan argued, "Southeast Asian 
countries see Australia as a small player in the region ..... with rigid trade and 
industry policies, inefficient manufacturing and service industries and a recalcitrant 
labour force. Major restructuring is, however, being undertaken in the Australian 
124oateline special programme on Northern Territory business links with Asia, November 1992. 
125 Cameron Stewart, '"Media 'threaten' ties with Asia", Weekend Australian 7-8.3.92, p.6. 
126oateline, Thursday 23.7.92. 
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economy. Deregulation and liberalisation are making for a much more competitive 
environment. .. " 127 ' 
A Lateline special entitled "The Asian Connection"128 had academic Bob Fagan 
identifying our sale of unprocessed and semi-processed goods, without value-
added inputs, as the primary cause of our poor performance in the Asian export 
market. But maintaining market share after establishing a foothold in Asia with 
finished products was seen as an increasing worry for Australian business. 
Examples were given of Asian countries, taking advantage of the small scale of 
Australian operators, who either ignored contractual good-will or disregarded 
inadequate Asian patenting laws. The result was Australian-designed innovations 
were duplicated and then re-marketed from Asian countries leaving the Australian 
manufacturer with surplus product that could not be sold and a lost market share. 
Examples ranged from the export of Australian ambulances to Malaysia to concrete 
pumps to Japan. 
From these examples it would appear there is no consensus on Australian business 
in Asia within the media. The broad range of opinions on Australian business in 
Asia was also supported by evidence gathered by Sydney Morning Herald foreign 
affairs writers David Jenkins when he toured the region speaking to "academics, 
policy-makers, businessmen and diplomats". Jenkins argued that Australia was 
held "in higher esteem than some Australians imagine" as many Asian decision-
makers have a "soft spot" for us. Perhaps reflecting the range of people Jenkins 
inteiViewed, it was argued, "the region is worried by our attitude to the work ethic, 
irritated by our tendency to moralise and puzzled by our obsession with guilt and 
self-flagellation". Overall the advice offered came down to things like establishing 
national targets, cashing in on educational strengths, making more use of Asian 
Australians, seeking out Asian opinions and doing more homework on Asia.129 
Not just our business culture and manners but also our political system are 
sometimes seen in Asia as justifiably lacking in propriety. As retired diplomat and 
journalist Malcolm Booker, in his 'world review' column in the Canberra Times in 
March 1992,130 noted, outspoken criticism in Australia against the Thai military 
127 Viberto Selachan, op. sit., p. 5. 
128ABC-TV Lateline, 21 .2.93. 
129 David Jenkins, 'Seven ways to get on with the neighbours', Sydney Morning Herald, 8.5.92. 
130 Malcolm Booker, "Outlook for democracy is dubious", Canberra Times, 31 .3.92. 
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crack-down and corruption was of limited impact, mainly because "Australian 
comment is also regarded as hypocritical. The record of some of our state 
governments is known in Southeast Asia; and it is sometimes pointed out that 
although our 'corporate cowboys' have mostly escaped jail they have done at least 
as much damage to the national interest as their Thai counterparts." 
But as Tiffen pointed out in his June speech to the National Press Club the front 
page of The Australian newspaper on the previous Friday had three leading stories 
centred around government corruption and scandals. Tiffen asked, "Where else in 
the region might we have seen a front page like that..?" He concluded not in Beijing 
, Hanoi or the ASEAN countries. Perhaps in a more restrained way in Tokyo or 
Manila. It was in this light that we should read the Booker article and that of Louise 
Williams who wrote an article for the Herald which included comments from an 
Australian businessman who was surprised to find out that corruption was a way of 
life in Asian business in the form of "gifts".131 
* The Pressure for Greater Censorship of Journalists and Writers. 
As mentioned earlier, the Federal and State Governments' "Push to Asia" has been 
projected primarily as economics - a trade and investment push. This involves 
closer diplomatic ties at government-to-government level and closer collaboration 
between business elites. Australian media criticism of Asian regimes, their business 
propriety, human rights records and administrative styles, all act as impediments to 
the smooth flowing of this diplomacy. In such a climate political pressure is 
inevitably exerted on journalists and editors to report "responsibly". 
Earlier we discussed how the Federal Government responds to pressure from Asia 
to bring journalists into line with calls for "sensitivity" in reporting. The business 
community also has reacted critically. Many feel Australian journalists should be 
more selective when making criticisms of Asian regimes. But they are also critical of 
government diplomatic initiatives over human rights abuses in the Asian region as 
an impediment to unrestrained trade and commerce. Examples of such criticisms 
abound in the Australian press. The business view is often supported by 
conservative political and economic columnists from the media. 
In March 1992 the Weekend Australian ran an article by foreign affairs reporter, 
131 Louise Williams, "Friendship bridge stradles troubled waters', Sydney Morning Herald, 6.5.92, p. 
8. 
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Cameron Stewart, under the heading, "Media 'threaten' ti~s with Asia", 132 where 
or. Jack Wynhoven, the Chief Executive of Connell Wagner, a Melbourne-based 
engineering firm, claimed, "Australia should adopt a more passive approach to 
events in Asia if it wanted to safeguard and develop its business links. with the 
region, (as) judgemental attitudes towards events in Asia could threaten th3 growth 
of Australian business interests in the region". Asserting that the Australian media 
had not been "as constructive as it could be", in its coverage of the Dili massacre 
and the Turtle Beach incident, Wynhoven maintained, "people do things differently 
in Asia. We've got to understand that they have a different culture to ours. It doesn't 
mean their culture is wrong, it is just different". 
Fred Hilmer, one of the authors of the Business Council of Australia's 1992 study of 
Australian-Asian business links, has commented, " .... We have some historic links 
that are a plus but at the same time we do our best to make them a minus. For 
example, through the production of television shows and in the latest Far East 
Economic Review the main mention of Australia is our tremendous record on 
human rights and our ability to lecture the world on them. But when you deal with 
the Koreans, Singaporeans and others from Asia, their agenda is very clearly 
business and the other agendas are kept separate .... "133 
Pressure on journalists to conform with the Federal Government position of 
accepting uncritically the economic dimensions of the 'Push to Asia' agenda has 
emanated from key journalists and foreign editors in Australia who lay claims to 
have greater expertise and insight than their journalistic and diplomatic colleagues. 
Greg Sheridan warned the readers of his column in The Australian that in Kuala 
lumpur there was "a feeling that Australia has far too often lectured Malaysia about 
its internal affairs . . . . . The Malaysians are not alone in feeling that Australia's 
propensity to lecture everyone on everything is offensive ..... They wish that we 
would ju~t shut up for a while."134 Implied within the Sheridan article was the idea 
that if we are going to successfully break into the Asian economic miracle, and of 
course that means Indonesia as well, then we need greater censorship over our 
domestic TV drama series, more stringent control over any feature films set in 
132cameron Stewart, "'Media 'threaten' ties with Asia", Weekend Australian 7-8.3.92, p. 6. 
133Fred Hilmer & Terry Arcus, 'Australian Business in Asia: Climbing the Mountains', The Sydney 
Papers, Winter 1992, p.129. 
134Greg Sheridan's 'Swim with Asian tide or we'll be beached', The Australian, 8.4.92, p.l3. 
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Asia, 135 greater muzzling of environmentalists trying to save the Penan tribe or 
Malaysian rainforests 136 and a reversal of our views on capital punishment. 137 
Similarly with Indonesia, in September 1991, the Sydney Morning Herald foreign 
affairs specialist, David Jenkins, acknowledged Sabam Siagian as "Jakarta•s blunt 
speaking ambassador" and then claimed "we should be grateful that Jakarta has 
sent an Ambassador who is prepared to discuss such matters (as secessionism) 
openly, even if only in the context of explaining why "fragmentation" (i.e. East Timor 
independence) is "not an option."138 Behind this sympathetic recording of the 
views of the Indonesian Ambassador was the belief that human rights abuses in 
East Timor should not interfere with the Australian-Indonesian business exchanges. 
Peter Robinson in the SydneySun-Herald adopted another Siagian-style criticism 
of local journalists with a •clean up your own backyard-firsf theme. On the Lusitania 
Expresso issue Robinson argued, "Our sense of shame is often visible in the media 
- in a crude insensitivity to other people•s feelings or to ordinary commonsense". He 
attacked TV reporters aboard the Lusitania Expresso for reiterating the ship was 
"in danger of being blown out of the water" by "sinister Indonesian frigates that were 
shadowing W. In a condescending tone he added, "(Well of course Indonesian 
ships were shadowing it. After all, it [the Lusitania] had announced its clear 
intention of violating their territorial integrity. In the event, as one might have 
expected, there was no story. It was a shameless beat-up)."139 
Whatever the truth of Robinson•s accusation about TV sensationalism, his use of 
the Lusitania issue to prove there is an anti-Asian strand in our regional journalism 
begged many questions. One was still left wondering which side Robinson would 
135sheridan makes a reference to the ABC Drama series Embassy causing difficulties for 
Australian·businesses in Malaysia. This problem was averted over Turtle Beach , he argues, 
because of the Senator Evans disassociation from the film and the "extremely critical 
reviews and commentary which Turtle Beach aroused within Australia". 
136see Chris Murphy's column in the Sun Herald, 21.6. 92 about the Sydney magistrate 
threatening heavy gaol sentences for peaceful anti-logging protesters facing minor 
obstruction charges. See also Broadside , No. 2, 1 0.6.92,p.1 "Evans told Kelly, Dump the Kit", 
where DFAT now censors environment kits to school kids because they are, amongst other 
things, critical of Malaysia's handling of the Penon issue. 
137Bob Hawke's criticism of the Barlow & Chalmers hangings as "barbaric". 
138David Jenkins, Sydney Morning Herald, 30.9.91. 
139peter Robinson, Sun-Herald, (Sydney)15.3.92, p. 32. 
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have come down on had the protest boat pushed on to Dili and come under. 
Indonesian attack with lose of life? If attacked, would those on board the Lusitania 
in solidarity with the victims of the Dili massacre become somehow responsible for 
their own deaths or injury? According to Robinson's logic, they were guilty. of "crude 
insensitivity" to "other people's feelings" with their lack of "ordinary commonsense". 
Were Robinson's "other people" the Admirals and Generals of the Indonesian 
military? Clearly, it wasn't the East Timorese; for they were crying out for 
international witnesses to the atrocities besetting them presumably would have 
welcomed the Lusitania ? 
Clearly, it's difficult to a mount a case against Indonesian pressure for censorship of 
the Australian press when senior Australian journalists and editors demand the 
same, under the banner of purging our suspected anti-Asian or colonial-remnant 
biases. The yardstick here must surely be which Asia, and more specifically which 
Asians, do we seek to avoid offending, and why?140 In short, business-as-usual 
with Asia means agreeing with, or at best ignoring, the human rights abuses in the 
region. No doubt the relatives of the Dili massacre will feel the Sheridan and 
Robinson prognosis is already in full swing as regards to East Timor.141 
* Television Drama: the Issues of Sovereignty and Media Freedom. 
In the mid 1980s ABC television satirical drama programmes like The Dingo 
Principle threatened Australian agriculture exports to the Middle East countries 
when the various foreign embassies reacted sharply to the depiction of Arabs in a 
number of the television skits. As in many other cases related to foreign affairs 
reporting there was the mistaken assumption by the foreign country that because 
the ABC received government funding it was therefore an arm of government 
policy. Some media commentators in Australia have taken criticisms of ABC drama 
by overs~as governments as an opportunity to make a concerted attack on the 
ABC as a whole and called for the Federal Government to more closely regulate the 
content of the ABC. Behind their arguments about protecting valuable trade 
markets was not so much a desire for diplomatic sensitivity as a secret wish to 
140A point elaborated upon by Alison Broinowski, Regional Secretary to DFAT, in the Foreign 
Correspondents Seminar, State Library, Sydney, May 1992, see Occasional Papers No.4, 
CIJ, U.T.S., Broadway. . 
141Sheridan appears to be in regular supply of departmental leaks. Another example was 
his "Bid for deal on Cambodian immigration", The Weekend Australian, 6-7.4.91, p.6 where 
he sourced "Confidential Dept of Immigration Documents". 
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muzzle a national media outlet that has been long assumed to offer a more critical 
edge on foreign affairs reporting the commercial networks. 
By the end of the 1980s the pattern was repeated. This time it involved Asian 
nations closer to home. Again the pressure mounted in the domestic media for 
government intervention. The increasing sensitivity of the "media damage" issue 
was demonstrated by the Malaysian Government's call for greater Australian 
Government control over our domestic media during the Embassy affair. The fact 
that the most serious complaints centred not on any claims concerning inaccurate 
reporting by news journalists covering Malaysia, but related to two works of fiction a 
television drama series called Embassy and a feature film called Turtle Beach , 
both aimed at an Australia viewing audience, illustrates the complexity of the issue. 
Many people felt the Malaysian Government's protests were hollow. It was claimed 
the protests were designed to fulfil a hidden political agenda that ranged further 
than television drama. They also felt the Evans/Hawke apologies to Malaysia were 
diplomatic conveniences that allowed them to skirt the more difficult aspects of our 
bilateral relations with Malaysia. For example, the Malaysian Government has 
accused the Australian Government of failing to use strong arm tactics to restrain 
protesters against the import of rainforest timber from Malaysia. Although not 
initially directed against the Australian media these diplomatic protests identified the 
media as fanning the conflicts by reporting the issue. 
Interestingly, the imprisonment of two Australians in Malaysia in late 1991 for 
supporting the Penans received only sporadic coverage in the Australian press. 
Whether this was a result of an anti-'greenie' backlash in the Australian media, or 
whether it reflected the success of the Australian government's 'damage control' 
philosophy of seeking a more 'responsible' press attitude to reporting on Malaysia, 
was somewhat uncertain. Significantly, the early release and deportation of the two 
Australians in Sarawak went virtually unreported outside of Radio Australia and 
ABC regional radio in Melbourne. 
If one had fears that the Government was attempting to "manage" Australian media 
coverage on Malaysia then the Turtle Beach saga was seen by some as another 
nail in the coffin of free speech. Clearly certain incidents in Turtle Beach were 
fallacious. Clearly, the producer's defence that it was a "work of fiction" was 
undermined by the script's narrative which presents itself as a political chronology 
of contemporary Malaysian history. Yet many still asked if the media beat ups and 
the Federal government's "disassociation" was going too far. As if to demonstrate 
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hoW far Australia had capitulated the Malaysia's Minister for International Trade, 
oato Seri Rafidah Aziz during her visit to Australia in July 1992 warned us, "unless 
the Australian Government moved quickly to disassociate itself when incidents 
occurred, its silence could be construed as condoning them".142 
Writer and critic Humphrey McQueen ridiculed the suggestion that rulers like 
Mahathir and Aziz do not understand the complexities of an independent media in a 
democratic society. He argued this view in itself was "another form of prejudice". On 
the contrary, he argued, they "understand quite well. Problems arise because they 
oppose the concept of a free press, suppress criticism at home and seek to bully us 
into silence." McQueen opposed the Federal Government's policy of disassociation 
as "opening the way for every thug in power to demand that their version of events 
be taken as the truth." Here he queried how the government would handle 
Tiananmen Square, Burma, Marcos, etc., if it had to respond with this new 
policy.143 
On a related issue, one of the Malaysian Government's demands was that the 
Australian media should write positive things about Malaysia. Journalist and script-
writer Nicholas Jose, questioned the ethics of responding to such a requests of 
sympathetic script-writing. He argued, "How many times has one felt .... this serves 
the interests of those you are talking to .... and identifies writing with propaganda 
and advertising copy?" Jose further suggested that the dilemma here was 
unavoidable when we are dealing with cultural forms that constitute a part of the 
media but lie outside the daily news flow pattern as was the case of the Embassy 
drama series. He argued one seldom wants to write something that is untrue -
unless it's a work of fiction. 
Ironically, fiction may indeed reveal more about a society than contemporary news 
reporting ... Jose believed the contents of a fictional work could be defended as the 
Writer's licence and should not be subject to censorship. This was because 
television drama had an inbuilt format that prevented any writer from always 
reflecting the truth. He instanced the scripting of The Avenue of Eternal Peace, a 




. Humphrey McQueen in the Australian Book Review, December 1991 - January 1992, pp. 42-
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mini-series for Australian television about China, 144 where allowances had to be 
made for discrepancies with the truth as television scripts in his view have "basically 
only ten different plots" and thus cannot be true to history. lnevUably, they must be 
re-written to fit the constraints of the television (mini-series) form.145 
Nevertheless it remains a fact that Australian culture - and this includes film and 
television drama series - are increasingly part of our drive to Asia. As the Garnaut 
Report noted: "Northeast Asian impressions of Australia have been considerably 
informed by the film and television industry, which has dealt on those aspects of 
Australia which appeal to tourists." Naturally the image of Asia depicted in our films 
will also inform Asians of how we view them. Similarly, how Australians view Asia 
will be in part informed by films from Asia. 
A conference called 'Filmlinks' was held in July 1990 attempted to bridge the 
cultural divide between Australian and Asian filmmakers. It discussed the vexed 
issue of the political impact of film on Asia. A report on the conference indicated a 
varied response. However it was clear that Asians were at times offended by how 
they were portrayed in Australian produced films. But more often the problem was 
that Australian films have little impact because they receive so little circulation in the 
region. On the other hand, Asian films in Australia face different barriers related to 
Asian illiteracy in both local film audiences and critics alike.146 Thus the problem of 
circulation, or getting enough of each other's product, may be a source of 
censorship quite independently of any government edict. 
*4. Recurring Themes in the Media's 'Push to Asia' Debate. 
(a) The "Push to Asia" as a Threat to Australian "liberal Values". 
As Peter Boyce international relations academic pointed out in the introduction to 
Diplomacy in the Marketplace: Australia in World Affairs 1981-90 : " ... physical 
security, economic well-being and preservation of political culture, remain the first 
144A television mini-series on the Tiananmen Square incident in 1989. 
145Nicholas Jose at the 'Asia-Australia Media Images' Conference, Canberra, November 27-28th 
1992. 
146see Georgia Wallace-Crabbe, 'Paedophiles & Pisspots: Changing Asian perception of Australia', 
Filmnews, October 1990, pp.5-6. 
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three foreign policy priorities of any sophisticated national govemment".147 There 
is a fear that in the current "Push to Asia" we may be jettisoning a valued political 
culture in our desire to achieve the first two of these three basic objectives. As Mike 
Ticher posed the dilemma, " Are we working on the assumption that democnicy and 
liberalism flow naturally from economic growth, so that co-operation with Asian 
countries will help to make them more like us politically? Such an approach would 
seem to sit oddly with the view that it is us who should be learning from 'Asia' about 
how to run our economy" .148 Indeed, both sides of this equation warrant some 
examination. 
Perceptions of Asia have been dominated for a long time by the defence-first 
orientation. Traditionally the notion of an 'Asian threat' to Australia has underpinned 
all else. It is widely perceived now that the racist underpinnings of our earlier days 
with the White Australia Policy have been eclipsed by more contemporary ideas 
around an accommodation with Asia in the light of that 'Asian threat' failing to 
materialise in a military sense since World War Two. Part of this reconciliation is a 
revised consensus over the Vietnam War. Related aspects are the development of 
Australia as a multicultural society and the decline of the notion of a communist 
threat manifested through aggressive Asian nationalism. 
But even if economics and trade have replaced defence as our primary Asian 
concern, Ticher questions whether "getting closer to" Asia in order to share in its 
development raises the question of how much Australia will have to compromise its 
"liberal democratic values" in order to fit in with the rest of the region. The notion 
that the closer we are to our Asian neighbours, the more they will emulate our 
liberal democratic political model, is one that is popular with politicians, diplomats 
and businessmen alike. Usually it is thrown into the media debate in response to 
challenges as to the morality of business links with some despised military regime. 
From here it is then argued that Australian investment is necessary for economic 
~47P.J. Boyce, Introduction, Diplomacy in the Marketplace, Australia in World Affairs 1981-90, 
oyce & Angel (eds.}, Longman Cheshire, Melbourne, 1992, p. 1. 
148M . 
A · !lcher, 'Into Asia?', introduction to the 'From Yellow Peril to Main Game' supplement, 
ustraltan Left Review, No. 142, August 1992, pp. 26-40 at p. 26. 
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growth which would in turn create the conditions for politicalliberalisation.149 
One line of thinking argues closer contact will reveal some innate superiority of our 
own political system over the authoritarian models of our neighbours. Part of this 
argument is based on the belief that increased trading will spom jndustrial growth 
and create demand for not just economic liberalisation but political liberalisation and 
democratic reform from within rigid regimes. The newly emerging middle class of 
Asia - the "mobile phone" rebels of Bangkok or the Indonesian "middle class" are 
seen as agents for creating such positive reforms. Similarly, in the wake of the 
Tiananmen Square incident, it was argued that lifting trade embargoes against 
China would act as an encouragement to the political liberalisation that was 
temporarily 'still-born' by the events of 1989. Under-pinning this hope was the "end 
of history" argument where in the post-Cold War era communism was seen as in 
perpetual decline and the triumph of liberal democracy has its own inevitable 
momentum to succeed. 
This vision of a causal link between freer or unimpeded trade (push to Asia) and 
political liberalisation inside Asian regimes has many Australian advocates from 
government advisers to media commentators. However, as academic James 
Cotton, a vociferous critic of this viewpoint, has argued, "despite decades of rapid 
growth and conscious efforts to adapt a variety of Western institutions and 
practices, the Asian Newly Industrialising Countries, .... while capitalist, are far from 
liberal democratic. As their economies mature they have adopted democratic 
political forms, but usually without liberal content. "150 Cotton goes on to 
demonstrate how the (Asian) elites perpetuate themselves within the electoral and 
parliamentary systems by maintaining authority structures through Confucian 
values that run counter to the Western democratic tradition. But Cotton does 
concede that in some places the "long-maintained corporatist controls have began 
149 Such as the Dateline programme questioning BHP's investments in Burma (Myanmar) in 
1990. Again in December 1992 when the Liberal Opposition appeared on the ABC 
television news during a protest outside the Burmese Embassy in Canberra and argued the 
ALP did not want to affect trade links by implementing a ban on trade and aid to Burma 
(Myanmar). 
150 James Cotton, 'History Reborn', Australian Left Review, op. cit., pp. 34-35. 
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to unravel" .151 
Cotton's view has been echoed by recent reports in the Australian media about the 
trend against Western style democracy in Asia. The Age's Singapore-based 
regional correspondent, Lindsay Murdoch, called it "East Asia's new allergy".152 
Murdoch noted there was "a growing challenge to pressure for Asian democratic 
reform in the light of Western economic and social crises". He reported Lee Kuan 
Yew receiving a warm reception for the idea of discipline over democracy when 
speaking in the Philippines, a country where "America's robust style of democracy 
has long been cherished". A few days later Lee stated in Tokyo that "with few 
exceptions, democracy has not brought good government to developing countries". 
Murdoch concludes, "Underlying the anti-Western rhetoric is a belief that Asia's own 
brand of soft authoritarianism is superior to the Western model of government, 
which developing nations have, for decades, b~en under pressure to emulate".153 
Murdoch argued that the economic crisis in countries like Australia, the US and the 
UK was being used as a justification for promoting the "Asian way" which implied 
"authoritarianism, underpinning a disciplined, modern, technology-based society." 
This form of state polis was preferred to the "excessive rights of the individual" 
esteemed in the West. Murdoch quoted Dr. Noordin Sopiee, the Director-General of 
Malaysia's Institute of Strategic and International Affairs, where he argued the 
differences between the cultural and value systems of East Asia and Western 
nations were "becoming increasingly evident" and would lead to "greater 
friction" .154 
151 J. Cotton, 'History Reborn, ALR, ibid., at p. 35. But the alternative view can be found in Philip 
Bowring, 'Singapore exhibits little sign of throwing off paternalism', Canberra Times, 21.9.92, p.11. 
An anti-privatisation leaflet, attacking the Kennett programme, from ALP MLC David Henshaw cited 
Singapore (along with Korea and Japan) as three Asian regimes to be emulated economically and 
politically. He put this down to their strong public sectors. (Electoral Newsletter, No. 6, June 1993). 
152 Lindsay Murdoch, 'East Asia's new allergy', Age , 25. 11. 92, p. 13. 
153 Interestingly the regionally-based Far East Economic Review December 10th 1992, gave the 
leader of the Philippines Fidel Ramos equal billing with Lee in its report on the Manila address. 
Ramos was advocating adherence to the Western democratic model. Is this another example of 
Australian journalism. getting the Asian debate out of proportion? 
154 Part of the problem is that "democracy" is a culturally relative term and all regimes 
claim to be democratic in some way. This issue and the changing nature of state power in 
· Asian regimes is dealt with more fully in Kevin Hewison, Richard Robison and Garry Rodan, 
(eds.), Southeast Asia in the 7990s, Authoritarianism, Democracy & Capitalism, Allen & 
Unwin, Sydney 1993, chapters 1&2. · · 
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Andre Malan headed one of his Asia Desk columns in the West Australian, 
'Democracy giant sleeping, not dead'. He argued, "Democracy is taking second 
place to authoritarianism as East Asian economies become more and more 
successful" .155 Malan quoted "World Bank and other policy sources" as arguing 
the success of "authoritarian" regimes meant the "ballot box" vision of development 
may be "flawed". In the same column a week earlier Malan speculated on whether 
the generals in Thailand would allow that country to make the transition to a 
Western style democracy with 'Democracy a tall order for generals'. This article 
quoted from a lecture by a visiting Thai academic to Murdoch University, Chai-anan 
Samudavanija, who linked the generals' interference in politics with their financial 
dealings such as commissions on foreign arms imports to highlight how 'market 
forces' can retard the trend towards democratisation. 
Editor-in-Chief of The Australian, Paul Kelly, took a positive view of the issue from 
the perspective of an improving climate for Australian media access to Asia. He 
argued, "The dynamic change underway in Asia means that it is becoming easier 
for the Australian media to cover the region. Virtually all of the region is undergoing 
liberalisation of one sort or another. Relatively quickly in South Korea and Taiwan. 
Slowly in China. Dramatically in Thailand. This is a major historical change that is 
now underway." However, even Kelly had reservations about the extent to which 
this liberalisation would flow on and create a liberal democratic press in the region, 
while nevertheless arguing it was important for the Australian media not to 
"exaggerate the obstacles". Optimistically he believed that technological change 
would transform the "standards and values" in the region and bring a "sense of 
freedom" that would be "redefined and extended" over the next ten years.156 
The second aspect of how the "push to Asia" was perceived as a threat to 
Australia':'J "liberal values" was the notion that we must an Asian lifestyle or way of 
155A. Malan, 'Democracy giant sleeping, not dead', West Australian, 13.11.92, p.11. See also 
Micheal Casey 'Asia unmoved by tribal claims', West Australian 7.7.92 and the same author 
'Democracy a tall order for generals, West Australian, 6.11.92, p.11. 
156 P. Kelly, op. cit., Backgrounder, p.3. Kelly's view should be compared to his roving foreign editor 
Greg Sheridan who recently discussed these issues with former Indonesian foreign minister Dr 
Mochtar Kusumaatmadja. Mochtar concluded on the subject of current Asian thinking that, "Whereas 
once America was the model of the future ... .In so far as there is any partial model it is Japan." His 
prognosis for Australia was summed up by: "The fact that South-East Asians are a bit more 
authoritarian than we are does not mean there is some ineffable, unbridgeable cultural gap between 
us. ·In many ways they are much like we were in the 1950s. And perhaps in some ways we 
ourselves were better off then." See Greg Sheridan, 'Asia shows there's life outside Westminster', 
Australian, 14.4.93, p.9. 
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living. The greatest fear here was over a change in work culture. An article in the 
perth News , 157 by Mayor of Perth and former Liberal Party Senator, Reg Withers, 
highlighted the way that the "Push to Asia" could generate these fears. In . the 
context of a Western Australian Government-sponsored Inter-Asia conference 
which advocated the expansion of that state's connections with Asia, Withers 
promoted the Tory political line. He argued that Perth as an "Asian" city, in order to 
attract more Asian tourism and investment, should become more like Asia, by 
adopting 24 hour-a-day shop trading in the CBD. This would necessitate employing 
extra closed circuit police monitoring of shopping plazas to make it "safe" for 
shoppers and traders. 
Encapsulated in this article, but not mentioned, were fears of loss of economic 
security by middle and working class Australians alike, as a result of declining 
disposable income levels and cutbacks on traditional leisure time, while the "Push 
to Asia" grows apace. The Withers article neglected to mention fears of small 
shopkeepers over the threats to their livelihood posed by greater competition from 
and loss of market share to the powerful CBD department stores. Nor were the 
fears of civil libertarians over greater regulation of the population through extended 
police surveillance measures to bring about the 'Asian-style' shoppers' paradise 
mentioned. Nor the fear that an "Asian" business style involved giving up penalty 
rates, fixed working hours and job permanency and the Australian concept of 'the 
good weekend'. Asian values in this sense can be seen as undermining the liberal 
values of an Australian middle class.158 
Beyond the concerns over the lack of democratic traditions and fears for economic 
security in the Asia equation was the threat to the ultimate of "liberal values", 
freedom of speech. Humphrey McQueen in his Weekend Australian column greeted 
With derision the failure of a Federal Government-funded body, the Australia-
Indonesia· Institute, to fulfil its charter and assist financially with the translation into 
English of a banned Indonesian text by celebrated writer Pramoedya Anata Toer. 
This reticence implied Indonesia decided how Australian tax-payers had their 
money spent for them. McQueen argued, "While telling Australians not to impose 
liberal democratic values on Indonesia, our government is importing into our cultural 
157 
W Peter Barber, '$300,000 campaign aims to put life back into the city', Perth News, Vol.1 No. 11, 
h ednesday 18th November 1992, pp.1-2. Withers said Asian tourists coming to Perth have "24-
0 our, 7 day-a-week shopping at home ..... we must offer them shopping hours that are better than the 
nes they get at home." (p.2}. 
158 
See later comments on micro-economic reform and the Asia debate, Chapter 4 (b). 
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life the standards of a dictatorship." 
In the same column, McQueen chided the Liberal Opposition when its 
spokesperson on trade returned from Asia to warn us that criticism of human rights 
violations in ASEAN countries would cost us exports. "What has happened to the 
Tory document that market economies would guarantee political liberty?", asked 
McQueen.159 Was Australia giving ground here that it may later regret having lost? 
(b) The 'Giobalisation' of the Economy in the face of Australia becoming the 
'Poor White Trash of Asia': 
* Asia Equals Working Harder For Less? 
The Hawke-Keating Government's deregulation of the financial markets in Australia 
throughout the 1980s was projected as part of an attempt to invigorate the 
Australian economy with a more 'global' and, now in the 1990s, with a more 
'regional' outlook. Thus the domestic debate around tariff protection of the 
manufacturing sector and the labour-intensive TCF industries has become 
thoroughly enmeshed with the debate over the economic 'push to Asia'. In a major 
policy speech in 1989 Foreign Minister Evans argued our "economic success in 
South-East Asia will depend primarily on the strength of the Australian economy, 
and the success of efforts to restructure it into an internationally competitive entity". 
Typical of the press commentary was an editorial in the Adelaide Advertiser which 
commended "Bob Hawke's visionary Asian-Pacific Economic Co-operation 
grouping", but then complained, Hawke was "not pushing restructuring enough" and 
further, was ignoring the "chorus for dramatic change" found in the Gamaut Report 
and the "prognostications" of Industry Minister John Button.160 
These views reflected another developing trend, the reframing of the public debate 
over Australia's lack of international competitiveness as somehow directly linked 
with the growth rates of countries in the Asian region.161 The high-rating Sydney 
radio commentator, Alan Jones, on one programme rattled off the national growth in 
output for some of the 'Asian tigers' like Taiwan, Korea and Singapore (almost 
double figures). He then scoffed at Australia's miserable performance by 
159H.' McQueen, 'Indonesia's noble Solzhenitsyn', The Weekend Australian, 22-23.2.92, p. 32. 
160 Editorial, Adelaide Advertiser, 9.12.89. 
161 The 'economic dry' was best exemplified in Richard Blandy, 'Rational policies made Asian 
nations prosper', Age, 3:2.93, p.13. 
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comparison (0.5%). In the next breath, Jones called for total dismantling of week-
end penalty rates, overtime, holiday loadings, a cut-back on public holidays and a 
demand for Australians to work harder or lift their game. These (employer-initiated) 
demands have been presented to the public as a cure-all panacea for our economic 
woes.162 
Thus disciplining the workforce, the notion of working harder for less, the entire 
'micro-economic reform' agenda, all slide into being the threats and preconditions 
for Australia joining the Asian economic miracle.163 This suggests that resistance 
to Keating's "push to Asia" from working class, trade union and ALP sources may 
increase as more traditional Labor supporters perceive "Asia" as just another 
rhetorical device employed by the captains of industry, politicians and their 
supportive media spokespeople, to implement the policies of the "economic 
rationalists" and further erode the Australian workers' living standards. The "level 
playing field" is often seen by this group as a cause of unemployment and not a 
"long run panacea". 
*Foreign Takeovers and Foreign Investment : The Arnotts Case. 
Yet a greater schism existed between the products of Australian-owned companies 
and transnational corporations. These divisions were reflected in the media 
coverage of industry rationalisation in the context of foreign investment and foreign 
takeovers. As the Arnotts-Campbell debacle showed, these divisions were 
increasingly focused on the issue of access, and potential access, to the "lucrative" 
Asian markets. In the Arnotts case the Australian Government and its FIRB was 
exposed as powerless or unwilling to intervene "in the national interest" in what is 
increasingly a trans-national corporation controlled "marketplace" .164 
The media focus was divided. As Glenda Korporaal commented in an op1mon 
column for the Age entitled, 'Mixed signals on foreign funds', the ABC's Four 
Comers television special on the Arnotts-Campbell battle played on emotional 
patriotism and Arnotts' nostalgic reputation as a national icon. She implied the 
162 Sydney Radio station, 2UE Monday 19.10.92. 
163 Typical here is the letter to the editor, Rajan Natarajan, 'Asia's lesson for us is to drop class 
Warfare', Age, 11.11.92, p.12 where the writer equated Asian economic success with "the absence 
of confrontationist trade unions". · 
164 The P.P.McGuiness column in The Australian was instructive here in pushing the "government 
hands off" line in favour of "marketplace rules". He was not alone as most economic commentators 
fell into line behind him. 
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program failed to highlight how the Federal Government had already watered down 
controls over foreign takeovers to a 'do nothing' philosophy, as evidenced by the 
Bundaberg Sugar case in 1991. Korporaal argued that the Four Comers program 
thus only served to undermine Australia's credibility as a reliable base for foreign 
fund investors at a time when American Pension fund investors were in Australia on 
a feasibility study. Her view was supported by Robin Bromby in her 'Amotts uproar 
waste of breath' article for the Business Australian. Bromby took the view " ... being 
part of the world business economy now means the national ownership of any 
company ...... .is a matter of who is prepared to pay the most. n165 
It should be noted that neither Korporaal nor Bromby, in the respective articles 
mentioned here, examined the implications of the Campbell takeover from within 
the context of Australia's "Push to Asia".166 A separate article by Elizabeth Fry, 
published in the Business Australian after the takeover was complete, noted the 
view of one analyst as, "Campbell have done very little in Asia, despite the fact that 
it has given a good impression of achievement in the region and it has nothing to 
offer Arnotts technologically." The same analyst reflected on the fact that Arnotts 
was poised for major expansion in the Asian marketplace and that this benefit 
would now flow to the US food giant and not to an Australian manufacturer; in short, 
"Arnotts needs Asia and Campbell needs Arnotts ... "167 In a separate article, Bryan 
Frith revealed the politics of the issue by pointing out that Campbells had belated 
got around opposition to its 51% stake in Amotts by claiming this level of equity 
was "now" a pre-condition before any commitment to expand into the Asian market 
would be made.168 
Clearly if the Federal Government was serious about the "Push to Asia" they should 
have acted here. Arnotts was in the Asian market and poised for expansion. Now 
Campbells have been handed on a plate access to all the Arnotts ground work with 
no guarantee that Campbells will in the long run use the Australian plants for its 
Asian expansion. While Frith called for a clarification of disclosure laws involved in 
165Robin Bromby, 'Arnotts uproar waste of breath', Business Australian, 6.-7.2.93, p.31. 
166Gienda Korporaal, 'Mixed signals on foreign funds', Age, 11.11.92, p.19. 
167Eiizabeth Fry, 'Campbell poised to mop up after win', Business Australian, 6-7.2.93, p.31. It 
would take another study to examine the press before these post-mortems. A preliminary study 
indicated the pre-takeover press coverage was more ambivalent on the ethics of Campbell's actions. 
168The implication being that Campbells couid well expand into Asia under the Arnotts brand name 
and then replace supplies with the Campbells' product. See Brian Frith, 'Biscuit bid demonstrates 
need for full disclosure laws', The Business Australian, 6-7.2.93, p.31. 
' ' ' 
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takeovers, the more fundamental issue, on the existing power of the Federal 
Government to intervene and deny Campbells permission to increase its stakes in 
an Australian company, was side-stepped by most media commentators. They 
argued in favour of the precedent of doing nothing. Thus despite enormous public 
interest the media role was determined by a handful of financial and economics 
writers who generally reinforced Canberra's "economic dries" with cries of "letting 
the marketplace rule" and "no government intervention". 
The whole media debate attempted to contain public outrage over the Arnotts sale. 
The "national interest", encapsulated by the protection of an Australian-owned 
company, poised to enter the "Asian market", was buried by the media's portrayal 
of key institutional shareholders (like AMP) as the sole legitimate participants. The 
Federal Government's role as legal regulator was largely ignored and thus its failure 
to act escaped criticism. The whole process was repeated shortly afterwards with 
Conrad Black increasing his share holding in Fairfax. Again the government sat on 
their hands by retreating to a cheap face-saving PR campaign over "Buy Australian 
products". 
*The Export Led Recovery and the Media. 
Increasingly, although not exclusively, the arguments have focused on Asia as both 
a source of export markets and a source of foreign investment. The media 
presentation of the issues are invariably from an 'economic dry' perspective. One 
example of the "macro" argument was The Australian newspaper's 'Run free with 
the Asian tigers to avoid poverty traps', where an article extracted from a book by 
former US President Nixon argued, "the success of the four Asian tigers - Hong 
Kong, Taiwan, Singapore and South Korea - provide the blueprint by which Third 
World nations can transform their economies from poverty to prosperity" based 
upon "free-market institutions", "investment in human capital", small government, 
"creating conditions that attract foreign investment", "making exports the engine of 
economic growth" .169 An example on the "micro" side of economics comes from 
the Asian Business section of the Australian which claimed 'Fruit veg exports 
nobbled' by "high government charges, taxes and competition between suppliers 
trying to service the same market" .170 
169Richard Nixon 'Run free with the Asian tigers to avoid poverty traps.' The Australian, 
8.1.92, p.9. From the book Seize the Moment: America's Challenge in a One Superpower 
World 7992. 
170 The Australian, 17 .11.92, p. 40. 
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In a similar vein, the Sydney Morning Herald ran an opinion piece in September 
1992 by conservative columnist Gerard Henderson, under the heading 'The new 
Aust: a lean, mean trade machine•.171 It began: "Despite all the political rhetoric, 
protectionism in Australia is a lost cause. As Paul Keating said in Tokyo last week, 
the Australia of 'high tariffs on manufacturing' is a thing of the past." Henderson 
encapsulates a lot of the Australian manufacturing industry fears, particularly in the 
TCF trade unions, over the 'push to Asia' leading to further job losses. He 
presented a report card on Keating and the Australian economy which suggested 
things were moving in the right direction with the "10% inflation psychology" broken 
and "reform in industrial relations" in wharfs, transport and telecommunications. 
Henderson is addressing the issues of lower labour costs, falling wages and 
sackings (compulsory redundancies) here but doesn't say as much. By use of the 
word "reform" he was avoiding the issue of the fate of all those made redundant by 
such changes in "work practices". 
But to raise the issue of the casualties of the new industrial changes leaves one 
open to the charge of being what Henderson calls the "cultural pessimists". Top of 
Henderson's list here was the ABC Four Corners programme on unemployment in 
the Adelaide suburb of Elizabeth - where a depressed suburb is depicted as 
apparently reflecting of the decline of the Australian manufacturing industry as a 
major employer of youth.172 Henderson presents the counter-argument: "In spite 
of the recession and resulting high unemployment, there is some good news on the 
manufacturing front. In his address to the 1992 Manufacturing Outlook Conference, 
Dr. Bob Hawkins, director of the Bureau of Industry Economics, pointed out that, 
'Australian manufactured exports .... are now 63% higher than the recorded levels of 
1988-89'." Henderson then quotes some OECD figures to suggest the reduction in 
protectionism has benefitted the local manufacturers. 
Henderson then related these predictions, statistics and assertions about the 
domestic picture back to Keating in Japan: "The Prime Minister's message to 
Japanese business leaders was important. Australia has changed significantly over 
171 Gerard Henderson, 'The new Aust: a lean, mean trade machine' Sydney Morning 
Herald, 29.9.92, p.l3. 
1721n spite of Henderson's criticisms, the programme in fact had a different agenda. The 
main emphasis of the program was on the government's failure to provide adequate 
retraining schemes for people made redundant from the manufacturing industry. The 
programme did not venture as far as advocating a resurgence of tariff protection to save 
. further job erosions in mqnufacturing. 
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the last decade. Unfortunately the degree of this metamorphosis has not been 
understood by many Australians." To illustrate this lack of understanding, 
Henderson points to "cultural whingeism" over the Asian trade debate. He argues 
that resistance to it comes from cultural conservatives who can't break their 
umbilical cord with Europe and rush to argue we have nothing in common with Asia 
culturally.173 
His second category of "whingers" here are the ill-informed, like ABC Radio 
journalist Maxine McKew who interviewed Tokyo-based academic Gregory Clark. 
McKew tentatively suggested the 'whole thrust' of Australia's trade policy has been 
to "promote trade with Asia". Professor Clark, the "cultural pessimist", replied, "What 
thrust are you talking about? I am sitting in Japan (and) I don't feel it very much .... 
It's all talk." Henderson argued that McKew should have challenged Clark here. He 
reached again for his statistics and concluded, "Unfortunately McKew was caught 
short on facts. Total Australian exports as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product 
have increased from 14.7% in 1982-83 to more than 18% by the end of 1991. Much 
of this increase has taken place in the Asian Pacific region which now contains eight 
of Australia's first eleven export markets. Perhaps someone should tell Clark." 
But there are many ways of interpreting statistics, as one left-wing weekly 
newspaper argued, "Media comments on recent ABS figures suggest that 
'Australia's new drive for manufactured exports has kept up its momentum in the 
year to June'. Exports of what the Treasury calls 'elaborately transformed goods' 
(ETMs)- that is, goods which have undergone a variety of stages of transformation 
from the basic raw materials stage - went up by 14% in the last 12 months, or 
quadrupled over the last 10 years. In that time their share of Australia's 
merchandise exports has risen from 12.3% to 18.6%."174 
These figures conform to those offered by Henderson, but the interpretation of what 
it means for Australia in the longer term differ. The article noted, "This trend has 
been seized upon as another sign that is supposed to signal economic recovery for 
173Here Henderson would undoubtedly find common ground with the diplomat Alison 
Broinowski. See her paper at the IDP Conference November 1992 and surrounding press 
comments over the resistance to Asian languages taking higher priority in educational 
institutions. · 
174 Editorial. 'Behind the rise in manufactured exports', The Vanguard, 26.8.92, p.4. 
<Vanguard is a Melbourne-based Marxist weekly newspaper). 
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Australia and an end to the depression ... The rapid decline of Australia's 
manufacturing base in recent years has hardly been a secret. To suggest that this 
is being accompanied by a manufacturing-led recovery doesn't add up, whichever 
way you look at it. Truth lies under the surface of the statistics. The increase in ETM 
exports has been concentrated in chemicals, computers, car engines and some 
pre-fabricated buildings. Add to the ETMs some increase in processed metals." 
"Manufactured exports to Asia now take up some 67% of Australia's total 
manufactured exports. This reveals a trend in which Australia's economy is 
becoming more closely integrated with this part of the world. But Asia is also the 
heartland of the operation of the Japanese multinational corporations. In recent 
years these corporations have invested a great deal to expand their productive 
capacity in countries such as Taiwan, South Korea, Malaysia and the Philippines. In 
fact the current trend is to move off-shore from Japan to overcome a serious over-
production crisis at home and to take advantage of cheap labour and other 
privileges offered by these countries. The region is being subordinated to the 
interests of the biggest Japanese capitalists and their allies in the various countries. 
Australia is also part of this picture." 
It was also noted, "Australia enters the scene mainly as a supplier of raw materials. 
But to a limited extent, Australia also acts as a supplier of certain manufactures 
which are inputs in the production process. The finished goods are made in the 
Asian sweatshops and then exported to Australia and other places. So the rise in 
Australia's manufactured exports is not such a good thing at all. The situation 
highlights the importance of the make-up of exports. This is far more significant 
than the mere percentage increases. As it stands, the current increase has been 
influenced by systematic dismantling of Australia's existing manufacturing base." 
The paper concluded, "It is a characteristic of imperialism, that producing 
commodities from the ground to the finished item in the one place is less and less 
common. The global multinationals arrange production in the way that best suits 
their profits and their strategic interests. Australia is being relegated to carrying out 
only portion of the total process, which is now being divided between a range of 
countries.175 What is needed is positive action to rebuild Australia's manufacturing 
base in an all-round way, so that the whole process can be carried out here. 
175 See David McKenzie, Toyota comes to the party on car plan', Business Age, 17.6.93, p.17-18. 
In formally accepting the Federal Government's car plan Toyota would open a new plant at Altona at 
the expense of 500 jobs from existing plants. Cars would be exported to the Thai market but import 
. credits would have to improve to compensate. 
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Foreign trade could then be carried out on more favourable terms. But of course 
this presupposes that Australia has freed itself from the hold of the foreign 
multinationals and set in place a production system which is geared to serve the 
needs of the people. This is the real issue at the heart of the problem."176 
From this it can be seen that the "Main Game" of Australia's "push to Asia" is seen 
by the mainstream press as based on the premise that Australia is locked into a 
global system that is increasingly interdependent in the production process. 
However articles from the left-wing press such as that quoted above, represent the 
"protectionist" position and maintain that the players are not equal. The mainstream 
press are accused of saying little on the question of Australia's weaker bargaining 
position in relation to our main trading partners, except to argue that this is an 
ingredient of why we must capitulate. The issue of Australian sovereignty and 
greater control of what is produced and consumed in Australia, in the main, seldom 
enters the debate in the mass media. 177 
*The Media and the Asian labour Market. 
Nor does the issue of 'slave labour' in the Asian marketplace enter the Australian 
debate very often. A rare exception was the article in the West Australian in 
October 1992 also noted: " .... The integration of Australia into the Asian region 
places the trade union movement in a difficult moral dilemma. .. ... The wages and 
working conditions of our poorer neighbours are now more than just a distant 
concern against which Australian unions can express their disapproval - they might, 
in fact, determine the fate of the labour movement in Australia. Ironically, it is the 
lure of Asia's cheap labour to Australian-based manufacturing companies which 
looms as a real threat to the Australian living standards unions have fought hard to 
get." 
Admittedly this article was outlining the Union movement's reservations about the 
'push to Asia', but as such it was a rare article within the general media flow. 
Seldom does the Australian media give a breakdown of wealth distribution within 
the developing Asian economies. One is left to assume that the 'Chuppies of China' 
or the 'mobile phone users' of Bangkok are almost a majority of the population? The 
answer to this issue probably lies in reports on labour trends. As the West 
176 Editorial, 'Behind the rise in manufactured exports', The Vanguard, 26.8.92, p.4. 
177 
ASIA DESK Micheal Casey 'Unions face up to foreign free-for-all', West Australian, 2. 10. 92, 
P.ll. 
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Australian noted: "While in Australia unions are responding to calls for greater 
cooperation with management, workers in the developing nations to our north are 
taking on a new found militancy ...... The West's industrial revolution is over. But in 
places like Indonesia and Thailand, Dickens' world of sweatshops and underpaid 
juveniles working 14 hour days is real.. ... .In Indonesia where the minimum wage is 
a dollar a day, workers have no access to independent trade unions and face the 
threat of military intervention if industrial action is deemed to be against the public 
interest."178 
Strikes are on the increase. One last year was in the Nike shoe factory. paying 
below the dollar a day even thought the shoes sell in Australia at $1 00 a pair. 
"Critics of the multinational company ... say the minimum production costs in its 
factories in South East Asia are a symbol of how the West's tastes in fashion are 
satisfied at the expense of the oppressed labourers." This seldom mentioned side 
of the 'Asian miracle' prompted TLC Co-ordinator Rob Lambert to argue: "If we fail 
to develop a borderless solidarity that is properly structured and resourced, the 
conditions of workers everywhere in the region will in the long term, be reduced to 
the slave-like conditions of Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia and the Philippines."179 
The media often reflected existing employer divisions between import and export-
orientated industries but seldom from the employee perspective. This came out 
clearly over the media's treatment of the Northern Territory's "Trade Zone 
Partnership" with Indonesia and China and the use of "guest workers" from China. 
The "partnership with Asia" political rhetoric here was revealed as a thinly disguised 
international division of labour between Australia and Asia. Northern Territory 
Government spokesman Hatton envisaged the "partnership" as one which "linked 
manufacturing operations, with labour-intensive work done in Indonesia and 
elsewhere, with automated and technological work, quality control and packaging 
done in Australia". 180 
While the conditions of Indonesian workers in the "partnership" has not been an 
issue with the media the import of Chinese "guest workers" has been billed as a 
major scandal. The media seized upon and exposed the "slave like" conditions of 
178 On 16.6.93, it was reported widely in the media that Australia had praised Indonesia at the 
Vienna Human Rights Conference. 
179 ASIA DESK Micheal Casey 'Unions face up to foreign free-for-all', West Australian, 
2.10.92, p.ll. 
180 William Tyler, "Territory. Dreaming?" Social Alternatives, January 1993, p. 55. 
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the Chinese guest workers. Similar to the "economic refugees" landing on our 
coastline, these Asian employees were depicted within a racist framework as either 
stealing local jobs or undermining Australian workers living standards. The real 
media focus of blame should have been on the Northern Territory administration, 
the Australian Government and the Australian trade union movement for not 
adequately police the system to ensure minimum standards were observed.181 
(c) The .. Push to Asia .. and Changes in Australian .. Regional Security .. 
Perceptions. 
In a recent book devoted to rethinking Australian security, Jan Pettman argues that 
the 'national interest', indeed the nation-state or 'Australia', are constructs that are 
often taken as given entities, in a way that that belies how such "problematic 
concepts" involve "socially constructed identities" .182 The media reinforce "state-
centric realism, where it is each state for itself or with its allies in a world of 
ungoverned and aggressive competition, with war as the ultimate sanction and 
preparation for war the ultimate security". 183 
She argues states become persons and sub-national ethnic conflicts become 
"subversive" by definition. The concept of "nation" is an "imagined community, 
(with) contested political identities". Different discourses create inclusion and 
exclusion. She argues the state and sovereignty have "internal and external" 
aspects that are often disguised in defence and foreign policy debates to a stage 
where the state, (defender of sovereignty), is often reified as a "single and fixed 
entity". This "homogenisation" of the state in foreign policy/defence debates denies 
access to groups outside the dominant viewpoint and relegates dissenting as 
"treacherous or un-Australian". 
Pettman . argues the "instability" lamented by realists is "often a symptom of 
people's insecurity and resistance in the face of their government's policies and 
actions". Internationally the 'personalisation' of state-to-state relations, (represented 
in the media by the warmth of the Keating-Suharto exchange), is one where the 
Australian government's declared interest in "closer relations with existing 
181 In a case of the pot calling the ket,tle black see Louise Williams, 'Evans moves on Chinese 'slave 
labour' imports', Sydney Morning Herald, 21.6.93, p.3 
182 Jan Pettman,'Nationalldentity and Security', Chapter 2 in Gary Smith & StJohn Kettle 
(eds), Threats Without Enemies Rethinking Australia's Security, Sydney, Pluto, 1992, at p. 53. 
183 J. Pettman, ibid., p. 54. 
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governments in the region" is fulfilled; only to be confronted with the human rights 
dilemma of sub-groups like the East Timorese. Similarly, in the Australian domestic 
arena, notions of "security" are constructed within the media that conform to the 
masculinist Anzac and Western Alliance traditions; with exclusion of Aborigines, 
ethnic minorities, (such as Arabs during the Gulf War), and women.184 
In the context of the "Push to Asia" Pittman notes that "immigration and investment 
policies are connected with, though not necessarily articulated together with, more 
militarised notions of defence of the nation."185 As immigration and investment 
shifts from Europe to Asia the media reinterprets these relationships. In a post-Cold 
War world where "economic security" takes priority Australia's relative power is 
seen as declining and notions of (colonial) dominance are gradually replaced by 
notions of interdependence and collective regional security. 
But even here, as Graeme Cheeseman noted, "Australia's latest regional security 
initiatives, while described in the language of common security, are little more than 
an attempt to reinstitute the kind of collective security measures that operated 
under SEATO and ANZUS."186 Not surprisingly, the media have been all too 
willing to swallow the rhetoric of Senator Evans and the "constructive engagement" 
line in their coverage of the issue. Thus Pittman argues the alternative version of 
"security" must move beyond the "conventional gao-strategic" concerns 187 where 
"states and governments may have more in common with each other than with 
many of 'their' people". She advocates moving beyond "state-centric" models to use 
"non-state actors" in extending the "moral and political community against 
violence". 188 
184 For women "security" is most immediately threatened by male violence and the very 
same mas~ulinist constructions that dominate constructions of the nation-state in Australia. 
See page 62 where Pettman examines how the notion of 'citizenship' relates to arms-
bearing with the implication for women being a "partial shift from private patriarchy to 
public patriarchy - from dependence on a particular male to dependence on the state". 
Then compare this with the media calls to exclude women from the Defence forces as in 
Brig. Phillip J. Greville, 'Ideology the enemy of the military', The Australian, 19.1.93, p.11. 
185J. Pettman, ibid., p. 60. 
186Threats Without Enemies, (Smith & Kettle op. sit.), Chapter 12, Graeme Cheeseman, 'An 
Effective and Affordable Defence for Australia', p. 313. 
187 J. Pettman, op. sit., p.66. 
188A clear example of this process at work was when the Australian Government was 
excluded from the Regional Meeting on Human Rights in Bangkok in early 1993. The 
alternative conference organised by the NGO forum to coincide with the main event gave 
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But the media have largely contained the debate surrounding regional security and 
the "push to Asia" to the interests and definitions imposed by the politicians. 
Security has been redefined largely in terms of either "economic security" or 
"regional defence cooperation". In terms of the latter, the successes, such as the 
Cambodian peace-keeping operation and joint naval exercises receive a high 
media profile, while the negatives, Timor, Bougainville, Burma, go under-exposed. 
As to "economic security", the issue underpins nearly all others but remains 
nebulous. Seldom does the media expose exactly whose "economic security" is 
being protected by regional trading arrangements. 
In answering why there is currently a preoccupation with the economic link between 
Australia and Asia, Viberto Selochan looked to our ambivalence over closer security 
relations with Asia in the post-World War Two, post-independence era. He argued 
that back in the 1970s the relationship was "uncomplicated" as Australia "continued 
to provide aid and support Asian countries' aspirations as long as their economies 
were not competitive". But the 'take off' of industrialisation in these countries soon 
demanded access to Australian markets. Our response was inadequate and 
remained high tariffs and a pre-occupation with security concerns. We continued to 
perceive our Asian partners as a security buffer and as a mesh against the Soviet 
Union. By the end of the 1970s Professor MacMahon Ball was warning in the 
Melbourne Age that it was clear Australia could no longer delay closer economic 
ties with Asian countries lest we become the "poor whites of Asia" .189 
Developing economic links with Asia posed less thorny issues than resolving 
human rights problems and, as Selochan suggests, the last decade has seen more 
than an element of opportunism or pragmatism in contemporary Australian foreign 
affairs thinking on Asia. He noted, "in the 1990s, the Federal government talks of 
the relationship largely in terms of economic co-operation, investment opportunities 
and markets" .190 An economics first approach resolved the defence dilemma of 
not wishing to plunge into immediate closer military ties with Asian nations long 
perceived as either a threat or a buffer. The past could be reconciled by arguing 
the NGO's a high media profile to counter narrowly defined interests of the nation-state 
representatives, or in the case of Australia, observers. 
189 Cited in V. Selochan, op. cit., p. 5. 
190 Viberto Selachan, ibid., p. 5. He instances the Senator Evans talk at Monash University opening 
of the Institute for Contemporary Asian Studies on 19 July 1990 and Bob Hawke's address to the 
University of NSW where he said Australia "needed to meet the challenging standards of the fast 
growing economies .... of Southeast Asia." (See The Australian 21.10.90). 
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closer economic links with these same countries would enhance national security. 
The press accepted the axioms of the Federal Government's new regional security 
agenda. The editorial of the Adelaide Advertiser . on December 9th, 1989,191 
entitled 'Security is more than guns', coincided with a major policy speech by 
Senator Evans. It is a good example of media compliance with the government. The 
Advertiser began with Senator Evans' late 1989 parliamentary statement defining 
Australia's place in the region as "the most significant overview of Australia's 
regional security in four years", where "Australia's place in a changing world 
depends not only on the military; it also depends on business, diplomats, economic 
policies and the Australian people." Implied here was the assumption that the 
Australian people (as a whole) had a real stake in going along with the agenda of 
the military, bureaucratic, political, diplomatic and business elite wherein key 
decision-makers redefined Australia's. future in terms of a somewhat nebulous 
"Push to Asia". 
The Advertiser credited the Evans statement with defusing "some of the silly 
noises about Defence Minister Beazley becoming a militaristic Rambo". The context 
of this aside was the widely reported criticism of Beazley's 'beefing up' our defence 
portfolio in a way that potentially threatened our Northern neighbours and by default 
undermined the economic diplomacy being pushed through the other bureaucratic 
arm of foreign policy - the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade.192 
The origins of this apparent contradiction lay in the 1980s "self-reliance" posture, 
beginning with the new policy guide-lines in June 1984. Related to this new posture 
was the 'Cooksey Review' of defence exports in 1986 which recommended greater 
defence-related exports "for reasons of economies of scale, a more balanced 
workload for industry, export revenue and employment prospects", 193 while The 
Defence-of Australia White Paper in 1987 consolidated the drive for acquisition of 
greater capital equipment. Australian Defence industries subsequently sought to 
expand military production for both local use and the export market. This was at a 
time when some ASEAN countries were pursuing a regional arms race under the 
191 Editorial, 'Security is more than guns', Adelaide Advertiser, December 9th, 1989, p.26. 
192 For an exposition of the contradictions between Defence Dept. strategy and DFAT here vis-a-vis 
Asia, see Gary Smith, 'Two Rhetorics of Region', Ch. 4, pp.111-132 in Graeme Cheeseman & St 
John Kettle, The New Australian Militarism: Undermining Our Future Security, Pluto, Sydney, 1990. 
193 Stewart Woodman, 'Defence and Industry: A Strategic Perspective', Working Paper No.257, 
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euphemism of a balanced forced structure in the post-Cold War age. Australia, it 
seems, wanted a more "secure" region, but also one into which it could off-load 
surplus arms. 
The Advertiser editorial disguised elite ambivalence on this issue by attempting to 
discredit the disarmament lobby as "peaceniks". Extreme media hostility to the 
peace movement over the AIDEX arms exhibition protests in late 1991 where the 
emphasis was on public violence rather than the need for regional disarmament 
showed again how the media sought to let the Federal Government of the hook 
over arms exports. To contain and manage the peace lobby even further, the 
Federal Government had moved to incorporate the Defence portfolio under the 
umbrella of its broader, regionally-orientated "Push to Asia" economic objectives. 
Through privatisation and corporatisation increased defence spending could be 
disguised as part of Australia's manufacturing industry "export drive" to Asia, while 
joint multilateral exercises could be presented as regional "cooperation" thus 
denying the reality that Australia was fueling the regional arms race and promoting 
militarisation of the region. 
This submerging of the defence exports issue under the "Push to Asia" economic 
banner won media support. On this issue, the Advertiser editorial reminded its 
readers, ".... This is particularly relevant to South Australia, with Adelaide's 
concentration on defence technology". Thus defence-related regional trade 
objectives, (some of which were potentially of dubious moral value to Australia's 
international human rights postures in foreign affairs), were increasingly recast by 
the mass media as a parochial domestic necessity involving the preservation of 
local jobs. 194 But the difference from before was that defence exports were seen 
as an imperative of a successful "push to Asia". The other side of the picture, as 
Peter Gronau in the marginal left-wing paper Broadside documented, had been left 
unstated. ·Gronau revealed that defence equipment exports had grown from $9.9 
million in 1985 to $168.9 million in 1991. Most of these exports, many of which had 
been manufactured and exported with tax-payer subsidy, were destined for the 
Asian market. 
This process of exporting arms as commodities was accelerated by Beazley's 
successor, Senator Ray, with his 1991 Force Structure Review. The 'defence 
194 As was reported on ABC-TV News, 17.12.92, the South Australian submarines under 
construction are arguably unsuitable for Australian conditions and have undergone a cost blow-out. 
Was it a case of defining defence needs too closely to export ambitions? 
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exports equals regional trade' strategy developed rapidly despite public opposition 
during the AIDEX Arms Exhibition and the Avalon Air Show in 1991-92. As Gronau 
noted, the increasing "commercialisation" of defence expenditure enabled "foreign 
policy to assist Australian arms exporters increase sales in the region." This 
commercialisation strategy partially removed the Defence Minister from inevitable 
criticisms over the eventual deployment of such weaponry in contentious areas. It 
also reduce debate on arms exports in the media lest such debate jeopardise a 
"push to Asia" that included defence exports as part of an all or nothing 
package.195 
Another aspect of the linkage of the arms trade to regional economic strategies was 
the public advocacy by Defence Department bureaucrats for overseas defence 
intelligence units, (based in the Foreign Affairs & Trade Department), to gather 
economic information useful for "promoting Australian (defence) exports" and to 
help in "identifying and developing (defence) market niches". Here it was argued, 
"Defence exports will never be our most popular or politically attractive (export). 
They are, however, important- they should become more so."196 Thus the linking 
of our defence exports as part of the general framework of our unquestioned 'Asian 
thrust' market diplomacy would appear to have been designed to lessen avenues 
for press criticism. 
The Advertiser editorial also interpreted the Evans speech under review as a 
further implementation of the 1987 Dibb Report, which was said to have 
incorporated "some lessons from the Vietnam war and buried the concept of 
forward defence". Concomitantly, with our reduced dependency on US protection, 
Australia opted for a military that was "self-reliant and regionally co-operative". It 
was one that was not a "regional police officer", but one that still involved 
"protecting our interests abroad", which might mean "defending Australian nationals 
or businesses". But this "military flexibility" was overridden by the need for 
"comprehensive engagement" with Southeast Asia to overcome "mutual ignorance" 
195 The Federal Government has used the 'arms length' strategy a number of times. The OTC (now 
AOTC) went into Cambodia whilst a Western embargo was still in force in 1988-89. More recently, 
AI DAB has been criticised for para-military training of the PNG police force for use against 
highlanders and on Bougainville. On the issue of the sale of air force weaponry to Pakistan the 
Government was not so lucky. India responded critically. It was this criticism which partially 
precipitated the current policy. 
196peter Gronau, two page speci.al on the arms race and Asia, Broadside, May 1992. 
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as was the case with our bilateral relations with lndonesia.197 
The Advertiser then quoted Senator Evans as defining regional security as 
involving Australia's improved understanding and inter-action to overcome the 
"significant image problem we still tend to have (within the region)." Evans was 
advocating a "multidimensional approach which included, according to the 
Advertiser, "non-military cooperation (drugs, AIDS, refugees and so forth), 
diplomacy and cultural exchanges, immigration policies, increased information and 
education", to make us part of the "powerhouse of the 21st century" where local 
businesses were "prodded" towards a "foreign investment culture". 
Thus from the Advertiser standpoint, Australia's future success as part of Asia had 
an external and a domestic component. By his "broadening the understanding of 
what constitutes security" Foreign Minister Evans had thus "reassured" our 
"physical security" and thereby satisfied the external component of national security 
which was after all the "first obligation of any government". However, the domestic 
component or second stage of the Asia strategy had, according to the Advertiser, a 
"long way to go". This involved "restructuring, in government policies, in business 
approaches and in community attitudes" before we can be fully confident of our 
place in the new world. That, and "not mere guns", was the "hard lesson" of the 
Evans statement. 
Clearly, what is implied is that "restructuring" and "micro-economic reform" are both 
positioned here by the Advertiser as essential components of our future "physical 
security" as well as a pre-condition for any real economic recovery. The message is 
that only by meeting such preconditions can we 'ever successfully push or integrate 
ourselves with Asia. What is at stake here is how the media and the Federal 
Government have redefined the political rhetoric of Australian-Asian relations in a 
way that links foreign policy objectives more tightly with domestic economic policy. 
What is implied here is that the Government and media elevation of the "push to 
Asia" strategy as an unassailable and pre-determined truism must inevitably restrict 
the margins of debate on issues such tariffs, foreign investment, defence spending 
197 See chapter on Keating in Indonesia (ch. 5, loc. cit.) for comment on the press failure to pick up 
on the inconsistencies of the Defence Cooperation Agreement reached with Indonesian Minister 
Murdani. 
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and immigration within the domestic media.198 
(d) The Aid, Trade and Human Rights Dilemma. 
Both the Federal Government and the media have grappled with the issue of the 
extent to which Australia's foreign economic relations with Asian countries should 
be predicated upon an a priori guarantee by those trading partners that they 
improve their human rights records either now or in the future. At one end of the 
scale here is the suggestion that Australia has no moral obligation to discuss 
human rights issues in conjunction with trade issues. This view is stated as 
'business is business', political and moral issues should not intrude into the 
marketplace, to link human rights and trade is to do irreparable harm to our bilateral 
relations or we should be seeking out points of unity with foreign governments and 
not niggling over points of division. 
One of the initiators of the Federal Government's 'push to Asia' strategy and author 
of the Garnaut Report, Ross Gamaut, was quoted in the West Australian , in 
November 1992, as calling on "Australia to be Jess insulting and more analytical 
about human rights in Asia". Garnaut was quoted as having made the following 
generalised remarks, "crass, ignorant and inaccurate treatment of human rights was 
likely to be counter-productive to the advancement of human rights..... Careful 
analysis of the real effects of our actions will usually argue for less rather than more 
overt and public pressure, less noise and Jess activism .... The genuine Australian 
interest in the expansion of personal liberty in East Asia and the genuinely 
Australian values of truth and fairness require us to be analytic, to weigh the whole 
context, to be accurate, and to do what is effective."199 
The Garnaut view, echoing the 'softly, softly' approach of the Department of Foreign 
Affairs and Trade, appears apologetic for human rights abuses. The press account 
doesn't identify any specific example of where human rights protests have been 
"inaccurate", or cases where "Jess noise" has achieved positive results. A similar 
line was expressed by former Indonesian Ambassador and DFAT head Dick 
198 Some commentators still relate the ALP deregulation/privatisation strategy as locking Australia in 
to a "global" situation (e.g. Scott Burchell on Ramona Caval! ABC-2RN 18.6.93). However since 
1992 many now argue we are committed to certain domestic policies because of our Asian 
"regional" strategy (e.g. the Henderson article, op. sit.). 
199 A. Malan, 'Democracy giant sleeping, not dead', West Australian, 13.11.92, p.11. 
-. 
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Woolcott in his widely reported speech to the Sydney Institute in May 1992.200 
Woolcott's comments were Jess generalised. He specifically attacked the pro-East 
Timor lobby in Australia and castigated those protesting against human rights 
abuses in East Timor for giving "excessive weight" to the issue, detrimentally 
affecting other "important aspects" of our bilateral relations within Indonesia which 
include "economic and commercial links" and "defence cooperation".201 
At the other end of the scale is the argument that Australia should impose trade 
embargoes, lift existing ones, threaten trade sanctions or merely refrain from 
entering trading agreements (or trade discussions) in the first place when. human 
rights are being violated. Protagonists here argue that human rights do, or should, 
have a superior ranking in foreign policy and international relations wh~re Australia 
is concerned. This is usually backed up by the belief that trade and human rights 
are integrally linked. Further, to ignore the link will harm not just the 'victims' in the 
other country but also Australia's own standing in the international community. Thus 
we cannot be 'a good neighbour' by profiting on the misery of others who are too 
repressed to speak out for themselves.202 
As Mike Ticher argues in the Australian Left Review : " .... Paul Keating has staked 
much on his attempt to redefine Australia's relationship with Asia .... his statements 
on Australia's need to 'come to terms with', or to 'become part of' Asia have opened 
up the debate on how Australia should reconcile its history with its 
geography .... 'Asia' (is) on the mainstream domestic political agenda." This means 
that Australia has no choice but to stay closely in touch with developments inside 
the region. But how to react to those rapid changes is still problematic; as Ticher 
maintains, an aspect of Keating's Asia drive remains "rhetoric" in that it still leaves 
the big questions unresolved. He illustrates this point by noting the uncertainty 
200Richard Woolcott, 'Myths and Realities in our approach to Indonesia', Sydney Institute, 26 May 
1992. See press coverage of this speech Greg Sheridan, 'Indonesia critics peddle propaganda: 
diplomat, Former head of foreign affairs says our biggest neighbour gets a bashing from media', The 
Australian 27.5.92, p.5 and Warren Osmond, 'East Timor fight a 'lost cause', Sydney Morning 
Herald, 27.5.92,p.9 and R. Woolcott, 'Indonesia: our distorted picture, SMH, 27.5.92, 15. 
201see references to Woolcott, op. sit. 
202 A recent articulation of this position was from the organisation 'Aidwatch' whose spokesperson 
Lee Rianne argued Australia's aid policy in the Philippines, through loans to the World Bank, etc. 
Was undermining human rights and preventing economically sustainable development. ABC Radio, 
2BL, 26.5.93. 
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among politicians, diplomats, journalists and the public alike,203 as to whether a 
preoccupation with democracy and human rights issues will be the "greatest 
contribution" Australia can make to Asia or whether it will be trashed as the 
"cultural baggage", a hindrance to our making · successful inroads into the 
region.204 
Another emerging strand of contention was the pleas by the business community 
for the Federal Government to follow the pattern of Japan and other aid delivery 
countries where aid was locked in as an export subsidy to the commercial sector of 
the donor country. This trend, already widely used, has come under increasing 
criticism in the media from the NGO sector because it deprives them of valuable 
funds for emergency and developmental people-to-people aid. The media sown 
much confusion on this issue and tended to side with the commercial donors rather 
than the NGO lobby. 
In 1993 the NGO aid organisations were going on a media offensive against the 
business aid approach of the government's "push to Asia". On ABC radio's PM 
Australian Catholic Relief head Micheal Whiteley said there was "little value in 
Australian business moving to Asia simply to take advantage of low wage rates". 
He instanced the footwear industry and jeans manufacturers in the Philippines who 
had moved their operations to Asia and were "paying people wages that were not 
enough to live on". Referring to prostitution he also condemned Australia's 
"entertainment links" in Thailand and the the Philippines as "very negative". He was 
concerned that business concerns were lobbying in the media for greater 
"developmental import financing facilities" and calling this "aid" when it was 
effectively a business subsidy.205 
(e) The Asian Immigration-Refugee Undercurrents within the Domestic Media. 
*The Cheap labour Scare. 
There is a widely held perception that Australia's 'push to Asia' is really a policy of 
disguised job losses with our 'open door' attitude to imports of which Asian imports 
203Note the admission by Senator Schacht to the media 7.12.92 that Australia has deliberately soft-
pedalled the human rights issue with our Asian neighbours in order to accommodate our bilateral 
interests. · 
204M. Ticher, 'Into Asia?', Australian Left Review, No.T42, August 1992, p. 26. 
205 . ABC Radio, PM, 16.4.93. 
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are the most visible. This policy is viewed as part of the further erosion of Australia's 
sovereignty as we integrate into Japan's regional division of labour, capital and 
markets. Many Australians fear their jobs being displaced by 'cheap Asiqn labour' 
and 'imports'. This fear has kept alive the issue of an 'Asian invasion' in the media. 
For example, in December 1992 the Hinch current affairs television program ran an 
item showing the jobs of SAFCOL workers in South Australia as under threat by the 
import of "sub-standard", "dumped" tuna from Thailand. The following week the 
Melbourne edition of the 7.30 Report covered the release of a government report 
on the seven oil tankers disasters on the Australian coastline. All employed cheap 
Asian crews - from Thailand, Philippines, Sri Lanka and Burma - in sub-standard 
"rustbuckets", on 'flag of convenience' ships, registered in Liberia and the 
Panama.206 
During an SBS-TV Dateline program in October 1992, examining aspects of 
Australia's "push to Asia", the issue of exploitation of imported labour from China 
was raised. The Chinese guest workers were operating in a "free trade zone" in the 
Northern Territory. Dateline showed a number of women working in a garment 
factory. It then gave a break down of their wages to show they were being forced to 
live on $120 a month after paying taxes to both the NT government and the 
Chinese Government at home. The item suggested clearly that they were being 
exploited and that this business co-operation offered up a bad example for future 
co-operation with other countries such as lndonesia.207 
Similarly, Japanese investment in Australia in golf courses, tourist resorts, 
supermarket chains, and more recently, the issue of Japanese tour companies 
insisting that tour guides be provided from Japan even when Japanese-speaking 
Australians are available, are all issues that have received a lot of publicity in the 
media, if not with more than a tinge of xenophobia. The logic of opposing Japanese 
imperialis·m from Australia as a strategy to will benefit the Japanese workforce is 
lost in the media amid the rhetoric of "national interest" where MITI is perceived to 
represent the Japanese interest. So to is the notion of increasing the real wages of 
the exploited Asian workforce as the only means of effectively protecting Australian 
competitiveness. 
206 Hinch, Channel 10 network, 7.12.92 and 7.30 Report, ABC-TV, Melbourne edition, 
17.12.92. 
207 
Dateline Sat 24. 1 0. 92 Program on the growing business links between the Nothern 
Territory and Indonesia. Reporter, Mark Carey. Producer, Lucinda Hambly. 
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*The Immigration-Refugee Scare. 
The immigration issue was fanned by the media in 1991 after key sections over the 
media editorialised that the 'bipartisan' support for current immigration policies had 
led to an osshication of the national debate where both the Government and 
Opposition ran the risk of becoming immune from genuine expressions of public 
opinion. This media call for a renewed national debate spilled over into a series of 
exchanges in the media linking immigration and unemployment in a way that could 
only be described as damaging to national cohesion and unity. Thus the arrival of a 
small number of Chinese and Cambodian boat people between 1989 -1992 
became the centre of yet another media initiated debate over not just our refugee 
policy (whether to repatriate "economic refugees") but the broader issue of whether 
our immigration policy leaned too much in favour of Asian countries. 
The issue of refugees cut right across the Keating 'push to Asia' strategy. Firstly, 
the Hawke four year reprieve for Chinese students was approaching its deadline. 
Secondly, the detaining of Cambodian boat people in what was widely described as 
inhuman conditions in Port Hedland ran counter to the positive image of Australia in 
the Cambodian Peace Keeping mission. Illustrating how this was sending 
contradictory messages to the region was Julie Stephens: "Consider the 
contradictory images of 'Asia' circulating in Australia at the moment. 'Desert Hunt 
for Asians': such was the historically resonant headline used on the Melbourne 
Age's front page on 17 February this year to depict the rescue of 37 Chinese 
nationals who had walked for ten days in some of the country's harshest terrain, 
after their boat was beached on the Northwest coast. Sergeant Micheal Harper of 
Wyndham, active in the rescue operation, .... concluded: 'If they've come all the way 
from China, then they've made Superman look like a sheila. A camel would drop, 
out there.' ... :•208 
Stephens· argued that this 'superhuman' aspect of surv1v1ng in the outback 
environment "underpinned" most media reports. She added: "The inhospitality of 
the outback (and the alienness of the 'Asians') was set against the practical 'G'day 
mate' bush myth response of the Australians who first encounters these Chinese 
women and men wandering into a cattle station the size of a small 'Third World' 
country. While the hospitality of the station owners was portrayed as 
quintessentially 'Australian', it was also understood as necessarily temporary. 
Fortress logic eclipsed any prospect of a positive identification of Australia as a 
208 J. Stephens, p. 16. 
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refuge, and public debate was dominated by calls to properly 'man' the 
outposts. n209 
Clearly the media picture created is that Australia wants an (economic) push to 
Asia, but not an (immigrant) push from Asia, unless it is one that we can regulate 
on our terms, such as with a selective family reunion program, business migration 
or Chinese guest workers in the Northern Territory 'free trade zones'. In referring to 
the Chinese boat people issue, Stephens argued: "Telescoped in this 'invasion' 
episode (Chinese boat people) were all the ambiguities of Australia's official attitude 
towards 'Asia', as well as the fear lodged so tenaciously at the heart of Australia's 
historical relationship with the region."210 
Clearly the current media projection of the Federal Government's new 'hard line 
against 'economic refugees' and the changes in Orderly Departure programs may 
achieve more than its stated objective of 'sending a message to the region' over our 
territorial sovereignty. Because of the evident callousness of the policy, it also 
raises fears of an anti-Asian bias in neighbouring countries. In the sense that the 
message is we want Asian money, but not Asians, the media may be co-operating 
in projecting a Government view that in the long run may undermine the 'economic 
push' towards Asia.211 
In an article in the Asian Studies Review, academic Martin Stuart-Fox argued the 
issue of Asian immigration is "emotive". However he pointed out the proportion of 
Asian immigrants would still take decades to significantly affect Australia's ethnic 
composition. He argued there were substantial benefits in terms of regional links in 
having a "dynamic trading" Chinese community. Only recently has there been 
evidence of this viewpoint reflected in the press.212 Ethnic Chinese have been 
209 J. Stephens, p. 16. 
210J. Stephens, p. 17. 
211 A spokeswoman from the Refugee Council of Australia told this author in an interview in 1992 
that there was clear evidence that a feature article in the Sydney Morning Herald on an alleged 
Chinese 'boat people' racket relied in part from inaccurate information supplied by the Dept. of 
Immigration on the issue. Other examples of journalists running the government line on refugees 
have been documented. However as former Immigration Minister Gerry Hand points out, the 
restrictive political asylum criteria used qy his Department was often (unfairly) criticised by the 
media. 
212 The Melbourne Herald-Sun devoted a whole page to exploring the central role of "Overseas 
Chinese" in Asian business and how they will be central to Australia's expansion into the region in 
Tye Kim Khiat, 'The masters of Asia', Herald-Sun, 25.3.93, p.13. 
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dealt with negatively with a number of television programs interviewing disaffected 
business migration scheme recipients who have returned to Hong Kong because 
they were unable to find employment in Australia.213 On the bright side, perhaps 
reflecting how the media have a 'flavour of the month' in terms of Asia's diverse 
ethnics, there has been the series of feature articles on the Vietnamese refugee 
success stories who are now expanding Australia's business connection with 
Vietnam. 214 
5. Keating's Indonesia Visit (April1992): A Case Study of the Media Response. 
(a) Background: From the Colonial Legacy towards Improving Bilateral 
Relations in the late 1980s. 
Australia's bilateral relations with Indonesia have proven to be a rather sticky issue 
over the past two decades. Principally this involved what Tiffen called the 
extraordinary sensitivity shown by parts of the Indonesian Government to what 
appears in Australian news." 215 While significant sections of the Australian 
population had supported the decolonisation process in Indonesia after World War 
Two, a fear of Indonesia became a real security concern during the Cold War as 
Australia saw dangers in the Non Aligned Movement, Indonesia's incorporation of 
Dutch New Guinea (Irian Jaya), and later, with Sukarnoism and 'guided democracy'. 
The Australian press shared a lot of responsibility for spreading ignorance about 
Indonesian nation building objectives in the post-war decades up to the mid-
1960s.216 
Indonesia, as Australia's largest and most immediate neighbour, has always been 
important to us. After the formation of ASEAN, Indonesia became even more crucial 
to our relations with Asia as a whole. The last two decades have seen the East 
Timor iss~e. and particularly the Australian media coverage of the issue, as the 
major blot on joint relations. The death of six Australian journalists during the 
213 Lateline in mid 1992 devoted a whole programme to one disgruntled family who had returned to 
Hong Kong because the "professional" bread-winner could not find employment in Australia. But 
when not depicted as whingeing, the Hong Kong business migrants were dishonest; other media 
reports commented on how many came to Australia, invested in "non-entrepreneurial" real estate 
and then returned to Hong Kong to await the inevitable 1997 exodus. 
214 The Bulletin, the Business Review Weekly and the Age Weekend Magazine have all run 
features along these lines. 
215Rod Tiffen, speech to National Press Club, June 1992. 
216 A. Tiffen, ibid. 
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invasion of Timor in 1975 ensured that the issue was kept alive within the Australian 
media even after the Fraser Government accepted the formal incorporation of East 
Timor as part of Indonesia. 
The issue came to a head in the early 1980s with the expulsion of the ABC Radio 
Australia correspondent from Jakarta following a Radio Australia short wave report 
concerning famine in East Timor. Indonesia claimed the report was inaccurate. The 
irony was the report came from wire service sources and not the Radio Australia 
Jakarta correspondent.217 Bilateral political relations improved after the Australian 
Prime Minister Hawke appeared on Indonesian television during an official visit in 
July 1985 and declared Australia recognised Indonesian sovereignty over East 
Timor. This process continued into the late 1980s with successive Australian 
Foreign Ministers forging closer ASEAN links, particularly over the Cambodian 
peace process and other aspects of regional security. 
Nevertheless the Australian press relations with Indonesia did not improve The 
restrictive policy on Australian journalists was inflamed by press reports of 
Indonesian corruption and nepotism during the 'Jenkins Affair' and the Robison 
book issue in 1986. Retaliatory action by Indonesia, which included a ban on all 
journalists, provoked a savage response from the Australian media.218 Throughout 
2171n fact, the two news items questioned both came to Radio Australia through agency 
sources and not the ABC's Jakarta desk. One item complained of by Indonesian Defence 
Minister Murdani was a quotation attributed to Indonesian Foreign Minister Mochtar 
conceding the famine conditions in East Timor were approaching those of Biafra. 
Commenting at the time, Sydney Morning Herald foreign editor, Peter Hastings, lamented 
the closure of the ABC Jakarta bureau as "typical overkill". He suggested ominously that the 
Australian media would have to be "patient" and "wait for better days". P.Hastings, 'ABC's 
Closure a Typical Overkill', Sydney Morning Herald, 24.6.80, p.7. 
218 Australian press coverage during the period following could be characterized by both 
its paucitY and hostility towards Indonesia. For example, the usually staid and conservative 
national daily, The Australian, in August 1986 was prepared to begin its World News lead 
with the heading "Jakarta braced for UN mauling on East Timor" with a despatch from 
Robin Osborne reporting that the UN Committee on Decolonisation was to consider East 
Timor in its next session. The accompanying subtitle with this article referred to East Timor as 
Indonesia's "bugbear". 
In September 1986, an editorial in The Weekend Australian, 'Indonesia proves it's no friend', 
argued: "The Indonesian Government's latest insult to this country ought to convince even 
the most easy going Australians that when we are dealing with the regime in Jakarta we 
are dealing with irrational and uncivilised people. Not content with banning Australian 
newspapers from circulating in Indonesia, ... (they) have now refused aircraft from the RAAF 
permission to land in Indonesia." Why? "General Murdani's ... motive was to show the 
displeasure of the publication in Australia of a book by Dr. Richard Robison, a scholar living 
in Perth." 
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the 1980s, Indonesian human rights issues and the East Timor question were never 
far from the surface and created friction between Australian journalists and 
politicians because of real and threatened trade and diplomatic retaliation by 
Indonesia in response to negative Australian press coverage. 
But media criticism of Indonesia was far from a unanimous out-cry. In a 1986 
retrospective article on the 1975 Timor invasion, the foreign affairs editor of the 
Sydney Morning Herald , Peter Hastings, defended the annexation on the grounds 
that it "tidied up the map". This view was not atypical of the thinking of other foreign 
editors and leader writers who gradually fell into line with efforts by the Department 
of Foreign Affairs and Trade as it explored avenues for repairing media initiated 
damage to our bilateral relationship with lndonesia.219 
It was not until late in 1988 that the first full-time Australian correspondent was 
allowed to resume work as a resident inside Indonesia. This concession to the 
Australian media corps reflected an improvements in bilateral relations between 
Australia and Indonesia Governments. As the Federal Government ignored the 
demands of the East Timor lobby and pursued economic objectives such as the 
Timor Gap Treaty and bilateral military and cultural cooperation, media coverage of 
Timor and related human rights issues waxed and waned accordingly. As part of 
the "push to Asia" in the late 1980s and early 1990s co-operation at a government-
to-government level, and later at the level of public service, academia and cultural 
exchange, saw a flourishing of the relationship. Timor was marginalised and 
became the piquant of a few persistent reporters and letter writers. 
(b) 1991: The New Media Highwater Mark over East Timor. 
In 1991 the Portuguese Government proposed sending a delegation of politicians 
and jour~alists to East Timor to investigate claims of continuing human rights 
violations. The proposed visit received a lot of attention in the Australian media for 
three reasons. Earlier visits by the Pope and the US's Indonesian Ambassador had 
been marked by demonstrations in support of East Timorese independence being 
brutally suppressed. Secondly, Portugal had mounted a World Court challenge to 
219peter Hastings, 'East Timor? War of Facts and Figures', Sydney Morning Herald, 20.4.87. 
As David Jenkins recently pointed out, Sydney Morning Herald, 30.11.91, p.21, Hastings 
viewpoint before the invasion was expressed in an article in September 197 4 on the eve of 
Whitlam's visit to Suharto. Hastings wrote "One hopes ... Whitlam is in no rush to have 
Indonesia swallow the place ... a wise policy for both Indonesia and Australia may be to 
persuade the Portuguese to stay on a while .... " 
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the Australia-Indonesia Timor Gap Treaty for oil exploration. Thirdly, the 
Portuguese delegation's visit had been stalled by an Indonesian refusal to allow the 
Portuguese-based, but Australian born journalist, Jill Jolliffe, permission to make 
the tour. 220 
The police repression surrounding the Pope and Ambassador's visits to Timor 
provided precedents for a harsh media reaction in Australia to the civilian 
repression that occurred during the Santa Cruz massacre in November 1991 in Dili 
where civilians were gunned down in mass by army units. However, there were 
qualitative differences in media coverage between the Santa Cruz massacre and 
earlier repression. Quite apart from the severity and large numbers of immediate 
casualties, for the first time since the 1975 invasion, Western news journalists 
successfully smuggled out of East Timor graphic film footage film of the massacre 
of hundreds of unarmed civilians. The injuries sustained by Western journalists and 
observers further authenticated massacre claims. A global television audience 
reacted in shock. Many governments condemned lndonesia.221 Such protests cut 
across the bilateral 'bridge building' carefully fostered by the Australian Government 
with Indonesia, albeit at the expense of the Timorese. 
As before, press condemnation was not a united chorus. While news stories carried 
by the Australian press in the lead up to the proposed Portuguese visit tended to 
accentuate the growing tensions inside Dili, feature articles in the quality press 
tended to follow the Senator Evans/DFAT line of stressing the importance of 
building up solid bilateral relations between Australia and Indonesia as part of the 
"Push to Asia" and as a prelude to then Prime Minister Hawke's proposed visit 
scheduled for early 1993. As such, the bottom line of of these articles was we 
should be sympathetic to Indonesia and her dilemma. 
A good e.xample of this feature article style were the Sydney Morning Herald piece 
by David Jenkins ' Can Indonesia maintain its unity in diversity•.222 As a 
backgrounder to the proposed Portuguese visit, the Jenkins article reflected on a 
possible solution to the Timor crisis - a soft option pursued by Australian ALP and 
220 See Andrew McMillan's book, Death in Dili, 1992, for examples of Australian press coverage of 
these incidents. 
221 For a more detailed analysis of the Australian media coverage see Jefferson Lee, 'Australian 
Media and the Dili Massacre', paper, Asian Studies Association of Australia Conference, UNE, 
Armidale, July 1992. Updated in the forthcoming volume by G.C. Gunn & J. Lee, East Timor Calling. 
222oavid Jenkins, Sydney Morning Herald, 30.9.91. 
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progressive liberals - advocating a form of regional autonomy for East Timor within 
greater Indonesia. Jenkins was sceptical of an Indonesian acceptance because of 
their desire for "national unity". He noted that an earlier granting regional autonomy 
in Aceh had been "whittled away". He concluded the Portuguese influence in 
Europe coupled with the military and diplomatic cleverness of the Fretilin leadership 
presented Indonesia with an "extraordinary difficult dilemma". 
Another article in this mode was written by Hal Hill, Head of the Indonesia project in 
the ANU Research School of Pacific Studies and published in The Australian 223 
entitled 'Indonesia: hopeful trends emerging'. Hill began by arguing that Australia 
was developing stronger ties than ever before with Indonesia. He described our 
relationship over the past 40 years as at times "brittle" with the big hiccups being 
East Timor in 1975 and the 'Jenkins affair' a decade later. But since the late 1980s, 
"new and more hopeful trends emerged". He then outlined a shopping list of 
proposals to improve trade and diplomatic relations between us. The issue of 
human rights in East Timor, or elsewhere in Indonesia, did not rate a mention in the 
Hill synopsis of the important bilateral issues. The Hill article, like that of Jenkins, 
was a good example of the Hawke-Keating Government's success in media 
diplomacy in its quest for improved relations with Asia. 
(c) The Media Response to the Dili Massacre of November 1991 - A Critical or 
Compliant Media? 
East Timor was thus being cast into the mould of an inevitable irritant that had to be 
carefully managed in the interests of the wider agenda. At tne time of the Dili 
massacre political relations between Australia and Indonesia were at their closest 
for some time. The press were keen to point this out to their readership and their 
response to the Dili events was in some ways tempered by this fact. However, to 
give credit where it's due, sections of the Australian media since the Indonesian 
invasion in 1975, have continued to gather evidence, often under extreme duress, 
and have given publicity favourable to the East Timorese independence cause in 
the face of apparent Government and public indifference. 
The immediate response of the Australian media to the November 1991 Dili 
massacre was outrage. But when the dust settled, the key media brokers endorsed 
the bipartisan consensus of the politicians by reiterating an "understanding" of the 
223Hal Hill, The Australian, 24.10.91. Hill is head of the Federal Government funded 
'Indonesia Project' which produces academic assessments of the Indonesian economy. 
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"legitimacy" of lndone~ian claims to East Timor and its annexation and 
incorporation of the former Portuguese colony. By way of example, in July 1992, 
when the Australian Foreign Minister Senator Evans asked the Australian 
ambassador in Jakarta to convey his "deep distress and extreme regret" at Major-
General Mantiri having "no qualms about ordering his troops to shoot at unarmed 
demonstrators again the Sydney Morning Herald ran the item in five short 
paragraphs at the very back of its news section on page eleven.224 
Behind this apparent media-government consensus to 'bury Timor' lay a number of 
other factors. Media proprietors and editors alike were no doubt cautious to avoid a 
repetition of the earlier breakdown of bilateral relations with Indonesia caused by 
harsh Australian press criticisms of Indonesia's Timor policy and the Jenkins affair 
in 1986. Thus key sections of the media, specifically press feature writers and 
academic commentators from the Canberra-based 'Indonesia lobby', cautioned the 
public and politicians against over-hasty reactions to the Dili massacre. Behind this 
writing was a desire to see the 'long-term' picture, where on-going bilateral relations 
with Indonesia, particularly in the area of trade, were perceived as more 
strategically significant than a pre-occupation with interests of human rights of the 
East Timorese. Such a coalescence or consensus between key media and 
government policy makers inevitably raised the issue of press 'management' in 
Australian foreign affairs reporting. 
Worse still was the prominence given to those who belittled genuine outrage in 
conspiratorial terms. Bob Santamaria column in The Weekend Australian 
presented the Lusitania Expresso as a contrived move by Portugal to covert the oil 
in the East Timor Sea. He dismissed Portugal's support for decolonisation and 
buried the human rights issue beneath the cloud of European Common Market 
versus Australian-Indonesian trade rivalry.225 His article was typical of the 
influential· circle of media commentators who narrowly defined Australia's 'national 
interests' in Asia as purely a set of economic objectives. The Timor Gap Treaty 
which has come under challenge in the World Court by Portugal - the sole power 
224 Amanda Meade, 'Massacre chief condemned', Sydney Morning Herald, 9.7.92, p.ll. 
225s. A. Santamaria,'Portraying Indonesia: sense without censure', Weekend Australian, 25-
26.4.92, p.22. The reply to mainstream position .of blaming Portugal for East Timor's 
misfortunes can be found in the column by Humphrey McQueen in the same paper. Me 
Queen argued in a subsequent column that Australia had conceded too much of its own 
sovereignty in the East Timor Gap Treaty in what was a blatant give away of our national 
estate to Indonesia. 
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recognised by the UN as concerned with the decolonisation process in Timor - was 
symptomatic of this narrow definition. 
Pro-Timor activists condemned the Australian government's failure to take a harder 
line on the official Indonesian Government inqui,Y into the Dili massacre. On this 
issue the Australian press were divided.226 They initially offered extensive publicity 
to the protesters cause giving good coverage to the more dramatic events such as 
Indonesian flag burning episodes, the overseas reaction to Dili massacre and the 
placement of symbolic white crosses outside the Indonesian Embassy by picketers. 
However, the media, taken as a whole, eventually appeared to fall in behind 
supporting the Federal Government's soft-pedalling its own criticisms. This was 
· most clearly demonstrated by editorial endorsement of Senator Evans accepting 
the bona fides of the Jakarta inquiry into the massacre.227 
Such pro-Jakarta sentiment was evident when the Financial Review offered space 
for Gavin Williams, a former DFAT Jakarta Embassy staffer turned lobbyist, to 
contextualize the Keating visit to Indonesia. Williams urged Keating to "demonstrate 
that rather than being simply a negative, carping nation we are relevant to 
Indonesia and can be a positive force in Indonesia's drive for economic 
development". Appearing prominently on the eve of the Keating visit the Williams 
article served to agenda-set key sectors of public opinion by providing a press focus 
that argued the trip should be "a commercial catalyst and not a political symbol". In 
short, the message was to forget East Timor.228 
226signifie"~nt articles in defence of the Timorese were by David Lesser and James Dunn in The 
Bulletin in late 1991. Such strident criticism's of the Federal Government may well have been a 
factor in the Australian Consolidated Press management decision to move against the Lyndall Crisp, 
editor of the Bulletin some months after. 
227 See Tracy Woods, Propaganda: Press, Policy and East Timor, Faculty of 
Communication, University of Canberra, Canberra, 1992 for a detailed breakdown of the 
media treatment. 
228G. Williams, "Building on opportunities in Indonesia", Financial Review, 13.4.92,p.l0. 
Williams was described as the "now manager, international trade and investment with Hill 
and Knowlton's Canberra office. The role of this US-based public relations consultancy in 
manipulating news on global conflicts, in particular the Gulf War, was revealed on ABC-
2RN, Background Briefing" We Don't Organize Coups", Tuesday 30.6.92.(repeat). The 
Financial Review published the Williams article in bold. 
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(d) The Keating Visit to Indonesia- April1992: Pushing to' Asia in the Shadow, 
ofDili? 
The Federal Government has largely set the press agenda on what is meant by 
"the push to Asia", its interpretation and the arenas of its potential success. By the 
eve of the Keating visit most of the press fell into line and defined good relations 
between Canberra and Jakarta as a centre-piece of the 'push to Asia' policy.229 
Jakarta was often depicted as a lynch-pin; the key to commercial success with the 
rest of the ASEAN nations and a potential ally inside ASEAN against the Malaysian 
'anti-Australia' position over our APEC membership. 
Canberra's briefing of staff from the foreign news desk of The Australian 
newspaper on the eve of Keating's Indonesia trip suggested a conscious effort by 
the DFAT to more directly 'manage' the key sections of the media in their foreign 
affairs coverage of the sensitive issue of Indonesia. This sensitivity was 
exacerbated by a continuation of the restricted access for Australian journalists, 
politicians and human rights observers to East Timor, and in some cases, Indonesia 
generally, in the wake of the Dili massacre. The on-going feud between Indonesia 
and sections of the Australian media had taken on a renewed focus by early 1992. 
Media speculation and active participation by journalists in the Lusitania Expresso 
protest inflamed the tensions with a war of words emanating from Jakarta. 
The Kerry O'Brien-Sabam Siagian exchange on the ABC-TV program Lateline at 
the start of the Keating visit to Jakarta was perhaps the most potent example of this 
rekindled adversity.230 It occurred the same evening that Keating spoke with 
President Suharto. The Lateline program hooked up to Jakarta with anchorman 
Kerry O'Brien confronting Ambassador Sabam Siagian (who was back in Jakarta for 
the Keating visit). O'Brien complained directly of the restrictions placed on his 
camera crew during their background visit prior to the Keating tour. This complaint 
was in response to Siagian attempting to side-step the broader censorship issue by 
claiming even the ABC had been given access to film in Indonesia. Siagian 
229An example here was Tim Satchell, 'Asian ties save Australia: PM', Adelaide Advertiser, 8.4.92, 
p. 7. 
230 ABC-TV Lateline programme (21 .4.92). Note this program followed directly on from a 
Four Corners special, highly critical of the Indonesian military in East Timor, which 
rescreened vivid film clippings from the Dili massacre. B.A. Santamaria in his weekly column 
in The Weekend Australian (25-26/4/92) was highly critical of the ABC for this juxtaposition. 
He argued it was designed to embarrass the Indonesian Ambassador and undermine the 
Keating agenda of good relations with our neighbours Indonesia, 
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responded to O'Brien's rejoinder by issuing him and the ABC film crew with a fresh 
invitation to re-apply for another visa to lndonesia.231 
But as Stuart Littlemore's Media Watch post mortem on the media coverage of the 
Keating visit screened on Monday 27th April showed, the O'Brien confrontation was 
more the media exception than the rule. The Canberra-based press gallery that 
accompanied Keating to Jakarta showed little of the fire and brimestone of the 
Lateline program. At the outset it was clear the PM's press entourage were not 
Indonesian specialists. Littlemore's analysis concluded the journalists didn't do their 
homework and they failed to ask the difficult questions. Lttlemore unkindly 
concluded the majority of the press contingent in Jakarta were thus little more than 
"junketeers". 
But Littlemore's disdainful remarks perhaps overlooked the extent to which the 
Keating visit had been cleverly stage-managed at both the Canberra and Jakarta 
ends. The media had been conditioned for weeks by the Federal Government 
stressing the importance of the visit to our "Push to Asia" strategy. Keating, we 
were often reminded, was making his inaugural Prime Ministerial overseas visit to 
Jakarta and not to the traditional first ports of call of Europe or America. The fact 
that both the Australian and Indonesian Governments were using the visit to 
enhance their own domestic political capital should have encouraged the media to 
more closely scrutinise the government's motives behind the timing of the tour and 
its relationship with the "Push to Asia". 
The large Australian contingent of predominantly domestic and national affairs 
correspondents who were granted visas to Indonesia inevitably scored the tour as a 
plus for the Federal Government's "Push to Asia" mission. It was reflected in the 
filing of reports. Difficult issues like Timor, West Irian and the PNG border issue 
were skirted in preference to comparative trivial details often garnished from 
government press backgrounders. The beat-ups were over the so-called advantage 
to Australia of Anita Keating's Dutch background, or the spectacle of garrish street 
billboard's showing Keating, Suharto, and their two wives, side-by-side in a picture 
of glowing harmony and the deliberate insertion into Keating's speech of the 
contrived diplomatic faux pas concerning the Australian flag and republican issues. 
231The thrust of the O'Brien cajolery was his implied suggestion that the ongoing issue of 
Australian journalists being denied access to Indonesia over the previous decade was an 
indication that the Indonesian authorities had something to hide. 
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The latter issue, in tum, was viewed as having struck a positive chord with Suharto. 
But if coverage of diplomatic manoeuvres of the tour was found wanting, treatment 
of regional security issues was even more abysmal. MediaWatch criticised 
praiseworthy media coverage over the defence co-operation agreement reached 
with Indonesia. The Keating-Motchar meeting where this was set in train was 
viewed by Media Watch as hypocritical on Australia's part. The Australian press all 
but forgot the Mochtar-Diro bribery scandal where the same Indonesian Defence 
Minister had bribed his disgraced PNG counterpart during an arms sale 
agreement.232 Here, Littlemore stopped short of suggesting any corruption would 
be involved with the new Australian deal, but he was still left pondering the sincerity 
of Keating's media outburst two days later concerning the lack of law and order in 
PNG when viewed in the context of his eagerness to arm with Australian weapons 
and training those responsible for the Dili massacre. Littlemore questioned the 
media's inability to draw out these important connections or even get beyond back-
slapping the politicians all round. 
As part of this post mortem of the Keating tour, Media Watch 233 examined the pre-
Jakarta promotion of the tour in the Australian press. He questioned the credibility 
of The Australian's front page 'scoop' on Monday 20th April, where foreign affairs 
writer Tony Parkinson previewed the Keating Indonesia visit. Given the private 
briefing to Parkinson included comments attributed to "senior government sources", 
Littlemore pondered whether this interview, and subsequent "leaks" to the same 
journalist, was a case of DFAT media management in action, or just a case of 
Murdoch journalists "writing to instructions".234 
Less cynical analysis may argue that the relationship between The Australian's 
foreign affairs staff and the DFAT in this case may well have been a case of normal 
journalisti~ cultivation of reliable sources on government policy. Nevertheless, 
Parkinson's fellow staffer, Greg Sheridan had penned 'Swim with Asian tide or we'll 
be beached', in The Australian, earlier in April. This article read like a DFAT 
'damage control' script. The article was a subtle echo of the DFAT line calling for 
232However Littlemore did praise the Sydney Morning Herald editorial, 22.4.92, which 
referred to SUS 139,000 bribe by Diro to Benny Murdani (who Keating was then meeting and 
offering new arms deals and foreign military aid). 
233 ABC-TV MediaWatch, Monday 27th Aprill992. (episode 105). 
234 The Australian, 20.4.92 , p. 1. 
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the media to drop the human rights agenda in favor of profit-seeking through 
greater trade with Asia. The article no doubt found a willing readership with the 
Indonesian Ambassador and perhaps with his Chinese and Burmese counterparts 
as well.235 
In the same vein of press-government complicity during the Keating-lndonesia' 
exchange, was an Adelaide Advertiser front page lead 'The Giant at our doorstep• 
which accented how Indonesia was "redefining the value of human rights". 
Littlemore castigated this extended article for its total reliance on such anonymous 
sources as "one government advisor", "one legal rights lawyer", "one senior 
government advisor", etc. The implication of the article for Littlemore was twofold. 
Firstly, the journalist was so keen not to disrupt the sensitive Australian-Indonesian 
media relations that all comments from officials had to be anonymously contributed. 
Secondly, it was clearly apparent that the paper was doing little more than 
mimicking the government line. Littlemore contemptuously suggested that such 
papers as the Advertiser appeared to be little more than mouthpieces for the 
Federal Government.236 
Similarly, Littlemore reproached the Sydney Morning Herald feature writer Peter 
Hartcher who wrote on Tuesday 21st under 'The bewitching charm of togetherness' 
of "one Cabinet Minister" who had argued "concern about human rights varies 
inversely with the distance from the abuse". But the shame was reserved for the 
Herald's editorial later in the same edition, 'Keating and Indonesia', which threw up 
the exact same axiom without any attribution to its original source. In a similar vein, 
argued Littlemore, The Australian's Greg Sheridan front-paged the orthodoxy of the 
Indonesian trip with 'PM pursues Asian role for the nation', while the editorialist laid 
down the diplomatic rules with 'Keating's overseas odyssey' where "Mr Keating will 
of course raise Australia's concerns about human tights in East Timor. The 
Indonesians will expect him to do this and will not react adversely." Littlemore 
expressed doubt over how far Keating would pursue the human rights issue and 
235Austra/ian, 8.4.92, p. 13. The relationship between the DFAT and the media would require 
a much broader study than undertaken here. Suffice is to say the Ministry and its 
Department actively intervene with press conferences, press releases and briefings to 
journalists with· the aim of both 'agenda-setting' policy debates and 'damage control' 
exercises to marginalise dissident voices from either the Opposition, the Democrats or the 
lobby groups and protest movements. 
236MediaWatch,27.4.92.; quoting the Adelaide Advertiser, 21 .4.92, p. 1 
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glibly added, "We'll see".237 
In an adjoining Sheridan article, 'Regional role demands mental revolution', where 
Keating was interview, Littlemore was a little kinderto the journalist. He pointed out 
that Sheridan had questioned Keating about the Australia-lndonesian-PNG 
relationship with, " .. The Indonesian view is that we have a responsibility to ensure 
the stability of PNG and that if we don't, it might, - because of the extent of its 
internal problems - have to take a larger role there." To which Littlemore opined, 
"It's a good question, but the answer (from Keating) seemed evasive." 238 
On the 21 st Tuesday April, the second day of Keating's visit, the ABC News noted 
the Keating's speech contained "one short neutral paragraph on East Timor", 
whereas SBS-TV News emphasised President Suharto's speech dwelled at length 
on the human rights issues in a somewhat contrite way. Littlemore argued that not 
only the ABC-TV, but also the print media journalists travelling with Keating, failed 
to pick up on this major concession by Suharto in their reports the next day. Instead 
they ran with the Keating line that East Timor should be played down as it 
presented a barrier to our good diplomatic relations.239 
Hence Littlemore makes a general conclusion that the travelling press gallery were 
not up to scratch during this tour as they failed to raise the difficult questions, nor in 
this case keep up the pressure for answers once they were raised.240 In their 
defence it could be argued the climate of Djakarta is more tropical than Sydney and 
the pressure on the press contingent to conform far greater. By contrast, nearly all 
the press cartoonists in capital dailies back home were lampooning Keating's 
sincerity on East Timor during the Indonesia visit. Littlemore described the 
cartoonists as "markedly tougher than the journalists" travelling with Keating. 
237 See also Dateline 24/4/92 Paul Murphy compere. on the"Dili massacre" issue. The Hinch 
Programme Wed. 22/4/92 also ran a segment under the heading "Dollars Before Dili". 
238 Australian. 21.4.92, p.4 .See MediaWatch. op. sit. Compare with Sunday Age 26.4.92 
on the PNG visit. 
239 Littlemore accuses the local press of "giving away" the foreign aid "bargaining chip" for 
human rights citing: 'No deals on aid and human rights'. editorial • Adelaide Advertiser. 
24.4.92. See also SBS News 24/4/92 who quote Keating saying: "I made my position clear 
where we stand on human rights. It must be balanced with Suharto's contribution to stability 
in the region." 
240 Given the furore over AI DAB funded police training for Bougainville and the highlands that blew 
up in the Australian media towards the end of 1992 it was obvious that the Federal Government was 
signalling its acceptance of a greater role for Australia in PNG security during the Indonesia tour. 
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He described Tanner's cartoon in the Age as "sceptical" the Brisbane Courier 
Mail's suggested Keating couldn't face East Timor, the Advertiser comment was 
"supine", while Moir in the Sydney Morning Herald showed Keating naively 
stumbling upon a whitewashing of a wall by the Indonesian leader - to remove the 
blood of the Dili massacre. A similar theme was taken by Tandberg in the Age 
where Keating was depicted addressing Suharto as the "elder statesman of the 
region". In the next frame he asks his advisor "Did I forget anything?". The reply 
was "Only a few East Timorese who didn't have the chance to grow old".241 
Another aspect of this tour which the media failed to pick up on was how Keating 
had already backed himself into a corner on the issue by allowing the Indonesians 
claim that the Australian press had offended Indonesia over its Dili coverage to go 
unchallenged. Thus the Canberra Times headed 'Tough first day for Keating, 
Suharto calls for respect' where Suharto made "a strong reminder to Australia that 
Indonesia will not tolerate criticism of its affairs". Similarly, the Australian ran 'Hard 
Suharto line to conciliatory Keating. PM heaps praise on Indonesian President', 
where "a firm warning from Suharto that Australia should not interfere in Indonesia's 
affairs" was the order of the day.242 The Financial Review line was "PM wants the 
media to focus Jess on Dili."243 
Littlemore suggested as well that the travelling media entourage were attempting to 
bury not just the Timor issue but also West Papua and the OPM. This drew 
comment on the Wednesday of the Keating visit columnist Peter Robinson in the 
Financial Review ,244 prompting a Littlemore barb over the author's Jack of guts to 
even mention "West Irian" by name, Jest it upset the Indonesians. Littlemore 
plugged Robin Osborne's Secret War in West Papua book and added, "I doubt that 
too many Oournalists) on the junket had heard of it", concluding, "we should all 
24lrandberg, Age Wednesday 24.4.92. 
242 Both quotes from press, Wednesday 22.4.92, see Media Watch 27.4.92. 
243 Financial Review 24.4.92. 
244 Financial Review22.4.92. 
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come down on their failure to ask difficult questions".245 
(e) Aftermath. 
One must conclude that the Keating visit was seen as a success by the Australian 
media. The media projected the relations between the two countries as close and 
harmonious. They commented positively on increasing contact at all levels -
economic, political, cultural, defence co-operation and in terms of improved 
Australian media access. In terms of Keating's domestic popularity the tour was a 
very successful manipulation of the Australian media. Keating emerged 
statesmanlike, as a leader who had repaired a damaged relationship with a vital 
neighbour. The stage-managed controversies over republicanism, the flag and the 
significance of Kokoda served to dampen critics on the Left at home who failed to 
keep Timor, Indonesian human rights or West Papua on the media agenda once 
the anticipated Ruxtonites and Liberal Party reaction, with Union Jack waving and 
pro-Monarchist sentiment stole the local media limelight. Keating knew that such 
responses would prove insignificant or even counter-productive in the final wash up. 
Not so the Labor Left where Keating knew the Timor issue was an Achillees heel. 
The caustic bitterness of Littlemore's Media Watch analysis was symptomatic of the 
disappointment from the Left felt on the issue of Timor. Littlemore's tendency to 
blame the journalists was an underestimating of the brilliance of Keating's minders. 
He was not alone in this regard. In another reflection on the media role, Rod Tiffen's 
post mortem to the National Press Club in June 1992 began by arguing that the 
"adversarial" role of the Australian media, its "priorities and style", were "not widely 
diffused throughout the region". But, he argued, the reputation of the Australian 
press as a "consistently combative and adversarial institution" had taken a beating 
over Keating's visit to Indonesia as the press had failed in its "adversarial" role and 
"scrutiny . of government actions and claims was much less probing". With the 
wisdom of hindsight, Tiffen complained, "When he (Keating) made the claim that 
he was inaugurating a new policy towards Indonesia, nowhere in the media did I 
see an examination of how it resembled or differed from Whitlam's, Fraser's and 
Hawke's policies. No-one asked the Foreign Minister how it differed from his 
245Jn the PNG leg of the tour the media were more concerned about the symbolism of Keating's 
ground-kissing when the party was one wreath short for a memorial ceremony tor the Kokoda 
veterans, an event that Keating claimed was more significant for the Anzac legend than perhaps the 
Gallipoli landing. This neatly tied in the anti-British republicanism with the "Push to Asia", but in so 
doing distracted the media from the realpolitik of PNG/West Papua and regional security in a similar 
way to the flag issue in Jakarta tended to bury the Dili connundrum. 
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existing policies, or what they had been lacking before Mr Keating's inteiVention. 
Rather, news coverage reported the Prime Minister's self-proclaimed policy 
breakthrough at face value. u246 
Part of the explanation for this apparent laxity related to the centrality that 
Indonesian Ambassador Sabam Siagian has assumed within the Australian media 
debate on Indonesia. On both bilateral Indonesian contacts and East Timor policy 
formulations Siagian's influence has been clearly in evidence as a major player. 
Whether this influence was a reflection of Canberra's 'bipartisan• defence policy or a 
mark of the extent to which the press is intrepid with 'affairs Indonesian• remains a 
speculative matter. But clearly, no other Ambassador, even the American one, 
could lay claim to anywhere near the same degree of influence within in the media 
debate over Australia's regional foreign policy.247 
The Santa Cruz massacre media coverage was an example of Siagian influence. 
One example was The Australian front page coverage on 14th October, two days 
after the massacre which featured Siagian's viewpoint.248 When this viewpoint was 
clearly demonstrated to be incorrect - over the extent to which civilian protesters 
were armed and the issue of the number of casualties at Santa Cruz - there was no 
evidence of a retraction or correction within the Australian or elsewhere in the 
press. While Siagian•s inteiVention into the media debate was no different in form 
from any other standard Embassy-based 'denial of atrocity• press release, the 
Ambassador's style of inteiVention is such that the public will read his remarks as 
carrying more weight than other diplomats in similar positions.249 
Another factor in this apparent media acquiescence on Timor during the Keating 
visit was the counter-attack mounted in the aftermath of the tour by respected 
authorities close to the Federal Government. Not to be outdone here was the 
retiring $ecretary to the DFAT and former Ambassador to Indonesia, Richard 
Woolcotf. His speech to the Sydney Institute think tank in early June was reported 
in depth in most quality dailies. It's publication in the Sydney Morning Herald drew 
246Rod Tiffen, National Press Club address, June 1992. 
247 See references in J. Lee 'Australian Media and Dili Massacre', ASAA paper, op.sit. 
248 Australian, 14.11.91, p. 1. 
249 Siagian's authority in this regard is reflected by a number of factors. His personal friendship with 
Foreign Minister Evans, his journalist background, his capacity to engage in debate with a wide 
number of Australians, etc. All of these factors are positive attributes. The problem is that many 
journalists forget his role is essentially to represent the views of a foreign government. 
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a critical response in the letters page, but the same report. went apparently 
unnoticed by readers of The Australian. Woolcott went to great lengths to 
whitewash not just the Indonesians, but also the DFAT complicity in apologizing for 
the aggression in East Timor.250 
One must conclude that most of the media now concurred with the Federal 
Government that the East Timor 'irritant' should be seen as embarrassing not only 
to our relations with Indonesia, but in turn, represented a negative force bearing on 
our status with ASEAN countries generally.251 Encapsulated here is the media's 
acceptance that the "Push to Asia" has higher stakes - stakes that are 
predominantly economic ones. But the competing voice remains. As the former 
Australian Consul to Dili, Mr. James Dunn, argued in The Bulletin, until the issue of 
human rights is presented as universal, transnational and unqualified within the 
Australian media, the media must bear some degree of responsibility for the world's 
shortcomings. 252 
6. Conclusion. 
*The Australian Media and Asia: From Colonial legacy to a new .. Cultural 
Cringe .. ? 
In all quarters of the Australian media, indeed from all areas of Australian society, 
evidence can be found which demonstrates our viewing of our Asian neighbours is 
still tinged in many ways by stereotyped Eurocentrism. An immediate response 
would be to point out that many Asians still view Australian through an equally 
myopic vista of "koalas" and "pisspots". While it is axiomatic that these cultural 
misconceptions are an inevitable by-product of national difference and historical 
development and that greater media interaction at all levels could serve to bridge 
this cultural divide, that is not the focus of this paper. This paper has sought to 
survey the Australian media response to the Federal Government's "push to Asia" 
strategy. It's our media performance, not theirs, which is under scrutiny. 
250 Dick Woolcott speech and letters, Sydney Morning Herald, June 1992 op. sit. 
2511t has been the international reaction to the Dili massacre, from the UN HAC and US Congress 
and the Timorese solidarity movement that has prevented this apparent media consensus in 
Australia from burying the Timorese issue. 
252James Dunn, The Bulletin, November 1991. See also his address to the Centre For 
Independent Journalism seminar on Foreign Correspondents, State Library, May 1992. (CIJ 
Paper, No. 4). 
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Historically, media analyst Rod Tiffen observed, in a 1976 study that focused on 
Indonesia but had broader application, there was a "tendency (of the Australian 
press) to report events without providing the context in which they occur and by 
leaving important questions concerning them unanswered". As one explanation 
here he offered, "Australia's international relations with Indonesia (then over West 
Irian) coloured the Australian press treatment of internal Indonesian affairs."253 
Indeed, in the wake of the Dili massacre coverage, Indonesian authorities have 
attempted paper over their genocidal record in Timor by counter-claims that the 
Australian press "colonial legacy" is still in place. While acknowledging such 
thinking amongst journalists does still exist, and indeed may be inevitable given we 
are still "European" in cultural background, the current use and abuse of the anti-
colonialist argument must come under greater scrutiny to ensure it is not a cover for 
one or other form of "neo-colonialism". 
In a sense, the Australian colonial involvement in Asia under the tutelage of the 
British, Americans, and in our own right in the Pacific, has left its indelible inprint on 
the national psyche. How this inprint has been reworked by the Federal 
Government as part of its "Push to Asia" strategy has been the subject of intense 
media debate. In the current case study, it was clear that Keatings visit to 
Indonesia, took place against a broader domestic debate about the nature of 
Australian society, its national composition and its national identity. The media 
response to the memorial presentation at Kokoda in April and the invitation to the 
Japanese Emperor to visit Australia in September are just two examples; in this 
case, reworking Australia's Anzac legend within the context of the "push to Asia". 
Doug White has argued that Keating's reworking a "sense of history" into our Asian 
war entanglements was part of a broader process where "historical intuition" has 
been built into current policies by his speech writers. But while Keating's new 
nationalism is one that is informed by a "series of solidarities" it is not born out of 
struggle itself. It is a nationalism that in fact asks for no solidarity at all from 
citizenry apart from the token acknowledgement that our past is littered with 
examples of struggle against "monarchies, dictatorships and foreign regimes". It is 
the "minimalist" republic that can appeal to Anglo-Saxons and migrants alike 
because it works up "no hatreds and no exclusions". The new nationalism defines 
national interests as those of the economy.254 
253Rod Tiffen, PHD thesis, Monash University, 1976, Chapter 4, p. 331 and p.321. 
254 Doug White, 'The minimalist nation', Arena Magazine, June-July 1993, pp.4-5. 
100 9/2/93. 
Lee Push to Asia 
Thus the issues of Republicanism, the proposal to change the national flag to take 
on a more Australian quality, the future composition of Australia ethnically, on the 
surface all domestic media issues, have now became interconnected with the 
foreign policy debate over the efficacy of Keating's style of Asian diplomacy. Here, 
Keating ensured the media registered his political briefings over 'our Asian future', 
and the importance of 'Asian trading partners', as an integral part of the debate 
over Australia's changing national identity. The media responded. By way of 
example here was the elevation of Keating's comments on the flag in Jakarta to a 
symbolic gesture of deference to Asia, rather than simply a stage-managed "breach 
of protocol". 
In their interpretion of the meaning of events such as this protocol incident many of 
the conservative commentators in both political and media circles relied on 
antiquated allegiances to the Monarchy, claiming such actions were pure treachery 
of our British heritage. This reflex response meant the conservatives lost the plot 
and were dismissed by the Keating supporters as having trivialised the debate on 
our future role in Asia. Again, with the touching up of the Queen incident, Keating 
himself ensured a similar response. On both occasions he was clearly introducing 
deliberate distractions which disguised inaction over policy issues like East Timor 
and unemployment. More importantly, explaining the negative implications of the 
"Push to Asia" could be conveniently side-stepped amidst claims that the 
Opposition were "out of touch". The public were thereby lulled into a false sense of 
security. They are accepting the "minimalist" Republican programme on the false 
assumption that it will only tinker at the edges of our social fabric. 
However, as White argues, the Keating agenda involves far more fundamental 
changes, that threaten existing arrangements in a different way to those envisaged 
by Opposition party scare-mongering. This is because replacing the monarchy is 
part of the process whereby Australia becomes a more "congenial location for 
investors, entrepreneurs and marketeers orientated to our newly powerful relatives 
to the near north". It necessitates a touch of "Australian despotism", so that we can 
match Singapore, South Korea, Indonesia and Malaysia. White argues that Keating 
"draws on selected aspects of an Australian tradition and avoids others" to bring 
about, "neither an independent Australia, nor a new Britannia, but a new 
Department of Asia." In order to achieve this objective the "decentred" qualities of 
multiculturalism and the "residual desire for local control" of state governments will 
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inevitably be sacrificed.255 
Keating's success in this areas in part reflects the degree of dependence of the 
National Press Gallery and other journalists on the Government-of-the-day for their 
interpretation of the "Push to Asia". Caution should be exercised here as the extent 
to which foreign editors and foreign news feature writers are prone to obtaining the 
'inside story' on pending diplomatic initiatives by reliance on background briefings 
and strategic leaks remains largely unexplored. Nevertheless, political 
bipartisanship in foreign policy has no doubt influenced the media agenda. Some 
argue media foreign policy debates are now a limited and tame exchange by a 
circle of like-minded 'experts'. The voices of marginal lobby groups, whatever the 
strength of their argument are largely excluded from participation in the debate. 
Increasing press ownership concentration in Australia also militates against the 
development of a new breed of critical journalists. 
To a large extent, the mass media in the early 1990s has allowed the Federal 
Government to set the press agenda on what is meant by "the push to Asia", how it 
is interpreted and how successful it has been. The reasons for this involve a variety 
of factors not least of which is the Federal Government constantly stressing how 
the media must be "responsible" and pay due regard to the diplomatic "sensitivities" 
of our neighbours. The Hawke and Keating Governments' success in their media 
diplomacy here reflects both the proximity of Asia to Australia, the immediacy of 
response from those countries and the fact that the government has the whip-hand 
in that it can often choose to simply ignore the media but not our neighbours 
response. 
Events such as the Canberra briefing for The Australian and Adelaide Advertiser 
newspapers on the eve of Keating's Indonesia trip suggest a growing influence and 
'management' by the government in foreign affairs reporting. This suspicion is 
supported by statements from the government bureaucracy. As Sue Boyd from the 
DFAT recently pointed out, "(The DFAT) provide regular background briefings to 
the Canberra-based Parliamentary press .... and maintain regular personal and 
telephone contact with editors, foreign editors, feature writers and leader writers in 
the capital cities."256 
One of the ironies of the current situation is that, unlike Australia, press freedom in 
255o. White, Arena, ibid., pp.4-5. 
256 Sue Boyd, 'The Media and foreign policy', Sydney Papers, Autumn 1992, p.l5. 
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the Asian-Pacific region is expanding in some regards as journalists and media 
institutions gain greater access to technological change and develop support 
networks and stronger trade unions and associations. In the past few years media 
organisations have sprung up to represent the rights of indigenous journalists. 
Economic growth in these countries has also allowed an expanding capital base to 
develop opening up the potential for a more independent local media in many 
countries. Ironically these democratic trends are the ones least exposed in the 
Australian media. By contrast, the more sycophantic journalists and editors from 
the Asian region's media are more likely to be offered a wide and uncritical 
exposure by the Australian media. 
In this regard, a mark of our "enmeshing" with Asia was the closing of the 
communication gap with regional leaders. Regional leaders in defence, politics, 
media and business and diplomacy have become regular visitors to Australia. They 
were feted by the domestic media for a reaction as to how Australia, or the 
Australian media, were perceived in the respective countries. There was a certain 
uniformity in the Asian leaders response here. They invariably argued the 
Australian media and politicians remain too critical and misinformed. In response to 
such criticisms, the domestic press and Australian-based foreign affairs reporters 
have been too "diplomatic" to tackle such criticisms with any real rigour. Some 
concluded cynically from this reticience that the long-regarded timidity of the 
regional press was catching on fast in Australia. Increasing monopolisation of 
media ownership in Australia and the downturn in job security has no doubt was 
another factor in the creation of a stifled atmosphere for both foreign and domestic 
reporting. 
This growing lack of a critical media culture has meant that the media in the main 
have failed to expose how much of the Federal Government's "push to Asia" 
strategy ·i's based on hope and supposition. As Kenneth Davidson, one of the few 
persistent critics has pointed out in the Age , "Professor Garnaut's report . . .. is 
based on the free trade ideal in which Australia's resource-rich economy is the 
ideal complement to Asia's rapidly developing industrial economies." Davidson 
argues the argument that the Asian market will incorporate Australia within its 
projected growth in the coming decades and, if we position ourselves correctly by 
changing our business orientation, then Asia will, as a matter of course, protect our 
existing standards of living from the negative impacts of the emerging European 
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and American trade blocs, is indeed largely supposition.257 
The missing dimension in this strategy is a failure to take cognizance of the 
nomadic nature of global capitalism. Expansion of capital into new markets is 
based on the sole desire to maximise profits and to this extent another dictum "the 
world doesn't owe Australia any guarantees as to our standard of living" is only too 
true. Admittedly, Keating is only too aware that his promised "Republicanism" does 
not promise any economic miracles. His Employment Minister, Ralph Willis 
' 
recently conceded the downside of the "push to Asia" through his "restucturing the 
workforce into unemployment" statement which implied that unless Australian 
labour costs are reduced to those of the Asian marketplace then the local 
manufacturing sector will continue to decline. 
As to the replacement industries in. the post-industrial society - information 
technologies - there is little evidence that Australia can compete here at all. The 
region power (Japan) is only to willing to off-load some of its previous 
manufacturing dominance onto to its neighbouring countries (including Australia) to 
avoid the implications of a high valued yen and more expensive domestic labour 
market. But this does not mean Japan will off load its lead in R&D or the micro-chip 
revolution onto Australia. We can only expect to see the end product of this 
revolution - a more automated factory and less jobs. It's no surprise the "sunrise 
industry" line about new "high-Tech" industries has taken a back seat in the current 
glamour over what we can sell to Asia. However, Keating's June 1993 trip to Korea 
stressed we were now desiring to sell"intelligence and not just minerals" to Asia. 
But rhetoric aside, the media debate has fallen back onto petty quibbles over how 
much longer we can sell our education industry to Asia and whether learning 
Japanese, Mandarin or Indonesian from high school level will enhance our 
marketability in Asia in the future in business and tourism. What's unstated is that 
language skills and cultural familiarity in themselves wont overcome the central role 
of Japanese imperialism in the region. The drive to profit maximisation and not 
cultural familiarity will remain the primary determinant of investment patterns. 
Similarly, although Australia currently stresses the edge it has in education 
standards, and markets this expertise as part of the "Push to Asia", Asia is rapidly 
bridging · the gap as foreign capital that we have relied upon for decades is 
relocated. 
257K. Davidson, 'Heroes and ~retics', Age, 17.6.93, p.13. 
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Coupled with this is the fact that there is no national panacea in. our selected 
involvement in the high wage end of the expanding Asian labour market, 
particularly with the specialised skills needed to run the new information technology 
of the future. Such highly paid Australians will shift countries according to the needs 
of capital. The "brain drain" in Australia is partially a reflection of this trend. It is 
cheaper for Japan and other countries to poach the brightest of our scientists and 
incorporate them into their own economy, than to invest heavily in Australian R&D. 
Thus labor force mobility for the elite sections of the Australian workforce needed in 
Asia it is argued will do little to improve the lot of the average Australian workers 
who has lost their jobs in "the push to Asia". Skilled workers moving off-shore are 
following new jobs created by Australian business as they shift their own operations 
off-shore to take advantage of lower labour costs, proximity to consumer market 
and government incentives to relocate.258 
Even Australia's good fortune to have accepted as recent immigrants a cross-
section of the entrepreneurial mercantile class from Hong Kong and Vietnam will 
not in itself guarantee us a larger share of the future Chinese and Vietnamese 
markets. This ethnically-based rentier class is not known for their indigeneous 
patriotism. They may well benefit in the export-import game of shifting capital and 
consumer goods and services throughout Asia. But whatever spin-offs occur this in 
itself is no real source of economic security for Australia. To assume their ability to 
network with "Overseas Chinese" or "Overseas Vietnamese" will ensure an Asian 
market share for Australia ignores their role as merely facilitators for the movement 
of overseas-controlled capital. 
Among the feature and foreign news writers of the Australian press were few who 
have pointed to these apparent shortfalls in the "Push to Asia" strategy. The most 
prominent sceptic was Ken Davidson in the Age. He argued that " .... The Keating 
Government's hope that Australia's economic salvation lies in unilaterally opening 
our markets to the world then being dragged along by the economic successes in 
Asia, with Japan replacing the US as our great and powerful friend is no less 
infantile than the policies of the Menzies Government in the 1960s which wanted to 
tie the US down permanently in Asia as a protector for Australia by encouraging US 
involvement in Vietnam". He added, "The real source of Australia's problems is a 
culture of dependence. Mr Keating is following the Menzies tradition, despite the 
guff about getting rid of the monarchy, which serves to hide the fatuity of aspiring to 
258 See Bruce Jones, 'Benefits in offshore development', Sun Herald, 20.6.93, p.37. 
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independence by becoming Asian, and seeing no contradiction in the congruent 
policy of selling prime Australian assets to foreigners." 259 
Part of any understanding of the media's role in the "Push to Asia" must begin with 
an analysis of how existing media ownership in Australia places commercial 
interests as paramount to their affairs. In this sense human rights issues emanating 
from our trading partners will often be perceived as restraints on trade where media 
exposure of ill deeds acts as a deterrent to either country's investment policies. 
Media depiction of regional events is also constrained by the necessity to report 
within a given political framework that is predicated on the necessity of upholding a 
US-dominated, post-World War Two global order. Australia's role in this order is 
one of junior partner (to the dominant US imperialism) in both the strategic and 
economic sense. In a political sense we are ideological bedfellows.260 
But even when the foreign editor for the Murdoch-owned Australian suggests our 
expanded regional role in the Asian-Pacific region must take into account the 
expanded role of Japanese investment, this does not involve a real 
contradiction.261 It merely tells us that a former Australian, who became an 
American media baron, now sees the Asian market as the most lucrative area for 
expansion. The media will inevitably reflect this nomadic nature of global capitalism. 
As the Australian media itself succumbs to increasing foreign ownership, it will feel 
even less need to view issues within the prism of "national interests". Foreign news 
will increasingly be filtered in a way that militates against than disclosure of any 
unsavoury aspect of the "Push to Asia". As the state becomes more responsive to 
the needs of international capital, a foreign dominated and controlled media must 
inevitably reflect similar "global" marketplace concerns. As was pointed out earlier 
when the media now discuss defence-related questions the missing dimension in 
the debate about "national" and "regional" security is often the unexplored territory 
259Kenneth Davidson, 'Wish as hard as we like, we cannot become part of Asia', Age, 
29.4.93, p.15. 
260stated another way, we are a junior partner in the American dominated Western alliance. The 
significance of this fact is often overlooked. At a discussion on Portugal's challenge in the World 
Court to the East Timor Gap Treaty, at the Uni of NSW in May 1992, a legal representative of the 
DFAT argued the Portuguese position was contrary to Australia's "national interests". I argued that 
the list of companies granted exploration leases read like a Who's Who of US and Japanese oil 
companies and that whether our "national interest" coincides with the interests of foreign-owned 
corporations is a moot point. 
261 Greg Sheridan, The Australian, Sheridan argued that our future belonged to Asia. He 
foreshadowed it may soon b.e an Asia dominated by the Rising Sun rather than Uncle Sarn. 
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of just whose security ,we concerned about.262 
The phasing in of this agenda has often seen the media scapegoated by Australian 
businesses as they attempt to secure themselves in the Asian marketplace. The 
media is presented as an obstacle to progress in cementing business deals. In this 
context the journalists become divided between those whose beat it is to pursue 
exposure politics, or 'hard-edged' news coverage, versus those who see their 
function promotion or public relations for the corporate and government sectors. As 
a journalist from the financial sector of the West Australian put it to me "There is a 
general feeling in the region that Australian journalists should stop moralising about 
human rights and just shut up for a while and concentrate on solving the Aboriginal 
problem. n263 
The counter view is that business bring themselves undone and seek to blame the 
media for their failure in Asia. This trend is sometimes extended to Government's 
and Foreign Minister's who implement policies that beg for criticism, but can't 
handle the flack when it does appear. An example of such a view was expressed at 
a Canberra Conference on cross-cultural exchange with Asia. Here it was argued 
our media's silence on the abuse of human rights in Fiji during Colonel Rambuka's 
tour of Australia in late 1992 was "disguised racism". The speaker in question 
argued that it did not mean we now respect the Fijians. It only meant we condoned 
the racism against Indian Fijians. He concluded from this that "Rambuka's lot" 
would hold us more in contempt than if we stood up to them and complained.264 
Throughout the "Push to Asia" debate in Australia the voices of the poor, the 
dispossessed, the war ravaged and the landless of the Asian region have never 
been articulated. But Government and media "appeasement" of human rights 
violations throughout the region merely reflect a similar insidious process occurring 
domestiqally. There has been no clear articulation of a voice from the Aboriginal 
262The Chomsky view, outlined in his recent documentary film 'Manufacture of Consent', screened 
at Sydney Film Festival , June 1992, holds true if we consider how the media, including the ABC, 
have adopted a position of closure over the media's dissenting voices on East Timor and 
Bougainville. See Max Watts and Norm Dixon,'The ABC's Bougainville Deception', Green Left 
Weekly, 23.6.93, p.2. 
263Journalist "x" at the Inter Asia Conference Monday 9.11.92. He did not wished to be named as 
he described his job as being one where "We're just public servants you know .... we can't make 
public statements unless authorised". 
264 Speaker Uni of Canberra Conference, Asia-Australian Media Images, November 27-28th 1992, 
Canberra. 
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community, the women's movement, or even that section of the refugee and 
immigrant groups who have been drawn from the Asian region to Australia. Until 
the government's much touted phrase of "people-to-people exchange" is 
implemented across the region, and people are allowed to move freely across all 
borders, whether by access to new satellite technologies, access to media 
columns, or access to unimpeded travel, then the government's cultural exhanges 
ambitions are of limited value. The current emphasis on business-to-business and 
government-to-government exchanges can only result in Australia's "enmeshing" 
with the region in a tokenistic and opportunistic way. 
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